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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
  
 This dissertation is developed at the intersection between organizational theory and strategy 
research (Oliver, 1991, 1997; Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Durand, 2012). The theoretical 
framework is mainly rooted in new institutional theory in sociology (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and hypotheses and findings have important implications for 
companies. Literature on institutional theory in sociology—hereafter institutional theory—has 
mainly focused on social evaluations, which are attributes that social actors give to organizations . 
They include the three main constructs of status, reputation, and legitimacy (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008; Bitektine, 2011), as well as some recent “spin-offs” such as celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 
2012), stigma (Devers et al., 2012), and public disapproval (Vergne, 2012). Social evaluations 
influence the way social actors behave towards the company (Bitektine, 2011). Given that some 
actors represent important stakeholders, social evaluations are critical for companies; they affect 
firms’ survival and performance, either directly or indirectly, through the influence of consumers 
(Deephouse and Heugens, 2009), governments (Bonardi and Keim, 2005), the media (Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003), critics (Durand et al., 2007), etc.  
 Therefore, while institutional literature has long examined the sociological processes that 
underlie social evaluations (e.g., Merton, 1968 for status; Weber, 1978 for legitimacy), in the last two 
decades, strategy literature has increasingly focused on understanding the strategic implications that 
social evaluations have for companies (Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Deephouse, 1996, 1999; 
Zuckerman, 1999; Cattani et al., 2008; Durand, Rao, and Monin, 2007; Durand, 2012). As a result, 
literature on social evaluations has flourished in recent years, yielding many published works that 
clarify, challenge and advance our current knowledge of status, reputation, legitimacy, and related 
constructs (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Bitektine, 2012; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 
2008; Rao, Durand, and Monin, 2005; Graffin et al., 2013).
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 A second reason for this recent growth is the fact that there are still many aspects on social 
evaluations that are puzzling or unclear. Among others, one of the main shortcomings is the 
tendency to focus on a “single audience” (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Pontikes, 2012); most research 
in the field tends to focus on the specific candidate-audience dyad (Zuckerman, 1999), analyzing 
how candidates’ actions affect the evaluation of a single audience (Cattani et al., 2008), usually the 
most relevant one in a given setting. This overlooks the fact that in most real contexts, there are 
multiple audiences (Hannan et al., 2007) whose evaluations do not necessarily overlap (Lamin and 
Zaheer, 2012). This dissertation advances previous literature by analyzing social evaluations in a 
multiple-audience context. In particular, it focuses on a specific type of social evaluation: social 
misconduct, which is defined at the intersection of literature on legitimacy and on organizational 
misconduct. Social misconduct is an important, yet understudied construct in the literature. Before 
further explaining this term and introducing the research question, I will review research on social 
evaluations and discuss its four current challenges.  
 
1  SOCIAL EVALUATIONS 
1.1 The three major types of social evaluations: status, reputation, and legitimacy 
Status, reputation, and legitimacy are the three main constructs of social evaluations. As individuals, 
we experience the impact of these constructs on a daily basis. High-status actors—the Queen of the 
UK, a three-star Michelin chef, a Nobel Prize winner, etc.—receive constant media attention for all 
sorts of normal activities that go unnoticed if performed by the rest of us. Before renting an 
apartment, we try determine the landlords’ reputation. Are they trustworthy? Will we get our deposit 
back? Finally, we try to teach our children to behave in ways that are considered legitimate, that is, 
conforming to the values and norms of our society.  
 These constructs are as crucial for organizations as they are for individuals. Organizational 
and management research has long studied their implications at the organizational level. Robert K. 
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Merton is generally understood to have made the first contribution to research that studies the 
positive externalities that high-status actors experience.  This phenomenon, known as the “Matthew 
Effect,” is related to the idea that “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.” Merton (1968) 
proposes that high-status actors (e.g., Nobel Prize winners) receive more credit than low-status 
actors for similar efforts.  
 Reputation research has a similarly long history in economics and sociology. Sometimes 
markets fail because consumers and buyers experience information asymmetry, adverse selection, 
and moral hazard; economists and game theorists have found different ways to overcome these 
problems, such as sending credible signals (Spence, 1973), making trustworthy commitments 
(Ghemawat, 1991) or building a good reputation (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).  
 Legitimacy is the third major construct in social evaluation literature. Scholars usually credit 
Weber (1910/1978) for introducing legitimacy into sociological theory (Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008), but its influence has steadily grown with the emergence of new institutional theory in 
sociology (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991). Since then, the concept of 
legitimacy has represented a growing trend in the field; 137 studies on legitimacy were published 
between 1980 and 2010, 27 of which were published between 2005 and 2010 alone, consisting of 
10% of all articles published in institutional theory and 1.38% of all articles published in 
organizational theory (Haack, 2012).   
 While status, reputation, and legitimacy are the most grounded constructs in social 
evaluation literature (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Bitektine, 2011), recent research has begun to 
investigate new concepts. Some of them are more theoretically advanced, such as stigma (Devers et 
al., 2009), celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010) and public disapproval (Vergne, 2012). Others are relatively 
new or mere variants of previous concepts, including wrongdoing (Zavyalova et al., 2012), unethical 
acts (Sullivan et al., 2007), certification, ranking (Graffin and Ward, 2010), and award (Wade et al., 
2006). While it is too early to say if any of these constructs will attain the theoretical importance of 
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status, reputation, and legitimacy, they have been undoubtedly useful in pushing scholars to more 
deeply examine the underlying mechanisms that distinguish one social evaluation from another.  
 
1.2 Current challenges in social evaluation literature 
With a steadily growing number of articles published in top management journals, books (Barnett 
and Pollock, 2012), professional development workshops (such as the one organized by David 
Deephouse at the 2012 Academy Of Management conference), and ad hoc conferences, recent 
social evaluation research has been very active and rich. For every social evaluation construct, there 
is a dedicated publication that periodically publishes review works to advance it in the field. 
However, it is still possible to identify major trends that are common across the different constructs: 
I discuss four of them. 
 
1.2.1 Social evaluations are multidimensional, not monolithic  
Literature has usually treated social evaluations in a monolithic fashion (Philippe and Durand, 2011) 
by looking at the overall effect that reputation, status, or legitimacy has: good vs. bad reputation, 
high vs. low status, or legitimate vs. illegitimate organizations. Research has only recently recognized 
that social evaluations have many dimensions that may or may not produce the same effects. For 
example, Mishina et al. (2012) distinguish between a reputation for quality and a reputation for 
character, showing how these two dimensions follow different paths. Philippe and Durand (2011) 
find that the effect of conforming behaviors depends on which type of goal is pursued and on the 
level of procedural commitment. Vergne (2011) distinguishes between different dimensions of 
legitimacy based on compliance with different norms: environmental (environmental norms), 
transactional (ethical norms), accounting (accountability standards), and competitive legitimacy 
(competition norms). He leaves to future research the task of studying the marginal effect of each 
dimension.    
INTRODUCTION 
 
 10 
 Scholars have recently invested considerable effort toward understanding the boundary 
conditions of each social evaluation. For example, having a high status, a good reputation, and high 
legitimacy is not always positive; trade-offs do exist, such as the time and money spent to build the 
reputation. Moreover, each construct has its own downside. Particularly interesting are recent studies 
that examine the negative effects of status (Graffin et al., 2012): for example, high-status actors are 
often punished more severely for misconduct (Jensen, 2006) because they are more likely to be 
“targeted” by the media, and because their misbehavior is seen as more intentional (Polman, Pettit, 
and Wiesenfeld, 2013). 
 
1.2.2 Social evaluations are not independent; they overlap and interact 
The fact that scholars have sometimes used the same operationalization to measure status, 
reputation, legitimacy, or other constructs, opens the obvious question as to whether these 
distinctions are practical or merely theoretical. An increasing number of papers have compared two 
or more social evaluations in the same study: for example, reputation and legitimacy (Deephouse 
and Carter, 2005), reputation, status, and legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Bitektine, 
2011), reputation and celebrity (Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova, 2010), and stigma and public 
disapproval (Vergne, 2012). These studies have found that social evaluations do overlap to some 
extent and are causally linked—for example, people attribute high reputation to high-status actors 
and vice versa. However, these studies also prove that each social evaluation does have its own 
unique raison d'être; while some mechanisms are shared, others are distinct. By looking at extreme 
situations—for example, high-status organizations that lose reputation, but not status—scholars are 
better able to understand the uniqueness of each construct, which helps clarify each of their 
underlying mechanisms. This trend has pushed researchers to explore new types of social 
evaluations. For example, David Deephouse organized a professional development workshop on 
social evaluations at AOM 2012 where nine constructs were presented: status, reputation, legitimacy, 
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stigma, celebrity, ranking, certification, public disapproval, and glory. Each of the presenters tried to 
explain why his or her respective construct was different from the others and worth studying. In the 
coming years, it is likely we will see more papers published on the differences and interactions 
among social evaluations.  
 
1.2.3 Literature has focused on few (homogenous) audiences 
While many different types of audiences are important to organizations, current literature has 
focused on relatively few. Building on mass communication literature and agenda-setting theory, 
many scholars have focused on the media as a primary audience (Deephouse, 1996; Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003, Zavyalova et al., 2012). The importance of the media is due to this  ability to align its 
agenda with the one of the public (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) by making some issues and opinions 
more salient to the eye of the people. From this perspective, the media is an important audience 
because it mediates the relationship between organizations and society (Deephouse and Heugens, 
2009). There are other audiences that perform a similar task, such as security analysts (Zuckerman, 
1999), rating agencies, and critics (Durand et al., 2007), which have also received increased attention 
from organizational scholars. While these audiences undoubtedly play a pivotal role, they are far 
from the only audiences that are crucial to organizations. Of these understudied audiences, the most 
important one may be “the people”—in their role as citizens, consumers, or employees. Scholars 
have tended to use the opinion of the media or other those other organizations to understand what 
people think, but have devoted little attention to investigating the direct relationship between these 
organizations and the people themselves (Bonardi and Keim, 2005). 
 Another limitation of existing research is that each audience has been treated as 
homogenous, leaving it to “future work” to examine the way in which different members of an 
audience interact (Hannan et al., 2007). As a result, audiences have been treated as black boxes, with 
few studies trying to unpack how different members of an audience reach a consensus (Cattani et al., 
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2008) or how their consensus or dissent influences future outcomes (Hsu, 2008). Audiences such as 
the media and rating agencies consist of different organizations that have their own strategy to 
survive and be profitable. Organizational literature has only recently tried to open the black box to 
see how companies can influence the evaluations of individual audience members, such as media 
outlets or critics (Westphal et al., 2012; Hsu, 2008). 
 
1.2.4 The “candidate – (single) audience” framework: What happens in a multiple-audience context? 
Since the publication of Zuckerman’s (1999) well-known article, analysis of social evaluations has 
usually been conducted—explicitly or implicitly—under a candidate-audience framework: the 
candidate, usually an organization, takes actions or submits proposals that affect the judgment, 
evaluation, or behavior of an audience (Bitektine, 2011). In turn, this evaluation directly or indirectly 
affects the survival or performance of the focal candidate. Most research tends to focus on one 
audience, usually the most important one in a given context: for example, the media in the venture 
capital market (Pollock and Rindova, 2003), the Michelin guide in the world of French cuisine 
(Durand et al., 2007), security analysts in the financial market (Zuckerman, 1999), and distributors in 
the movie industry (Cattani et al., 2008). The underlying assumption is that other audiences’ 
evaluations are less important, either because they do not own critical resources for organizations 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), or because they share evaluations (cf. Deephouse, 1996, who argues 
that media legitimacy is equal to the people’ perception of legitimacy).  
 Nevertheless, in many contexts, organizations are subject to the simultaneous pressures of 
multiple audiences (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012), which can have different orientations and evaluation 
criteria. Therefore, a recent stream of literature has focused on understanding how multiple 
audiences react differently to the same actions, such as the media vs. regulators (Deephouse, 1996), 
the public vs. the investment community (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012), or “market-takers” vs. “market-
makers” (Pontikes, 2012). These studies have the advantage to examine social evaluations in a 
multiple-audience context. However, they treat the evaluations of these audiences as orthogonal and 
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independent, neglecting to investigate how the evaluation of an audience may influence the 
evaluation of another. For example, Deephouse (1996) does not examine how the media’s 
evaluation influences regulators’ evaluation, and vice versa; Lamin and Zaheer (2012) do not 
investigate how public opinion influences that of the investment community, and vice versa.  
 It is important to note that this shortcoming in the literature of social evaluations 
exacerbates the three challenges previously discussed: understanding the different dimensions of 
social evaluations, the way social evaluations overlap or interact, and enlarging the range of 
audiences studied are even more compelling problems in a multiple-audience context. This 
discussion leads to the main literature gap that my dissertation addresses: 
 
Literature gap: Previous literature has analyzed social evaluations in a single-audience 
context. In case of a multiple-audience context the evaluation of an audience 
has been considering orthogonal to the evaluation of the other. This leaves 
unexplored the question as to how and why the evaluation of a particular 
audience influences the evaluation of another audience.  
 
This dissertation starts addressing this broad literature gap by focusing on how a specific type of 
social evaluation, social misconduct, affects the evaluation of another audience. 
 
2  THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL MISCONDUCT ON DIFFERENT AUDIENCES 
I define social misconduct at the intersection between literature on legitimacy (institutional tradition) 
and organizational misconduct. Thus, I will start by reviewing the definitions of legitimacy and 
organizational misconduct, as well as their advantages and limitations. 
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2.1 Definition of legitimacy 
The field of organizational studies has examined legitimacy for many years, although attention to it 
has varied. Scholars usually date the origin of the study of legitimacy back to Weber’s work 
(1910/1978), though it is only since the birth and surge of new institutional theory that legitimacy 
has become a pivotal concept in organizational studies (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It is likely due to this relative newness (Scott, 1987) that its boundary 
and mechanisms are still receiving scholarly attention. It was only in 1995 that Suchman proposed 
one of the first formal definitions by synthesizing the way the concept had been used so far (p. 573): 
 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions. 
 
Though Suchman’s article successfully summarized previous research and provided new direction 
for further analysis, it did not completely address the problem.  
 Bitektine (2011), expanding on the work of Suchman, finds that scholars have used 
legitimacy in 12 different ways (6 of them following Suchman’s analysis) and proposes a more 
detailed definition of legitimacy (Table 1).  Bitektine’s definition differs from Suchman’s in three key 
respects. First, Bitektine distinguishes between cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. Cognitive 
legitimacy concerns the “taken-for-grandness” aspect of legitimacy, and has been used mostly in 
population ecology studies. Socio-political legitimacy refers to the conformity of behaviors to a 
defined system of norms and values, and has mostly been examined by institutional scholars. It is 
evident that both constructs refer to very different ideas and mechanisms despite being grouped 
under the umbrella of “legitimacy.” Second, he articulates the different evaluating audiences that can 
render organizational legitimacy: the media, regulators, and other industry members (such as 
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advocacy groups, employees, etc.), whereas Suchman does not differentiate between them. Finally, 
Bitektine does not believe that organizational legitimacy or illegitimacy is automatically linked to 
rewards or sanctions; rather, he allows the individual evaluator the faculty to choose whether to 
provide support, remain neutral, or penalize the organization. 
 
Table 1 - The enumerative definition of organizational legitimacy (Bitektine 2011:159) 
Scope 
The concept of organizational legitimacy covers perceptions of an organization or entire 
class of organizations, judgment/evaluation based on these perceptions, and behavioral 
response based on these judgments . . . 
Evaluating 
audience 
…rendered by media, regulators, and other industry actors (advocacy groups, employees, 
etc.), who…   
Perceived 
dimensions 
…perceive an organization’s processes, structures, and outcomes of its activity, its 
leaders, and its linkages with other social actors and… 
Analytical 
processing 
…judge the organization either by classifying it into a preexisting (positively evaluated) 
cognitive category/class or by subjecting it to a thorough sociopolitical evaluation, 
which… 
Benefit 
distribution 
…is based on the assessment of the overall value of the organization to the individual 
evaluator (pragmatic legitimacy), his or her social group, or the whole society (moral 
legitimacy), and… 
Compliance 
mechanism 
…through the pattern of interactions with the organization and other social actors, the 
evaluating actor supports, remains neutral, or sanctions the organization depending on 
whether the organization provides the benefit(s) prescribed by the prevailing norms and 
regulations. 
 
2.1.1 Limitations of the definition of legitimacy  
Both Bitektine (2011) and Suchman (1995) use legitimacy as both a level and unit of analysis: an 
organization is legitimate/illegitimate (level of analysis) and scholars need to measure 
legitimacy/illegitimacy as the overall perception of an organization (unit of analysis). Obviously, this 
makes it very challenging for researchers to measure the overall perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of an organization. As a result, many studies use a “shortcut” and study legitimacy and illegitimacy as 
actions or behaviors (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; see also the meta-analysis of Heugens and Lander, 
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2009), equating a/an (il)legitimate action with a/an (il)legitimate organization. Even if 
legitimate/illegitimate actions increase/decrease organizational legitimacy, the two do not always 
overlap. For example, some illegitimate companies can actually decide to take legitimate actions to 
increase their overall fit with the social environment, without necessarily immediately offsetting the 
perception of their illegitimacy (Vergne, 2011); to the contrary, organizations can use illegitimate 
actions to acquire legitimacy (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). This was why Suchman (1995:574) clearly 
distinguishes between “organization” and “actions” (acts) as units of analysis: 
 
Legitimacy is generalized in that it represents an umbrella evaluation that, to some 
extent, transcends specific adverse acts or occurrences; thus, legitimacy is resilient to 
particular events, yet it is dependent on a history of events. An organization may 
occasionally depart from societal norms yet retain legitimacy because the departures 
are dismissed as unique. 
 
This interchangeability of organization and action as units of analysis is responsible for considerable 
confusion in the literature and likely one of the cause of the unclear relationship between legitimacy 
and performance (Heugens and Lander, 2009). 
 A further complication regards the evaluating audience (Bitektine, 2011). As Suchman (1995) 
specifies, the concept of legitimacy is “dependent on a collective audience, yet independent of 
particular observers.” Thus, an organization or an action can be considered inappropriate by a single 
member of the audience, but it can conform to the system of values of the overall audience.  This 
makes it very challenging for researchers to find the appropriate context in which to measure 
organizational legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996) while assuring results are generalizable to other 
contexts. As a result, few operationalizations of empirical studies on legitimacy were able to 
accommodate the insight of Suchman (1995) and measure the perception of the overall audience 
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and not the one of some sub-groups. 
 Due to these challenges, today the term legitimacy signifies different ideas, literature, and 
mechanisms to different scholars, even when articles on the topic are published in the same journal. 
Eighteen years after Suchman’s article, the concept of legitimacy seems to be still “more often 
invoked, than described and […]more often described than defined” (Suchman, 1995:573). 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that scholars have used alternative terms in situations where previous 
definitions of legitimacy apply. For example, Philippe and Durand (2011) use the term “norm-
conforming actions” to refer to actions that conform to the norms of society. There have been 
much more variable terms for illegitimate actions, such as misconduct (Wier, 1983; Greve et al., 
2010), wrongdoing (Zavyalova et al., 2012), irresponsible, or highly unethical actions (Sullivan et al., 
2007). Of these, the construct of misconduct has perhaps the longest history and has received the 
most theoretical attention. Literature on organizational misconduct can solve some of the challenges 
discussed regarding the concept of legitimacy, even if it opens different ones. 
  
2.2 Definition of organizational misconduct 
In their detailed review of organizational misconduct literature, Greve et al. (2010) ironically begin 
by also noticing that “the definition of misconduct is often implicit” (p. 53) in previous literature. 
Thus, they attempt to provide a more rigorous definition:  
 
We define organizational misconduct as behavior in or by an organization that a 
social-control agent judges to transgress a line separating right from wrong; where 
such a line can separate legal, ethical, and socially responsible behavior from their 
antitheses. 
 
This definition stems from work in sociology, particularly labeling theory (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 
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1951). Becker (1963), the presumed father of labeling theory, distinguishes between actual and 
perceived behavior. His well-known 2 x 2 matrix (Table 2) identifies four situations based on 
whether a behavior is obedient or rule breaking, and whether or not it is perceived as deviant. The 
novelty of this model is that is stresses the value of perception rather than actual behavior; in fact an 
obedient behavior that is “labeled” as deviant can have more dramatic consequences than rule-
breaking behavior that is not perceived as deviant. 
 
Table 2 - Becker (1963) matrix on actual vs. perceived behavior 
 Obedient Rule-breaking 
Perceived as Deviant Falsely Accused Pure Deviant 
Not Perceived as Deviant Conforming Secret deviant 
 
Taking a cue from Becker’s work, Greve et al. (2010) define misconduct by judgment; there is no 
misconduct if there is no perception of misconduct. For a perception to exist, an audience must 
make an evaluation. Greve et al. (2010) referred to this particular audience as a “social-control 
agent” which is an actor “that [represents] a collectivity and that can impose sanctions on that 
collectivity’s behalf” (p. 56). This is not a completely new approach compared to legitimacy, given 
Bitektine’s (2011) discussion of the role of the evaluating audience. However, in their definition, 
Greve et al. (2010) make the role of the social-control agent central, in that “it takes two to tango”—
without a social-control agent, there is no organizational misconduct. Until Bitektine (2011), the 
evaluating audience in legitimacy literature occupied a secondary role. This is the first advantage 
Greve et al.’s (2010) definition has over previous conceptualizations of legitimacy. 
 A second advantage of this definition is that it clarifies the unit of analysis. While 
misconduct is defined at the level of analysis (the organization), the unit of analysis is the action. 
Misconduct is a “behavior”; this makes it easier for scholars to examine the operationalization of 
organizational misconduct versus that of legitimacy. Finally, Greve et al. (2010) are more specific in 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 19 
their definition of the reference group. Suchman (1995) generically refers to “some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574), a definition which is flexible 
enough to be applied to any social group, even those viewed as illegitimate from the society point of 
view, such as the Mafia. In contrast, Greve et al. (2010) immediately set the reference group in their 
definition: society. Misconduct transgresses the boundary defined by society’s laws, ethics, and social 
norms (see also Warren (2003) and her distinction between norms and hypernorms). 
 
2.2.1 Limitations of the definition of organizational misconduct  
Apart from these advantages, the construct of organizational misconduct differs from the construct 
of legitimacy in one other crucial aspect: Greve and his colleagues regard “legal, ethical and socially 
responsible behavior” as a single unit, and do not distinguish between laws and social norms. In 
contrast, legitimacy literature has flourished in large part because it contrasts illegitimate vs. illegal 
actions, that is, actions that break social norms vs. laws (Webb et al., 2009). Given illegal actions 
usually have more dire consequences than illegitimate actions, it is not surprising that illegal actions 
have received more attention in misconduct literature. From this perspective, Greve et al. (2010:60) 
define the social-control agent as:  
 
An actor that represents a collectivity and that can impose sanctions on that 
collectivity’s behalf […] we consider the world polity (i.e., international governing 
bodies), the state (i.e., national and local governmental bodies), and professional 
associations (e.g., the American Medical Association, the American Bar Associations) 
as social-control agents. Each of these entities represents a larger collectivity, and has 
the capacity to impose significant sanctions on its behalf. 
 
Under this definition, social-control agents are third parties that monitor and enforce punishment 
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on behalf of the community. While this can be true for laws, which are monitored and enforced by a 
centralized third-party authority, such as the court or the state, it is not generally the case with social 
norms. Ingram and Silverman (2002) claim, in reference to general institutional literature on 
legitimacy, that social norms work as “decentralized institutions” that rely on “diffuse individuals to 
punish” their violations (Ingram and Silverman, 2002:10). Sanctions (or rewards) are uncertain; they 
depend on the judgments of individual actors and rely on their ability and willingness to enforce it 
(Scott, 2008). Therefore, though Greve et al. (2010) decide to “omit more general audiences such as 
customers, or specific-interest groups without an official standing such as non-governmental 
organizations or lobby groups,” these audiences are pivotal with regard to the enforcement of social 
norms. 
 Therefore, if it “takes two tango” to commit illegal acts (Greve et al., 2010:78), it may take 
“three to tango” for transgressions of social norms ; these acts not only involve the “organization–
social-actor agent” dyad, but also the “social-actor agent–other audience” dyad, that is, individuals or 
other contextually defined performance gatekeepers for the organizations. Literature on 
organizational misconduct has mainly focused on the former while overlooking the later, reinforcing 
the previously discussed literature gap. As a result, the framework of organizational misconduct is 
more suitable to apply to actions that break laws, rather than those that contravene social norms.  
 In summary, while the concept of misconduct can help resolve some ambiguity in legitimacy 
literature, it falls short by failing to distinguish between illegal and illegitimate actions, unlike most 
legitimacy research (Webb et al., 2009). However, integrating the constructs of organizational 
legitimacy and misconduct could open up interesting new research avenues. This leads to a new 
construct that I call “organizational social misconduct.”  
 
2.3 Definition of organizational social misconduct and research question 
Organizational social misconduct is defined at the intersection between legitimacy and 
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organizational misconduct, and builds on the advantages of each. The formal definition of 
organizational social misconduct is as follows:  
 
Organizational social misconduct is an evaluation made by a social-control agent that 
an organization’s behavior contravenes the system of values and norms of society. 
 
Consistent with literature on organizational misconduct, the action is the unit of analysis of 
organizational social misconduct. Moreover, social misconduct is an evaluation made by a social-
control agent, in the form of a statement or an action. Thus, there is no social misconduct if a social-
control agent does not label it as such. Consistent with legitimacy literature, organizational social 
misconduct exclusively concerns the infringement of social norms, not of the laws. Most illegal 
actions are also considered as violating social norms, but this is not always the case (Webb et al., 
2009). Conversely, there are many forms of social misconduct that are not illegal. Also, the violation 
regards the values and norms of society as a whole, even if some individuals or sub-groups may 
disagree (consistent with the insight of Suchman, 1995). 
 Given that social misconduct regards only the violation of social norms, the definition of 
social-control agent should be revised accordingly, as social-control agents are not limited to 
organizations such as world polity, the state, etc. While these organizations are pivotal in monitoring 
and enforcing laws, they fall short of administering social norms; indeed, it is difficult to identify 
organizations that are able to dictate what is appropriate and what is not. Therefore, I refrain to 
define a priori a given set of organizations that can be considered social-control agents for social 
misconduct. Instead, I define social-control agent as an evaluating audience that identifies a behavior 
as social misconduct and is able to informally penalize the focal organization, either directly or 
indirectly, through the influence of another audience. For example, a self-regulatory organization can 
be defined a social-control agent; even if the organization cannot directly punish a company, it has 
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the ability to trigger negative media coverage or public disapproval of it. This relationship between a 
social-control agent and another audience is the focus of this dissertation.  
 
In section 1.4, I discussed the main gap in the literature on social evaluations, namely that previous 
literature has overlooked the way the evaluation of one audience influences the evaluation of 
another audience. Having defined the specific social evaluation under investigation, I will present the 
specific research question that my overall thesis will address. 
 
 
 
Where organizational social misconduct is defined, as mentioned above, as an evaluation made by a 
social-control agent. 
 
2.4 Research Gaps 
In order to address this question, I consider three distinctive audiences that directly or indirectly 
affect organizational survival and performance: people, investors, and the media. 
 
2.4.1 The effect of social misconduct on people 
People, in their roles of consumers, employees, and citizens, are a crucial audience for companies. 
People who are disappointed with companies are less likely to buy their products or work for them. 
More importantly, in democratic countries, individuals as citizens can influence the regulators and 
politicians that eventually influence organizations’ survival and performance (Bonardi and Keim, 
2005). People have many ways to express their opinions of an organization, including social media, 
boycotts, and complaints to regulators, to name a few. However, the voice of the people has been 
Why Does an Audience Change its Evaluation following             
Organizational Social Misconduct? 
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largely neglected in the literature on legitimacy and organizational misconduct. Legitimacy literature 
usually considers the people’s opinion via the media, equating media legitimacy with public 
legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). This equivalence is based on mass 
communication and agenda-setting theory claiming that, as the media has the double role of 
reporting and influencing people’s opinions, the media’s agenda is usually aligned to that of the 
people (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). However, while it is clear that the media is able to exert 
considerable pressure on what people think about (Deephouse and Heugens, 2009), the same mass 
communication literature shows that it is much more debatable as to whether the media is always 
able to influence what people think of (McCombs, 2005).  That is, the media influence what issues 
people think about, but does not control their opinions on those. Similarly, literature on 
organizational misconduct does not directly measure public opinion, but relies on social-control 
agents as actors that represent “a collectivity and that can impose sanctions on that collectivity’s 
behalf” (Greve et al., 2010:56). Therefore, most of the research in this field has not investigated the 
relationship between the evaluation of a social-control agent and public opinion. 
 While it is likely that people may react to organizational social misconduct, it is not 
immediately obvious what triggers these reactions. This leads to the first research gap: 
 
Research Gap 1: Why do people react to organizational social misconduct to a 
greater or lesser degree? 
 
2.4.2 The effect of social misconduct on investors 
It is one thing for an individual to make a relative costless complaint; it is another to make a decision 
that significantly affects one’s finances, such as selling or keeping stock. Therefore, investors do not 
necessarily react to organizational misconduct in the same way as citizens might. Investors are more 
likely to make their decisions based on economic rationality (is the company’s top or bottom line 
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impacted by social misconduct?) versus normative rationality (Oliver, 1997) (is it right to keep the 
stock?). The link between such behaviors and organizations’ economic performance has been 
addressed in misconduct literature more thoroughly than in any other area (Greve et al., 2010), 
mainly with regard to misconduct that involves some form of illegal action. In such scenarios, 
sanctions take the form of fines and imprisonments enforced by third parties, like the state, courts, 
and police (Hechter and Opp, 2005; Ingram and Silverman, 2002). Given the gravity of such 
behaviors, this type of misconduct is also informally sanctioned, that is, by other social parties that 
interact with the company (Jensen 2006, Sullivan, et al. 2007). Thus, it is doubtless that illegal actions 
negatively affect the financial performance of guilty organizations and, given that the same laws 
apply to all companies in a given regulative context, the negative effect on performance is likely to 
be the same for all companies.  
 It is less clear how sanctions are imposed upon behaviors that merely contravene society’s 
values and norms, but are not illegal. Social norms work as “decentralized institutions” that rely on 
“diffuse individuals to punish” their violations (Ingram and Silverman, 2002:10). Sanctions (or 
rewards) are uncertain; they depend on the judgments of individual actors and rely on their ability 
and willingness to enforce it (Scott, 2008). This ambiguity makes the outcomes of social misconduct 
far less clear and consistent. Indeed, scholars have long debated whether the relationship between 
actions that deviate from the norms of a specific group and organizational performance is negative 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), non-linear (Deephouse, 1999; Smith, 2011), 
or positive (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Durand, Rao, and Monin 2007; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). 
 Two main contributors to this dilemma are data availability and the difficulty in 
operationalizing the variable. It is likely that the willingness of individual actors to penalize 
companies for social misconduct will depend on the type of norm violated, the type of industry, and 
the role of infomediaries (such as the media, ratings agencies, and critics). However, previous studies 
have had difficulty explaining the causal mechanisms and differentiating the effect of each element. 
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Most have focused on one industry (Kraatz and Zajac, 1996), the violation of one type of norm 
(Miller and Chen, 1996), and have looked at behaviors that were already reported by an infomediary 
(usually the media) (Deephouse, 1996), neglecting transgressions that may have been ignored by 
infomediaries (what Becker, 1963 defines as “secret deviance”). Therefore, the answer to the 
question on why companies will be more or less financially penalized for social misconduct is still 
unclear. This leads to the second research gap: 
 
Research Gap 2:  Why are companies financially penalized to a greater or lesser degree for 
their social misconduct? 
 
2.4.3 The effect of scandals – events of severe social misconduct - on the media 
The media is an important audience for organizations, not because it directly affects organizational 
outcomes, but because it is able to mobilize important stakeholders. Accordingly, the media 
occupies a prominent role in literature on both legitimacy and organizational misconduct. Bitektine 
(2011) considers the media as one of the three evaluating audiences (along with regulators and other 
industry actors) that are able to confer organizational legitimacy. In the context of organizational 
misconduct, Greve et al. (2010) regard the media as an important audience that can penalize 
companies. A common assumption to both research streams is the belief that the media can be 
treated as a homogenous audience; in other words, that it is possible to measure the media’s overall 
opinion of a given subject. Traditionally, scholars have classified media stories as positive vs. 
negative (Pollock and Rindova, 2003), or endorsing vs. challenging (Deephouse, 1996), and then 
combined them in various ways (usually using the Janis-Fadner index). While this assumption has 
clear empirical advantages, it can be too simplistic, as it overlooks the fact that the media consists of 
different members, each with different motives and reactions to the same behaviors.  
 Similarly, each audience consists of different members. The very existence of different media 
outlets is justified by the fact that each tries to address a different segment of the readers. In order to 
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survive and thrive, media outlets must tailor their news accordingly. Therefore, while journalism’s 
ethical code normalizes media news to a certain degree (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), each media 
outlet still has the freedom to strategically decide what news to report, how to prioritize one story 
over another, and how to report it. Literature has addressed these specificities by either focusing on 
a single newspaper (usually one with high status and credibility, e.g., the Wall Street Journal), or by 
almost indiscriminately pulling a large number of news articles from multiple newspapers using 
databases like Factiva or LexisNexis (Zavyalova et. al, 2012; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Few 
management studies have tried to understand the way companies can strategically manipulate 
relationships with specific journalists (cf. Westphal et al., 2012), and even fewer have specifically 
addressed how different media outlets can respond strategically to the same companies’ actions.  
 I look at how the evaluations of multiple newspapers with different orientations change after 
a scandal. Scandals are dramatic events that originate from severe type of social misconduct. 
Therefore, scandals are likely to have an impact on the evaluation of the media. However, it is less 
clear why this evaluation varies among different media outlets. This leads to the next research gap: 
 
Research Gap 3: Why do the media change evaluations after a scandal? 
 
 
In summary, I look at the effect of social misconduct on the evaluation of three different audiences: 
people’s complaints, investors’ share prices, and media’s evaluations. The objective of this 
dissertation is to study not only the direct effect of social misconduct on these audiences, but mainly 
the factors that moderate these relationships. In this way, I can shed light on the mechanisms that 
explain why and how each audience reacts to social misconduct. Figure 1 provides a graphic 
illustration of the research question and the three research gaps. 
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Figure 1 – The research question and the three research gaps 
 
 
For my empirical analysis, I will use two novel and unique datasets: Chapters 2 and 3 focus on 
advertising self-regulation in the UK, which involves the assessment of behaviors based on their 
acceptability by the “average [UK] consumer” (CAP Code 2010:113); Chapter 4 focuses on a scandal 
(“Calciopoli”) that, by definition, involves transgressions of which society as a whole disapproves. I 
will briefly introduce these two contexts. 
 
3  INTRODUCTION TO THE THREE ESSAYS 
3.1 Empirical Contexts 
I use two distinct settings as the empirical contexts of the three chapters that follow. Chapters 2 and 
3 focus on advertising self-regulation in the UK to assess how people and investors react to social 
misconduct. Chapter 4 analyzes the scandal Calciopoli, which affected Italy’s top soccer league (“Serie 
A”) in 2006, to assess changes in newspapers’ evaluations after severe social misconduct. 
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3.1.1 The UK advertising self-regulation system 
Advertising tends to reflect society’s current norms, beliefs and values, at a given time. Thus, it is an 
ideal setting in which to study social norms and social misconduct. In an attempt to maintain the 
highest standards of advertising, companies have long funded a third-party self-regulatory 
organization to ensure that any form of advertising or marketing communication is “legal, honest, 
truthful and decent” (Advertising and Marketing Communication Practice Code 2011:6). In this 
dissertation, I focus specifically on the UK’s self-regulatory organization, the Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA) for the following reasons: 
1. The ASA, which was founded in 1961, is one of the most legitimate self-regulatory 
organizations in the world. In recognition of this reputation, the UK’s Office of 
Communications contracted out its responsibility to control broadcast advertising to the 
ASA in 2004. 
2. Since 2004, the ASA has been the one-shop stop for all forms of advertising in the UK. In 
other countries, advertising complaints are directed to other agencies or governmental 
bodies, which would reduce the reliability of a study. 
3. The ASA receives around 25,000 complaints a year, which represents 50% of the total 
advertising complaints made in Europe.  
The ASA fields complaints from both individuals and organizations. These are then passed on to a 
Complaints Executive, and, depending on their gravity, are eventually submitted to the ASA 
Council. Each complaint can either be upheld (the advertisement is banned) or not upheld (the 
advertisement is cleared). Adjudications are published every Wednesday and receive significant 
coverage in all types of media: national and local, trade and consumer, offline and online. This media 
visibility is one of the primary punishments for advertisers that do not conform to the code; as with 
most self-regulation organizations, the ASA cannot directly fine the offending companies.  
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 Each case is assessed based on its likelihood to mislead, offend, or harm the average UK 
consumer:  
 
The likely effect of a marketing communication is generally considered from the point 
of view of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed. (The CAP 
Code 2010:113, emphasis added) 
 
The reference to the average consumer echoes Suchman’s (1995) note that the evaluation “is 
dependent on a collective audience, yet independent of particular observers” (p. 574). Thus, I 
consider the decisions of the ASA Council as a direct (less problematic) proxy for society’s collective 
belief as to whether or not a company’s advertising conforms to the UK’s system of social norms. In 
this context, the ASA is regarded as the social-control agent, and the decision to ban an 
advertisement is treated as an operationalization of organizational social misconduct.  
 
3.1.1.1 Data collection and coding 
I had direct experience with advertising self-regulation when I was a marketing manager at P&G. My 
toughest meetings in the company were with the legal department to discuss (and negotiate) what 
kinds of advertising communication would be considered appropriate by the standards of a given 
country’s self-regulatory organization.  
 Then, during the second year of my thesis (2010), I contacted the European Advertising 
Standards Alliance (EASA), which is the meta-organization that “brings together national advertising 
self-regulatory organizations and organizations representing the advertising industry in Europe and 
beyond” (EASA, 2012). The EASA is “the single authoritative voice on advertising self-regulation 
issues and promotes ethical standards in commercial communications by means of effective self-
regulation” (EASA,2012). EASA’s role is particularly important for its cross-border complaints 
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system that is in operation since 1992, at the outset of the single European market. The cross-border 
complaints system helps dealing with advertising viewed in one European country, but carried in 
media originating in another country (e.g. an Irish consumer who wants to complain about the 
content of an advertising he or she saw on the television broadcasts from the UK). Moreover, as 
part of its mission, EASA also runs an Education Program, featuring the 3E (EASA - Ethics - 
Education) Module, which has been an important source of information and inspiration for my 
work. This module provides an innovative platform to promote and teach ethics and advertising 
standards in the digital age to a broad range of targeted groups: from government representatives, to 
advertising industry representatives, university students, professionals at small and medium size 
enterprises etc. 
 In my dealings with the EASA, they were extremely open, collaborative and transparent, 
providing me a wealth of information about the history and foundations of advertising self-
regulation, as well as regulatory differences between Europe and the rest of the world. In the 
following year, I participated in two incredibly informative EASA meetings in Vienna and Warsaw 
with its European members. I focused on relatively few countries to better understand whether the 
regulatory context and the data available were appropriate for the scope of this dissertation, 
conducting phone interviews with German, Dutch, and Swedish self-regulatory organizations, 
among others. I also visited the self-regulatory organization in Italy (where I also attended a 2-day 
course on Italian self-regulation), Spain, France, and the UK. Following this experience, it became 
clear to me that focusing on the UK context, specifically with regard to ASA activity, would be the 
most appropriate avenue of analysis for this study.  
 Having visited ASA four times in the last three years (November 2010, July 2011, July 2012, 
and March 2013), I also found them incredibly collaborative and transparent. During our first 
meeting, I interviewed managers from different departments, including multiple interviews with the 
ASA’s CEO. My main ASA contact, the complaints reception manager, was always available for 
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questions and clarifications, and provided me with information about complaints. This information 
included the date in which the complaint was received, when it was resolved, and the characteristics 
of the complaint (topic, issue, industry, and medium). However, data on the complainants were 
anonymous: the ASA did not provide me with the complainant’s name, address, or any other 
personal information, for obvious confidentiality reasons.  
 In order to begin compiling my second data source (newspaper articles), the ASA put me in 
contact with their press agency, Meltwater. Meltwater is a “software as a service” that provides 
companies with online articles published on around 140,000 websites worldwide. I purchased a 
report from Meltwater containing all the articles about the ASA published from October 2007 to 
2010 (more than 30,000). They also provided me with the algorithm they used to search articles, 
which I adapted to search for offline articles on LexisNexis and Factiva during my visiting period at 
New York University. I contacted customer service for both databases to ensure the algorithm and 
search criteria were appropriate to my objective. With the help of a programmer, I imported articles 
found using LexisNexis and Factiva into Excel. Then, I manually removed repeat articles and false 
positives. Finally, I ran a content analysis of the articles with the help of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
service. Amazon Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourcing website that helps find workers that can 
perform Human Interface Tasks—that is, tasks that are easy for a person to perform, but very 
difficult for a computer program to automate (for example, answering questions such as, “What is 
the main company mentioned of the article? Does the journalist agree or disagree with the ASA’s 
decision? Does the article mention how many people complained to the ASA?”). This service helped 
coding around 10,000 articles under many dimensions. 
 
3.1.2 “Calciopoli,” the 2006 Italian soccer scandal 
Chapter 4 relies on the uniqueness of the event that affected the Italian Serie A in 2006, an event 
known as Calciopoli (“calcio” being Italian for soccer and “poli” the common Italian slang term for 
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“scandal,” analogous to the “-gate” suffix used in English for scandals). Boeri and Severgnini (2011) 
present a reliable and synthetic summary of the scandal: 
In May 2006 a major scandal was uncovered by Italian prosecutors after tapping 
phone conversations in relation to an investigation on the use of doping at Juventus. 
They found that the general manager of Juventus, Luciano Moggi, had exerted 
pressure on referees, officials of the football federation and journalists, ahead of 
crucial matches involving Juventus or rival teams. These contacts were finalized to rig 
games by choosing referees favorable to Juventus and manipulating news on 
televisions and newspapers against the referees not displaying a favorable attitude 
toward the team of Moggi….  
 
Juventus won the 2004–05 Italian Championship, while A.C. Milan, Inter and Udinese 
qualified for the Champions League, and Bologna, Brescia and Atalanta were relegated 
to the Second Division...More importantly, they not only involve Juventus, but also 
are mostly in favor of Juventus, as they condition the outcomes of the other matches 
in favor of Juventus. The other teams involved in the scandal were A.C. Milan, 
Fiorentina, Lazio, and Reggina. A.C. Milan was accused of having influenced the 
assignment of linesmen for its match against Chievo Verona (April 2005); while Diego 
Della Valle and Claudio Lotito, Fiorentina owner and Lazio chairman respectively, 
were accused of having used a method similar to Luciano Moggi in rigging matches 
throughout referees' designation. The allegations against Reggina were also in the same 
vein. 
 
The official judiciary documents, as reported by national newspapers, suggest a variety 
of methods had been used by referees to affect the outcome of a match. Sometimes a 
strong player (e.g., Jankulowski in Udinese–Brescia) was given a red card (which 
means automatically missing the following match) without any serious reason during 
the match just before the one in which he should have played against Juventus. In 
other cases, the referee gave a penalty or neglected an offside thereby favoring one of 
the two teams. In all of these cases, tapped phone conversations certify direct contacts 
between the managers involved in match rigging, the team of designatori [ the 
administrators that assign the referees] and sometimes the referees themselves. 
Tapped phone conversations also involved a number of journalists in popular 
television shows. Managers rigging matches were in their conversations threatening 
the referees by saying they would destroy the referees' reputations by using their media 
power if they do not comply with their requests.  
 
Soccer is the most followed sport in Italy, attracting an incredible amount of public and media 
attention. In fact, Italy is one of the few countries in the world to have three daily sports 
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publications (all of which mostly focus on soccer): Corriere dello Sport, Gazzetta dello Sport, and 
Tuttosport. Each newspaper and the majority of its readership are located in a different region in 
Italy, causing segmentation in the sense that each paper devotes some of its reportage to local teams. 
The day after a match, each newspaper comments on referees’ mistakes in a specific column called 
“Moviola,” which is usually written by an assigned journalist dedicated to the column. Given the 
subjectivity of referees’ decisions, journalists have some latitude as to deciding whether to report and 
how to evaluate them. Moreover, given that Calciopoli was mostly unexpected, articles on the 
scandal can be used as a quasi natural experiment to compare media evaluations before and after its 
occurrence.  
 
3.1.2.1 Data collection and coding 
Data collection for this project took place from 2006 to 2011, starting when I was working on my 
master’s degree. In 2006, I contacted the three above-mentioned Italian sports dailies to ask for their 
articles on Moviola. At that time, I only collected data for the 2005-2006 season. In 2009, I 
contacted the editorial staff of each newspaper to request articles from all seasons between 2000-
2001 and 2009-2010. Of the three publications, Gazzetta dello Sport is the only one that has digital 
copies of its issues available as far back as 2000-2001; they provided me with .rtf versions of every 
Moviola for the entire requested date range. While Corriere dello Sport did not have the same level of 
digital availability, I was able to meet with their dedicated Moviola writer (as of the 2005-2006 
season), Antonello Capone, who, along with his predecessor, has maintained an archive of hard 
copies dating back to the 2000-2001 season. I was allowed to copy all  Moviola for the requested 
date range. Tuttosport was the most challenging source of the three. As it has neither a digital nor 
hard copy archive, I visited the city library of Turin (Biblioteca comunale di Torino) and manually 
duplicated all Moviola for the requested date range. I coded the articles with the help of a research 
assistant. 
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3.2 Essay 1: Vox Populi Vox Dei? People’s Complaints about Inappropriate Advertising 
Essay 1 addresses the first research gap (why do people react to organizational social misconduct to 
a greater or lesser degree?) in the UK regulatory context. The decisions of ASA to ban an 
advertisement provide a measure of social misconduct. The number of individual complaints lodged 
is a way to measure the reaction of the people themselves; in fact, not only can any person submit a 
complaint, but also 90% of complainants do so only once.  
 Essay 1 therefore investigates the way the evaluations of ASA influences future complaints 
lodged by individuals. Two mechanisms are proposed: the saliency of the event and the ambiguity of 
the norm. The saliency of the ASA’s decisions is predicted to have a positive main effect on the 
number of future complaints: the greater the saliency of ASA’s decisions, the greater the number of 
complaints people make. In contrast, the ambiguity of the norm is expected to moderate the way 
people react to the specific type ASA decision. The ASA makes two types of decisions: it either 
upholds the complaint and bans an advertisement, or it does not uphold the complaints and clears 
the advertisement. These decisions regard two types of norms: some are less ambiguous (misleading 
cases) and others are more ambiguous (offensive/harmful cases). Essay 1 predicts that, when an 
advertisement is banned, the number of complaints increase more when norms are less ambiguous 
(misleading cases) than when the norms are more ambiguous (offensive/harmful). To the contrary, 
when the advertisement is cleared, the number of complaints should increase less when the norms 
are less ambiguous than when they are more ambiguous. This is because of the fact that the 
ambiguity of a norm leaves more latitude for individual interpretation; when norms are more 
ambiguous, it is expected that public opinion will not align as uniformly with ASA decisions.  
 
3.3 Essay 2: What is the share price reaction to organizational social misconduct? 
Essay 2 uses the same context as Essay 1, but focuses on investor reaction; specifically,  it analyzes 
the effect of ASA decisions on the affected companies’ share prices. The essay uses the 
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methodology of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), a common method to analyze financial 
impact in organizational misconduct research. However, in this context, as the ASA does not 
directly fine organizations, most of the observed negative effect on share price will owe to informal 
sanctions provoked by ASA decisions. Presumably, these informal sanctions are not the same for all 
companies. Therefore, Essay 2 helps answer the second research gap (why are companies financially 
penalized to a greater or lesser degree for their social misconduct?) by  understanding the conditions 
that increase or decrease the degree to which companies are penalized for social misconduct. Three 
mechanisms are proposed to increase these penalties: (1) the saliency of the event, which is 
measured by the amount of media coverage the decision received; (2) the ambiguity of the norms: 
when the norm is less ambiguous (misleading cases) the share price should decrease more than when 
the norm is more ambiguous (offensive/harmful cases); (3) the localness of the company: investors 
would penalize UK companies more heavily than foreign companies.  
 
3.4 Essay 3: Scandals as social disturbances and strategic opportunities: newspapers’ 
evaluations after Calciopoli 
 
Having an advertisement banned by the ASA can be consequential, as it can affect the number of 
individual complaints (Essay 1) and the share price (Essay 2). However, it can be considered a 
“light” type of social misconduct, in the sense that its consequences are important, but 
circumscribed by time and location. In contrast, scandals are a more severe type of social 
misconduct that generates disruptive publicity. They are dramatic events that can have a more in-
depth effect on society and its evolution.  
 With this in mind, Essay 3 looks at how newspapers’ evaluations change after a scandal, 
specifically with regard to newspapers’ evaluations of referee behavior before and after Calciopoli. 
Referees’ decisions can be debatable and are frequently reported and contested by newspapers. 
Essay 3 predicts that a newspaper’s evaluation depends on three factors: the social characteristics of 
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the referee (status and newness), the ambiguity of the norm enforced, and the identity of the team 
(i.e., local vs. non-local). Essay 3 proposes a theory of scandals as social disturbances that open up 
strategic opportunities. In particular, it is predicted that a scandal will produce a liability of status and 
an advantage of newness for referees; these effects are predicted to increase when the norms 
enforced are more ambiguous as they leave more latitude for audience interpretation. Finally, a 
scandal is expected to affect disagreement among newspapers. As each newspaper has some 
respective local teams, each will judge referees’ conduct differently. Matches involving local teams 
are predicted to generate more disagreement among newspapers. Essay 3 proposes that a scandal 
increases this disagreement by exacerbating newspapers’ bias toward their own local teams. 
 
Figure 2 shows the detailed structure of the dissertation. The dissertation consists of 5 chapters. 
Chapter 1 is the introduction; Chapters 2, 3, and 4 develop each of the three essays; Chapter 5 
concludes. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Literature on social evaluations has mainly analyzed the audience-candidate dyad, leaving underexplored the way the 
evaluation of a main audience (e.g. a social-control agent) influences the evaluation of another audience. 
Literature on both legitimacy and organizational misconduct has studied behaviors that contravene values and 
norms of society, but each approach has drawbacks. Therefore, the effects of organizational social misconduct are 
unclear in current literature. 
MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Why does an Audience Change its Evaluation following Organizational Social Misconduct? 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Why are companies financially 
penalized to a greater or lesser 
degree for their social 
misconduct? 
Why do the media change 
evaluations after a scandal? 
1. Ambiguity of the norm 
2. Saliency 
3. Localness of the company 
 
1. Ambiguity of the norm 
2. Localness 
3. Status of the actors evaluated 
Investors (Share price) 
 
Media (Newspapers’ evaluations) 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Investors seem not to financially 
penalize companies that make 
social misconduct, which do not 
involve direct fines 
 
Scandals create social disturbance 
and strategic opportunity: 
a. It creates a liability of status for 
the actors evaluated 
b. It increases the disagreement 
among newspapers.  
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 In case of organizational social misconduct, the evaluation of a social control agent does influence the evaluation of 
another audience, however this effect is not mechanical. Three primary moderators emerge from the three essays: 
ambiguity of the norm, saliency of the event and localness of the transgressors. The ambiguity of the norm 
attenuates the negative effect of social misconduct, while saliency increases it. In contrast, localness is ambivalent: it 
can either increase or attenuate it.  
In summary, this dissertation shows that social norms are better understood in a triadic framework: candidate – 
social-control agent – another audience. Social norms are not set exogenously, but are endogenously created by the 
actions of the candidates and the evaluations of (at least) two audiences.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Why do people react to 
organizational social misconduct to a 
greater or lesser degree? 
 
1. Ambiguity of the norm 
2. Saliency 
 
 
AUDIENCE (EVALUATION) 
People (People’s complaints) 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
 People increase complaints on 
organizations’ behaviors: 
1. When social misconduct is more 
salient. 
2. When the norm’s violation is less 
ambiguous  
 
AUDIENCE (EVALUATION) AUDIENCE (EVALUATION) 
MAIN MECHANISMS 
 
MAIN MECHANISMS 
 
MAIN MECHANISMS 
 
CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 
 
CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 
 
Figure 2 – Structure of the dissertation  
 
CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 
RESEARCH GAP 
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CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 
VOX POPULI VOX DEI? 
PEOPLE’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT INAPPROPRIATE ADVERTISING1 
 
Previous research on social norms assumes normative convergence among different 
audiences. However, some norms are open to multiple—often even conflicting—
interpretations. To address the unexplored questions of whether and how these 
interpretations affect audiences’ evaluations and behavior, we studied the relationship 
between the number of public complaints received by a self-regulatory organization 
about companies’ advertisements and the decisions made by that organization 
depending on the types of infringed norm. Drawing from sociological and socio-
cognitive research on norms, we argue that people complain more when the self-
regulatory organization (a) banned an advertisement that violated well-established and 
less ambiguous norms, and (b) cleared an advertisement that infringed norms that are 
open to multiple divergent interpretations. We tested and empirically confirmed these 
predictions by looking at people’s complaints about companies’ advertisements to the 
UK advertising self-regulatory organization (ASA).
                                                        
1 This chapter was developed in collaboration with Gino Cattani and Rodolphe Durand 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Sociological and organizational research has long been concerned with how social norms regulate 
behavior. Norms are cultural phenomena that prescribe certain actions as appropriate and desirable, 
while proscribing others through the use of sanctions (e.g., Becker, 1963; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Coleman, 1990; Dubois, 2003; Hetcher and Opp, 2005). Sanctions can take the form of 
“rewards for carrying out those actions regarded as correct or punishments for carrying out those 
actions regarded as incorrect” (Coleman, 1990: 242). While a set of mutually consistent and stable 
norms help regulate behavior, norms that are subject to multiple, conflicting interpretations are 
likely to engender ambiguity about what is socially appropriate and desirable (Becker, 1963; Hetcher 
and Opp, 2005; Horne, 2005; Rao, Monin, Durand, 2005). Norms that have not been translated into 
specific rules are difficult to apply in concrete situations since it is necessary to first sort out the 
“ambiguities that arise in deciding which rules are to be taken as the yardstick against which 
behavior is measured and judged deviant” (Becker, 1963: 8; see also Dubois, 2003).  
We aim to uncover the consequences of norm interpretability in a context in which two 
distinct but related audiences may interpret the same norms very differently. Sociological and 
organizational research typically assumes that audiences can discriminate between actions that are 
appropriate and desirable, and actions that are not—implicitly assuming lack of ambiguity about 
which norms to apply, when, and how (e.g., Suchman, 1995; Zuckerman, 1999; Cattani et al., 2008; 
Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011). Even the studies that look at multiple audiences (e.g., Lamin and 
Zaheer, 2012; Pontikes, 2012) assume that each audience uses its own norms, ignoring the possibility 
that audiences differ in their evaluations, and that the evaluations of one audience may impact those 
of another. Building on sociological (e.g., Becker, 1963; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zuckerman, 
1999; Hechter and Opp, 2005) and socio-cognitive (e.g., Sherif, 1936; Festinger, 1957; Cialdini, 
Kallgren, and Reno, 1991; Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini, 2000; Dubois, 2003) research on norms, we 
argue that a critical source of variation in audiences’ evaluations is whether norms have been 
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translated into specific rules or instead are open to interpretation. In the former case, different 
audiences are more likely to converge in their evaluations and, in the latter, to diverge. Accordingly, 
we propose that the type of norm is an important moderator of the influence that one audience 
exerts on another. 
To investigate these questions, we chose a context in which firms’ behavior is evaluated by 
audiences of two kinds: people, namely consumers and citizens (the focal audience), and a third-party 
(self-regulatory) organization, supposed to take action on behalf of people. We situated the analysis 
within the context of the UK advertising industry. In an effort to promote the highest standards of 
advertising in the UK, firms sponsored the creation of the Advertising Standard Authority (ASA) to 
ensure advertising’s conformity to specific norms and the enforcement of various sanctions. Firms 
advertise their products or services to prospective consumers who then can voice their complaints 
about firms’ advertisements to ASA. Upon receiving a complaint, ASA categorizes a potential 
infringement as misleading or harmful/offensive. Misleading advertisements misrepresent facts by, for 
instance, promoting erroneous prices or deceptive promises, thus conveying information that is 
presumed to violate norms that have been translated into specific rules (e.g., codes of commerce). In 
contrast, harmful/offensive advertisements hurt local mores, beliefs, or values—i.e., violate norms 
for which rules are either inexistent or “not so precise and fool-proof” (Becker, 1963: 132)—thereby 
allowing for multiple audiences’ individual, and often conflicting, interpretations. After evaluating 
each case, ASA makes a decision (adjudication) to ban or clear an advertisement.  
We argue that the type of social norm that an advertisement is presumed to infringe is a key 
determinant of the level of agreement or disagreement between people and ASA, and therefore of 
people’s subsequent complaints to ASA. When both groups identically interpret norm infringement 
(i.e., ASA bans a firm’s advertisement), people will complain more if the norm infringed has been 
translated into specific rules—like in the case of misleading advertisements. In this situation, ASA 
fulfills its mission by protecting people against evident false promises and economic prejudice and 
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stimulates people to be even more vocal about (well-defined and condemned) misleading 
advertisements. In contrast, when ASA clears a firm’s advertisement (i.e., it disagrees with those who 
complained), we expect people to be more vocal about cases dealing with interpretable rather than 
rule-based norms because of negative feelings about ASA not fulfilling its protective role and 
mission.  
We utilized a unique dataset covering three years (2007-2010) that included all the 
complaints received by ASA (64,104 complaints) and all the off- and online articles about all 
disclosed ASA decisions (19,176 articles). Our findings support our hypotheses: the interaction 
between the type of ASA adjudications (ban vs. clear) and the type of violated norm (misleading vs. 
harmful/offensive cases) determines the extent to which people voice their concerns about firms’ 
behavior. One major strength of our study is that we can assume social norms remained relatively 
stable during the three-year long period, which means broader societal level changes in values and 
norms are less likely to have affected ASA’s decisions and people’s propensity to complain. Our 
findings emphasize the importance of looking at the degree of interpretability of a norm and the 
interplay between different audiences for research using a candidate-audiences interface framework 
and, more generally, for research on legitimacy. By bringing people to the fore, this paper also 
speaks to research studying the links between society, organizations and firms.  
 
2  THE CONTEXT: THE UK ADVERTISING REGULATION 
In order to study social norms and people complaints, we focus on UK advertising. As in most 
countries in the world, advertising in the UK is regulated by a legal (statutory) and a voluntary 
system. The legal system is typically more developed for specific industries or topics of public 
concern because they deal with health (e.g., drugs, tobacco, food, drinks) or are the target of social 
scrutiny (e.g., children, environment). The legal system consists of laws that preclude misinformation 
and misrepresentation of facts (on price, intrinsic qualities, etc.). The voluntary system is a form of 
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self-regulation in which firms create a code of conduct and fund an independent organization or 
institution to enforce it (e.g., King and Lenox, 2000; Ostrom, 1990, 2000; Barnett and King, 2008; 
Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011). The basic principle of advertising self-regulation is to ensure that 
any form of advertising or marketing communication is not only “legal,” but also “honest, truthful 
and decent” (Advertising and Marketing Communication Practice 2011: 6).  
Back in 1937, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) issued the first advertising 
code that, through subsequent updates, became the “mother code” for all the other national codes 
(Blue Book, 2010: 28). At that time, almost no countries had regulations to monitor advertising. 
Gradually, countries that were members of the ICC began to introduce self-regulatory systems to 
enforce national codes. In Europe, France was the precursor in this area: its Office de Controle des 
Annonces (Advertising Control Office) was founded in 1935 and was subsequently transformed into 
the Bureau de Verification de la Publicité (Advertising Verification Office) in 1953 and into the Autorité 
de Régulation Professionnelle de la Publicité in 2008. The UK was the second European country to adopt a 
self-regulation system. The resolution was made during the Advertising Association Conference held 
in Brighton in 1961. The Advertising Standards Authority was given the task to create and supervise 
the overall advertising self-regulation system with the following goal: 
“The promotion and enforcement throughout the United Kingdom of the highest standards 
of advertising in all media so as to ensure in co-operation with all concerned that no 
advertising contravenes or offends against these standards…” (The Advertising Standards 
Authority First Report 1964: 3). 
 
 
The Advertising Standards Authority Limited was created on August 22, 1962 and held its inaugural 
meeting on September 24 of the same year. Since then, UK advertisers voluntarily pay a 0.1% levy 
on most of their advertising investment. This levy is collected by two independent organizations: the 
Advertising Standards Board of Finance (ASBOF) and the Broadcast Advertising Standards Board 
of Finance (BASBOF), for non-broadcast and broadcast advertising respectively. These two 
organizations are needed to ensure the independency of ASA from the advertisers (ASA does not 
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have visibility on which advertisers pay the levy and how much each advertiser pays). This levy is 
described as “an excellent example of enlightened self-interest. Advertisers pay the levy because they 
know they benefit greatly as a result. Likewise the public benefit in that it is fast and it is free” (The 
ASA and the ASBOF/BASBOF: 2).  
 If advertising were not subject to self-regulation, it would be “subject to [more] statutory 
regulation” (The ASA and the ASBOF/BASBOF: 2). Self-regulation can reduce the pressures and 
the costs of the legal (statutory) system (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005).  As Mr. George Darling, 
M.P., Minister of State (Home) Board of Trade, expressed on December 1, 1964 in his speech on 
“Advertising and the Labour Government”:  
“I think legislation that goes beyond misrepresentation of fact, which can be assessed 
objectively, would be quite difficult to frame; rather slow, cumbersome and expensive to 
operate; and, in the end, probably not as effective as a really efficient voluntary system” (The 
Advertising Standards Authority First Report 1964: 3). 
 
In the ASA case, the adjudication process lasts from 10 to 85 working days (36 days on average for 
complaints that require a formal investigation).2 When the adjudication is published, the firm is 
immediately asked to amend or withdraw the advertisement. The ASA self-regulation is 
consequential:  decisions can result in a firm losing hundreds thousands up to millions of pounds 
when an ad must be withdrawn or a campaign stopped (as was the case with Louis Vuitton’s ban—
see Appendix A—or the launch of ‘Heat’ perfume). These rulings came with a low societal cost: the 
0.1% levy amounted to a collection of 6.7 million pounds in 2010, which advertisers paid at no cost 
to taxpayers. 
The ASA Chairman has the authority to appoint the board and the members of the ASA 
Council, which adjudicates the most problematic cases. The ASA Council today consists of 12 
members in addition to the Chairman: four from the industry and eight independent members. The 
four industry members are chosen based on their expertise in the field of advertising and sit on the 
                                                        
2 Data from the ASA Annual Report 2011 available online at: http://www.asa.org.uk/News-
resources/~/media/Files/ASA/Annual%20reports/AR%20ONLINE_FINAL280512.ashx.  
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Council as individuals and not as spokesmen from the industry. The eight independent members are 
selected for their ability to represent a wide cross-section of society (e.g., charities, consumer groups, 
young people). Among others, they include, or have included in the past, Nobel laureates, poets, and 
directors of charitable organizations. Both the current and previous ASA Chairmen were Lords and 
served in many governmental chairs (e.g., ministries or trading associations). 
The history of ASA has been marked by its efforts to gain legitimacy among different 
audiences whose interests are not always aligned: industry members, public opinion, and the state. 
After 50 years, today ASA is a key legitimate actor in the UK advertising field and one of the most 
successful examples of self-regulatory organizations in the world. ASA has gained legitimacy within 
the industry (advertisers voluntarily pay the levy- through the ASBOF and BASBOF and abide by 
ASA decisions), public opinion (in the UK people make around 25,000 complaints a year—about 
50% of the total complaints of all European countries combined), and the state. In 2004, ASA has 
become the “one-stop shop” of all advertising complaints for non-broadcast and broadcast 
advertising, i.e., including TV and radio. 
 ASA has a clear procedure on how to handle complaints. Anyone can submit a complaint, 
and the online form for filling a complaint is simple and fast to complete. It includes five steps in 
which the complainer is asked to attach or describe the advertisement, specify where it was 
displayed, and explain the reasons for the complaint. The complaint is then passed onto a 
Complaints Executive, whose task is to classify it based on the type of norm violation (Misleading or 
Harmful/Offensive), the topic (e.g., Children, Environment), and a complexity category. Complaints range 
from “No Additional Investigation” cases, which involve “frivolous complaints or those that relate 
to marketing communications that clearly do not breach the Code” (ASA Non-broadcast Complaint 
Handling Procedures 2012: 4), to “Standard Investigations” cases, which cover a “not minor” part 
of the Code and are “likely to be of interest, in terms of indicating where the ASA draws the line, to 
other marketers” (ASA Non-broadcast Complaint Handling Procedures, 2012: 4). “Standard 
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Investigations” cases allow advertisers to respond to the complaint and produce supporting 
evidence. They can provide ASA with studies, evidence, their point of view, and any other 
information they believe supports the claims of their advertisement. After responses are received, 
the Investigation Executive, who is responsible for undertaking the Investigation (be it Formal or 
Informal), drafts a recommendation about how to resolve the complaint. The complaint can be 
either upheld - and the advertisement is banned - or not upheld - and the advertisement is cleared. This 
recommendation is sent to the advertiser for final input and presented to the Council, which then 
adjudicates.3 Adjudications are published every Wednesday and are posted on the ASA website 
within 14 days of the decision.  They receive significant coverage in all media types: national, local, 
trade, consumer, offline, and online. Along with the direct cost related to coping with ASA 
decisions, media visibility of ASA’s adjudications and subsequent implications for reputation are a 
major sanction for companies whose advertisements do not conform to the Code. Table 3 shows 
the breakdown of ASA decisions in 2009.  
Table 3 - Breakdown of ASA Procedure for All Complaints Received in 2009 
 Complaints % 
Total Received 28,929  
Of which:   
Not of substance and closed 21,558 75% 
Minor substance, parties informed, change made without 
Council decision, and closed  
1,683 6% 
Major substance, parties informed, Council decision: 
complaint not upheld, and closed  
3,453 12% 
Major substance, parties informed, Council decision: 
complaint upheld, ad amended or removed 
2,052 7% 
Decisions on cases of major substance (19% of the 2009 complaints) are published by ASA 
every Wednesday. 
                                                        
3 Complainers or advertisers can appeal the decisions of the Council, including the decision not to investigate a 
complaint, to an independent reviewer who—similar to the ASA’s Chairman—is chosen based on his/her reputation 
and status in the field. For example, since January 1, 2010, the independent reviewer has been Sir Hayden Phillips, who 
has had a long career in the Civil Service, serving as senior member of the Home Office, European Commission, the 
Cabinet Office and Treasure, and, now, as Chairman of the Digital Funding Partnership. To obtain a review, the 
requester must be able to denounce a substantial flaw in the decision process or produce additional relevant evidence. 
The independent reviewer assesses whether the request is acceptable before initiating an investigation and making a 
recommendation to the ASA Council, which can decide whether to accept it or not. Appeals are infrequent (46 out of 
2,704 of the ASA Council’s decisions in 2009 and 33 out of 2,454 in 2010), and very few end in reversed adjudications (4 
in 2009 and only 1 in 2010). 
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3  RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
The degree to which people react to a firm’s perceived norm infringing behavior is likely to vary 
greatly based on the level of public attention it receives. Accordingly, our baseline hypothesis 
concerns the relationship between the salience of ASA’s decisions and the number of future 
complaints people will make to ASA about firms’ advertisements. We argue that the more ASA’s 
decisions are publicized, the more people are likely to complain. This behavior hinges on a 
reinforcement mechanism rather than the decision itself (ban or clear). The rationale is premised on 
agenda-setting theory’s assumption that there is a correspondence between the issues media outlets 
make available to the public and people’s agendas (e.g., Cohen, 1963; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; 
Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). In one of the first studies of this kind, Davis (1952) found that the 
increase in people’s estimate of the crime level in Colorado correlated with the amount of crime 
reported in Colorado newspapers—not an actual increase in crime. In their study of the 1968 US 
presidential political campaign, McCombs and Shaw compared the salience of issues in news content 
with the public’s perceptions and concluded that “people learn from the media what the important 
issues are” (1972: 176).  
According to this vein of research, a decision’s salience is a function of its media coverage. 
The more frequently a topic is discussed, the more likely people are to perceive it as important 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972). As they read or hear about ASA’s decisions through media reports, 
people become more sensitive to firms’ advertising in general. This, in turn, increases the likelihood 
that people complain to ASA about advertisements in their immediate environment. Moreover, 
salience of ASA decisions makes the adjudication process more widely known and people more 
aware that they need to complain before ASA can act. Reading about other people’s complaints 
stimulates mimetic behavior: as they face the same or similar situations (in this case, firms’ 
advertisements), people tend to imitate what others have done. Finally, salience of ASA’s decisions 
informs people about ASA’s influence and authority to ban or clear an advertisement, so sanctioning 
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its removal or continuation. Even though the role of ASA is well-established and legitimate among 
advertising professionals, it has only limited resources to promote its activities to the public. In this 
sense, ASA decisions’ salience in media contributes to increase people’s awareness of its existence, 
mission, and authority. Taken together, the previous arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more salient ASA’s decisions are, the more people’s complaints it will receive. 
 
ASA decisions’ salience is an important determinant of whether people will voice their concerns. Yet 
the nature of these decisions matters as well, since different decisions attract people’s attention 
rather differently (Deephouse and Heugens, 2009). Based on different criteria, ASA can ban or clear 
firms’ advertisements. We argue that the type of social norms an advertisement is presumed to 
infringe is key to explaining whether people will be more or less vocal when ASA releases its 
decisions. ASA categorizes people’s complaints as misleading or harmful/offensive. In the UK, the 
advertising code describes misleading as follows: “Marketing communications must not materially 
mislead or be likely to do so” (UK Code of Non-broadcast Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct 
Marketing – 03 Misleading). It then goes on to provide a detailed list of rules that specify what is 
allowed and what is not allowed. For example, marketing communications “must not mislead the 
consumer by omitting material information” or “the identity of the marketer.” Moreover, before 
distributing or submitting a marketing communication for publication, marketers “must hold 
documentary evidence to prove claims that consumers are likely to regard as objective and that are 
capable of objective substantiation.” ASA’s mission is to eliminate advertising that could damage 
trust between people and firms. If ASA tolerated misleading advertisements, it essentially would be 
concealing behavior that hurt people’s economic welfare. Buying products on the ground of 
“misrepresentation of facts” (The Advertising Standards Authority First Report 1964: 3), false 
promises, or erroneous price advantages is detrimental for both consumers and the advertising 
industry in general.  
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 Misleading advertisements can involve some interpretation; for example, “obvious 
exaggerations (‘puffery’) and claims that the average consumer who sees the marketing 
communication is unlikely to take literally are allowed provided they do not materially mislead” 
(CAP Code 2010: 16). Although separating what is “obvious” exaggeration from condemnable 
exaggeration can be delicate, compared to harmful/offensive cases, misleading cases are based on 
well defined rules. Whenever confusion arises in the interpretation of rules, bulletins and new 
editions of the Code seek to elucidate these ambiguities. For example, in the first five years of its 
existence, ASA promulgated three editions of the Code in order to clarify its rules, mostly for 
misleading cases. In contrast, harmful/offensive advertising falls under a different section of the 
Code. Harmful/offensive cases are judged based on the following principle:  
“Marketers should take account of the prevailing standards in society and the context in 
which a marketing communication is likely to appear to minimize the risk of causing harm 
or serious or widespread offence” (The UK Code of Non-broadcast Advertising, Sales 
Promotion and Direct Marketing: 24).  
 
The ASA’s attempt to create guidelines that can be tailored to a variety of cases in which harm and 
offence are judged has not been without difficulties. The challenge of assessing harmful and 
offensive cases was evident since the beginning, as early as in 1967, in the ASA’s 4th year of 
operation:  
“Matters of taste are always the most difficult to adjudicate upon as they are necessarily 
subjective, and judgment varies according to the medium used, the timing of the 
advertisement, individual and reader-reaction and many other factors” (The Advertising 
Standards Authority Report Fourth Report: 21). 
 
In the early 1970s, with the rise of a more permissive society, the number of complaints on taste 
increased significantly. ASA did not uphold the complaints and clarified its position toward 
complaints on taste and decency as follows: 
“The Authority… does not interpret its responsibilities for supervision as requiring or 
entitling it to act as a censor of morals or as an arbiter of taste. Its role is rather one of 
watching the general level of taste in each sector of advertising, in the interest of the public 
and of advertising as a whole, in relation to what is currently considered fitting and 
acceptable” (The Advertising Standards Authority Eight Report 1971: 19). 
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ASA acts only when cases cause widespread harm or offence to the extent that it damages the entire 
advertising field: 
“Where a form of advertising copy or illustration can bring the whole advertising industry into 
disrepute, it clearly becomes a major source of concern to the Authority. And that point is 
reached when a majority of citizens come to regard any advertising as grossly offensive, whether 
directly or by innuendo” (The Advertising Standards Authority Ninth Report 1972: 7). 
 
Understanding when this “point” is reached officially falls under the purview of the members of the 
ASA Council. However, because values about taste and decency change significantly over time, the 
definition of the “prevailing standards” in society that marketers and ASA should adhere to remains 
open to interpretation. In some situations, companies can produce evidence (e.g., a poll, 
experiments) to show that the majority of people do not feel harmed or offended by a particular 
advertisement. Despite the option of running such tests, ASA Council evaluations for 
harmful/offensive cases are based more on members’ personal judgment and interpretation of social 
norms than on concrete evidence and infringement of well-defined rules. (See Appendix A for 
illustrative examples.) This is in sharp contrast with the approach used for misleading cases, when an 
advertisement is considered to violate norms based on specific rules that state with precision which 
actions are approved and which are prohibited. For harmful/offensive cases, norms at stake cannot 
be expressed in codified rules and remain at the level of mores or values—i.e., according to Becker 
(1963: 131), equivalent to “vague and generalized statements of preference” that are “not useful in 
deciding on courses of action in concrete situations.” Interestingly, in the section of the Code (CAP 
Code 2010) that discusses categories, the description of the Misleading category is seven pages long 
with three title levels (section, subsections, and particular cases). The description of the 
Harmful/Offensive category is only one page long and offers a simple list of general overarching 
principles (e.g., avoid offence, fear or distress, anti-social behavior, unsafe practices, and 
encouragements to drink and drive). The previous distinction between misleading and 
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harmful/offensive cases is particularly important because we expect the impact of ASA’s decisions 
on people’s subsequent complaints to vary with the type of norm violation.  
Let’s first consider the decision to ban an advertisement—i.e., when ASA’s adjudication 
decision aligns with a complaint. What is the effect of ASA decision’s saliency on future complaints 
if the case is misleading rather than harmful/offensive? For misleading cases, when ASA decides to 
ban a company’s advertisement, the mechanisms introduced in Hypothesis 1 should be reinforced. 
First, a company’s misconduct is not only challenged by people’s complaints, but also penalized by 
ASA, thus increasing the perceived illegitimacy of the UK advertising on overall. The company’s 
perceived misconduct is likely to produce negative externalities that spill over to other 
advertisements (Tirole, 1996; Desai, 2011; Vergne, 2012), similar to cases of industrial accidents 
(King and Lenox, 2000) or product recalls (Zavyalova et al., 2012). Second, since ban decisions signal 
ASA’s propensity to recognize people’s complaints as valid, they further stimulate the process of 
complaining and reinforce the mimetic pressures to follow previous complainers. Finally, misleading 
cases involve a loss in customers’ welfare. As acknowledged by ASA’s senior executive (our 
interview, March 13, 2013), “banning advertisements that fooled people and cost them money 
entices other potentially fooled customers to fill in a form and complain.” As a result, when ASA 
decrees that firms made use of misleading advertisements people are likely to complain even more.  
Different considerations apply for ASA ban decisions in harmful/offensive cases. People 
will complain less than average because there is less shared consensus among them about whether 
the violation of a specific norm has the potential to cause harm or offence (e.g., what is decent or 
obscene). Although ban decisions indicate agreement between complainants and ASA, people are 
unlikely to uniformly consider a given advertisement harmful or offensive. Reference to abstract 
overarching principles that embody society’s prevailing standards is inevitably confusing because no 
well-defined judgment criterion is available to discriminate between what is normal or acceptable 
and what is not (Becker, 1963), or to “perceive unambiguously what is normative and what is not” 
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(Dubois, 2003: 4). As a result, when banning harmful/offensive advertisements, ASA will receive 
less univocal support from people. Therefore, compared to ban decisions in misleading cases, 
people will voice less strongly to ASA harmful/offensive ban decisions. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Saliency of ASA ban decisions will trigger more subsequent people’s complaints for misleading 
cases than for harmful/offensive cases. 
 
Let’s turn to clear decisions, cases in which ASA diverges from people’s original complaints. 
Saliency of cleared misleading cases provides little additional information to people and potential 
complainants about norms, their infringement, and their application (Mishina et al., 2012). As a 
result, we do not expect a significant reinforcement of the relationship between salience and 
future complaints for these cases. In contrast, for harmful/offensive cases, the ASA Council is 
charged with the task of evaluating the point “when a majority of citizens come to regard any 
advertising as grossly offensive, whether directly or by innuendo.” These judgments are neither 
based on a set of specific rules nor on hard facts, but on the individual evaluations of ASA 
members who decide where to put the “yardstick” that separates decency from offence. 
Inevitably, this process leaves room for interpretation (Dubois, 2003; Fine, 2005; Hetchter and 
Opp, 2005) and is likely to disappoint or irritate members of the public who would like ASA to 
strictly defend their mores and values. As decisions to clear harmful/offensive cases become 
more salient, the public’s attention increases and begins to target both companies’ behaviors and 
ASA’s decisions on whether to punish perceived norms violations. Clearing harmful/offensive 
cases may therefore trigger negative feelings among people and foster new complaints (Vohs, 
2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Through increased complaints, people signal to ASA that 
certain topics have growing relevance in society, and indicate their hope that ASA will lower its 
yardstick on what is considered acceptable. Accordingly, when ASA decides to clear an 
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advertisement, we hypothesize the number of complaints will increase more for 
harmful/offensive than for misleading cases: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Saliency of ASA clear decisions will trigger more subsequent complaints for harmful/offensive 
cases than for misleading cases. 
 
4  METHOD 
4.1 Sample and Data Collection 
Our main variables are people’s complaints to ASA and, to estimate saliency of ASA’s decisions, the 
number of media reports (articles) on ASA decisions. Information about complaints was provided 
by ASA. During the study period (2007-2010), the 11th Edition of the British Code of Advertising 
Practice (CAP) was used. The 12th Edition was released on September 2010, which marks the end of 
our analysis. Most of the complaints that ASA receives are submitted via the online form and 
automatically transmitted to the ASA internal software. The received date is the one on which the 
complainant completed the form. In a few cases (less than 10%), ASA receives complaints through 
other channels (e.g., fax, phone, mail) and its staff uploads them manually to the same software. 
ASA provided us with daily information about all complaints for the focal period. For each 
complaint, we have information about the type of norm violation, the topic, the industry, the 
product category, the media type, the complexity, the exact date on which the complaint was 
received, and the type and date of its resolution. However, data on the complainants were 
anonymous: the ASA did not provide us with the complainant’s name, address, or any other 
personal information, for obvious confidentiality reasons. People can complain on behalf of an 
organization (for-profit or non-profit) as long as they confirm that the organization agrees to be 
named. However, since the motivation of an organization to complain can differ from that of an 
individual, we excluded organizations’ complaints from the sample. Their exclusion does not impact 
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our results because they amounted to only 4% of the total complaints received by ASA during the 
study period.  
The number of complaints by advertisement is highly skewed: 92% of advertisements 
received only 1 complaint, 7.5% of the advertisements between 2 and 25 complaints, and only 
0.5%—216 advertisements—more than 25 complaints. However, these 216 advertisements were 
responsible for 30% of total complaints. They attracted considerable media and public attention and 
covered sensitive issues (e.g., religion, homosexuality, or animal protection). Therefore, we 
considered them special cases and decided to exclude them from our sample. Although not reported 
here, the results – which are available from the authors upon request – are qualitatively similar 
whether we include or exclude these cases. It is worth noting that even one complaint is sufficient to 
start the whole process leading to ASA adjudications.  
We collected articles about ASA decisions through LexisNexis and Factiva databases 
(printed and broadcast news), and Meltwater—ASA’s media agency (online news). Since media data 
were available from October 2007, our focal period runs from October 2007 to August 2010 (up 
until the introduction of the 12thEdition of the British CAP), for a total of 1,030 days4 and 39,487 
decisions. Previous studies using media articles have mainly focused on the use of newspapers, given 
their prominence in society. However, in our focal period, online media outlets were an increasingly 
critical source of information for people. Since online and offline media do not always overlap, we 
tried to make our media selection as comprehensive as possible. Specifically, we included printed 
and online newspapers, broadcast news, consumer and trade magazines, and national and regional 
outlets. As a result, we covered almost the total universe of articles that mentioned ASA in the UK 
during the study period. We took several steps to ensure the reliability of this data collection. First, 
we contacted Meltwater, the media reporting agency of ASA, which monitors 140,000 websites, 
                                                        
4 We have data from October 9, 2007 to August 31, 2010—a total of 1,058 days. However, we have 28 days of missing 
data distributed as follows: 1 because we used a lag value for some of our independent variables; 26 because ASA’s 
internal software did not work during the first 13 weekends (Saturdays and Sundays); 1 because the software did not 
record a complaint on January 8, 2008. 
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most of them in the UK and other English speaking countries. Meltwater was able to trace media 
articles back to October 2007, the starting date of our study. These articles then were cleaned by 
eliminating double counting of the same news on the same website (sometimes the same webpage 
had two URLs). Meltwater provided us with the algorithm used to search media articles about ASA. 
This algorithm includes different labels used to identify ASA as reported in the news, such as 
“Advertising Standard(s) Authority,” “Advertising Standard(s) Agency,” and “Advertising 
Standard(s) Association.” We double-checked these labels with ASA. The second step was to adopt 
the same Meltwater algorithm to extract data from Factiva and LexisNexis. Factiva and LexisNexis 
are leading companies in media analysis and often used in academic research (e.g., Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003). Unlike other studies, we relied on both databases and cross-checked the results. The 
two databases cover the same major UK media outlets, but can differ for less important outlets that 
were still important to our study, such as those with only regional readership. While the two 
databases overlapped for most of the articles, 20% of the articles in LexisNexis were not in Factiva. 
Overall, we collected 19,176 articles (25% offline and 75% online). 
 
4.2 Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable, People Complaints, measures the number of complaints people made to ASA 
on a specific topic during 1 of the 1,030 days of our study period. We divided complaints into the 
four most representative topics. According to “agenda-setting theory” (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), 
people are more likely to file a complaint on a topic when they have read an article on the same 
topic, so it is important to control for a topic’s effect. ASA distinguishes topics by 100 sub-
categories. Sub-categories are not fixed but change as new topics arise in people’s complaints: 
advertising is a dynamic domain and what society considers appropriate and desirable evolves over 
time. However, in agreement with ASA, we identified the following four stable macro topics: 
children, human dignity, product claim, and others. Therefore, we had 4 observations per day—1 for 
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each topic during 1,030 days—, a total of 4,120 observations. In total we analyzed 64,104 
complaints. We logged the dependent variable because it is skewed to the right. 
 
4.3 Independent Variables 
We created the variables of theoretical interest using media articles, which we grouped into specific 
categories to test our hypotheses. First, we distinguished between articles whose primary focus was 
ASA (Specific) and articles that referred to ASA only incidentally (General) and therefore contained 
separate news content to which people could react. We classified an article as Specific if ASA was 
mentioned either in the title or within the first three paragraphs. Otherwise, we classified the article 
as General. Articles classified as Specific were further distinguished between (1) articles centered on 
ASA decisions (ASA Adjudications) and published primarily on Wednesday and Thursday (ASA 
publishes formal adjudications on Wednesday); and (2) articles that covered other news concerning 
ASA (ASA Other)—e.g., an executive leaving or staying, ASA’s reports, companies that voluntarily 
withdrew an advertisement against which complaints were filed. These articles covered news not 
directly linked to the ASA formal adjudications. Finally, articles on Adjudications were divided 
between Ban and Clear, and Misleading and Harmful/Offensive. Articles classified as Ban covered 
adjudications that upheld the complaints and banned the advertisements, while those classified as 
Clear referred to adjudications that did not uphold the complaints, thus clearing companies’ 
advertisements. The categories Misleading and Harmful/Offensive comprise articles that referred to the 
type of norms and rules companies’ advertisements are presumed to have violated. Note that these 
two categories (Ban vs. Clear and Misleading vs. Harmful/Offensive) are different partitioning of the 
overall Adjudications articles. The interaction of these two categories led to four sub-groups—Ban-
Misleading, Ban-Harmful/Offensive, Clear-Misleading, and Clear-Harmful/Offensive—with which we tested 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
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 Because individuals’ ability to focus their attention on specific issues or situations is limited, 
the effect of media articles on the attitude of people to complain diminishes with time. This means 
that people are most sensitive to the articles published the same day or the day before. Therefore, 
for People Complaints measured on day d for a given topic, our independent variables (i.e., 
Adjudications, Ban, Clear, Misleading, Harm/Offence, and their interactions) measure the cumulative 
number of articles on the same topic at d (i.e., the same day) and d-1 (i.e., the day before). We also 
logged the number of articles because they were skewed to the right. We increased both variables by 
1 unit before applying the log transformation to retain observations with value 0. For example, the 
topic Children received 20 complaints on October 20, 2007, and 10 adjudications articles were 
published that same day and 5 the day before. For October 20, 2007, our dependent variable People 
Complaints was computed as log(20+1) for the children topic and the Adjudications variable as 
log(10+5+1).  
 
4.4 Control Variables 
Our analysis includes several control variables to rule out alternative explanations for the results. 
First, we used Specific/Other articles to control for ASA’s visibility in the media. More visibility in the 
media is likely to stimulate more complaints because people become aware of the existence of an 
organization (ASA) to which they can complain about companies’ advertisements. Second, we used 
General articles as a proxy for the level of advertising’s illegitimacy. Media articles that mention ASA 
only incidentally are likely to be articles that question advertising in general and, in so doing, further 
stimulate people’s complaints. Specific/Other and General variables are calculated like the other 
independent variables: they are the log of the sum of articles at day d and d-1. Third, the 
characteristics of the companies involved in ASA’s decisions can influence people’s complaints. 
Some companies get more attention than others. We thus looked at the two following 
characteristics: ownership and geographic scope. With respect to ownership, we distinguished 
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between public and privately owned companies. We expected public companies to receive more 
attention and hence more complaints. % Public is the percentage of articles that refer to companies 
(or their subsidiaries) listed in a stock exchange market. As to geographic scope, we distinguished 
between national (UK based) and international companies. International companies are more likely 
to be under greater public scrutiny and thus the target of more complaints. For this reason, we 
expected the percentage of articles that refer to international companies (% International) to have a 
positive effect on People Complaints. 
For the first 13 weeks of the study period, ASA did not accept complaints during the 
weekend: people had to wait until Monday to file a complaint. We thus created a dummy that is 
equal to 1 when complaints were filed on Monday and 0 otherwise. There were also two 
advertisements that caused a public outcry and intense media coverage. The first was an 
advertisement in which Heinz used a gay couple to advertise its products; more than 200 people 
complained, and Heinz decided to withdraw it. The second advertisement was an atheist campaign 
that invited people to “stop worrying and enjoy your life” because “there’s probably no God.” This 
advertisement generated 392 complaints and the reaction of a Christian political party that 
responded with an advertisement that claimed “there is definitely a God”—an advertisement that 
generated 1,205 complaints. ASA did not adjudicate either of these cases: Heinz voluntarily 
withdrew its advertisement and the second was considered outside the realm of ASA. Yet both cases 
created a lot of buzz around ASA. We thus created two dummies that are equal to 1 when media 
articles covered both advertisements, 0 otherwise. Finally, we inserted Year and Quarter dummies to 
control for temporal effects. 
 
4.5 Model 
 
Our data set has a panel structure that is usually represented by a matrix N x D. In our case, N 
represents the number of topics and D the day; thus the matrix is 4 x 1,030. 
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People Complaints id = αi+ ß1Articlesi,(d+ [d-1]) + ß2Control Variables +εid 
 
where i is the topic (from 1 to 4); d is the day (from 1 to 1,030); People Complaints id is the log of the 
number of complaints received on topic i on day d; Articles i,(d+ [d-1]) is the log of the sum of the 
number of articles on topic i on day d and the previous day [d-1]; αi is the topic specific constant 
term—i.e., the unobservable for the topic i; and εid is the disturbance term. While a random-effects 
specification assumes that unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the other explanatory 
variables in the model, the fixed-effects specification allows them to be correlated. As we cannot 
exclude correlations between regressors and the random error terms, and since we observed the full 
population of cases (and not a sample of it), we opted for a fixed-effects model.   
 
5  RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation values, which are generally low. We 
checked all models for the existence of multicollinearity by computing the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) and found VIFs to be below the recommended threshold of 10 (all values are less than 3).  
 
Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Values 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1. People Complaints t 2.36 0.76 
      
 2. Adjudications (d + (d-1)) 1.04 1.20 0.35 
     
 3. Ban (d + (d-1)) 0.88 1.15 0.35 0.92 
    
 4. Clear (d + (d-1)) 0.28 0.65 0.14 0.52 0.20 
   
 5. Misleading (d + (d-1)) 0.68 1.06 0.45 0.77 0.78 0.28 
  
 6. Harmful/Offensive (d + (d-1)) 0.50 0.92 0.05 0.64 0.51 0.51 0.08 
 
 7. Ban – Misleading (d + (d-1)) 0.62 1.03 0.44 0.75 0.81 0.18 0.98 0.08 
 8. Clear – Misleading (d + (d-1)) 0.12 0.40 0.22 0.38 0.25 0.60 0.48 0.07 
 9. Ban – Harmful/Offensive (d+(d-1)) 0.35 0.81 0.04 0.55 0.60 0.12 0.09 0.85 
10. Clear – Harmful/Offensive (d+(d-1)) 0.18 0.56 0.04 0.39 0.08 0.83 0.04 0.60 
11. Specific – Other (d + (d-1)) 1.48 1.02 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.18 
12. General (d + (d-1)) 2.17 0.71 0.16 0.32 0.29 0.17 0.23 0.21 
13. % International  (d + (d-1)) 0.27 0.42 0.25 0.56 0.52 0.26 0.40 0.37 
14. % Public (d + (d-1)) 0.20 0.37 0.21 0.49 0.45 0.25 0.41 0.24 
15. Heinz Kiss  0.04 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
16. Atheist ad  0.07 0.25 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.08 
17. Monday 0.15 0.35 0.13 -0.22 -0.19 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 
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Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 8. Clear – Misleading (d+ (d-1)) 0.31          
 9. Ban – Harmful/Offensive (d+(d-1)) 0.09 0.03          
10. Clear – Harmful/Offensive (d+(d-1)) 0.02 0.10 0.13        
11. Specific – Other (d+ (d-1)) 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13       
12. General (d+ (d-1)) 0.22 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.32      
13. % International  (d + (d-1)) 0.38 0.20 0.33 0.19 0.15 0.19     
14. % Public (d + (d-1)) 0.38 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.71    
15. Heinz Kiss  0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.03 
  
16. Atheist ad  0.07 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.25 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.01 
 
17. Monday -0.14 -0.08 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.18 -0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.04 
  
Table 5 reports the results of our regression models. Model 1 is the baseline model, which includes 
only the control variables. Model 2 tests the first hypothesis by including articles about ASA’s 
adjudications. Model 3 discriminates between articles that reported ASA’s decisions to ban or clear 
companies’ advertising. Model 4 distinguishes between the two types of norm violation. Finally, 
Model 5 is the full model that includes the 4 subgroups (Ban-Misleading, Ban-Harmful/Offensive, Clear-
Misleading, and Clear-Harmful/Offensive) and represents the interaction between the type of ASA 
decisions and the type of norms. Table 6 presents the test for the coefficients of the regression in 
Models 3, 4, and 5, respectively. It provides a test for Hypotheses 2 and 3, respectively. The baseline 
model (Model 1) reports the coefficient estimates of the Specific/Other (ß=0.064, p<0.001) and 
General (ß=0.157, p<0.001) variables that positively affect the number of people’s future complaints. 
As expected, media’s general reference to ASA favored more people’s complaints by enhancing 
ASA’s visibility and awareness of its existence and role. The Monday dummy and the variable % 
International are positive and significant (ß=0.386, p<0.001 and ß=0.165, p<0.001, respectively). This 
indicates that a greater number of complaints were submitted after the weekend and the greater the 
percentage of international firms mentioned in ASA’s adjudications, the larger the number of new 
complaints. In contrast, public firms do not seem to trigger more future complaints than private 
firms do. The other two dummies—Heinz Kiss ad and Atheist ad—refer to two advertisements that 
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attracted wide media attention on ASA. The media buzz around these two advertisements did not 
create a significant halo effect on the number of complaints ASA received on other commercials. 
Some of the Years and Quarters variables were significant, suggesting the presence of temporal effects 
in people’s attitude to complain. 
 Model 2 shows the results for the first hypothesis—i.e., more media reports about ASA 
adjudications will increase the number of people’s complaints. The coefficient of the Adjudications 
variable is positive and highly significant (ß=0.090, p<0.001). Specifically, a 1% increase in the 
number of articles on Adjudications increased people’s future complaints to ASA by 9%.  
 Model 3 estimates the main effect of media coverage of ASA’s decision type on the number 
of complaints without controlling for the type of norm violation. Coefficients for both Ban and Clear 
decisions are positive and significant. While the coefficient of Ban (ß=0.077, p<0.001) is greater than 
the coefficient for Clear (ß=0.064, p<0.001), Row 1 in Table 6 shows that the difference is not 
statistically significant (p<0.442).  
 Model 4 assesses the effect of the type of norms without controlling for the type of decision 
made by ASA. As in Model 3, the two coefficients are positive and significant. However, in this case, 
the coefficient for the variable Misleading (ß=0.095, p<0.001) is almost twice the size of the variable 
Harmful/Offensive (ß=0.047, p<0.001). Row 2 in Table 6 shows that the difference is statistically  
significant (p<0.01). Figure 3 illustrates this result graphically, confirming that articles on Misleading 
cases have a consistently greater impact than articles on Harmful/Offensive cases on the number of 
people’s future complaints.  
 Model 5 introduces all four sub-categories of articles and provides the coefficients for testing 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. For Hypothesis 2—articles on Misleading cases have a greater effect than articles 
on Harmful/Offensive cases for ASA ban decisions—the coefficients of the Ban-Misleading (ß=0.089, 
p<0.001) and Ban-Harmful/Offensive (ß=0.031, p<0.01) variables are both positive and statistically 
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significant. Row 3 of  Table 6 provides the statistical test of their difference. The difference is 
statistically different, (p<0.001) supporting Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 5 – Fixed Effects Models Predictions the Number of People’s Future Complaints 
• p<0.05; •• p<0.01; ••• p<0.001 – Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include year, quarter, and topic 
fixed-effects. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Hypothesis 1      
Adjudications (d + [d-1])  0.090•••    
  (0.010)    
Ban (d + [d-1])   0.077•••   
   (0.010)   
Clear (d + [d-1])   0.064•••   
   (0.014)   
Misleading (d + [d-1])    0.095•••  
    (0.011)  
Harmful/Offensive (d + [d-1])    0.047•••  
    (0.011)  
Hypothesis 2      
Ban – Misleading (d + [d-1])     0.089••• 
     (0.011) 
Ban – Harmful/Offensive (d + [d-1])     0.031•• 
     (0.012) 
Hypothesis 3      
Clear – Misleading (d + [d-1])     0.048• 
     (0.023) 
Clear – Harmful/Offensive (d + [d-1])     0.059••• 
     (0.016) 
Specific/Other (d + [d-1]) 0.064••• 0.056••• 0.057••• 0.058••• 0.058••• 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
General (d + [d-1]) 0.157••• 0.128••• 0.129••• 0.128••• 0.130••• 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
% International  (d + [d-1]) 0.165••• 0.081•• 0.090•• 0.105••• 0.112••• 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
% Public (d + [d-1]) -0.011 -0.053 -0.050 -0.054 -0.052 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Heinz Kiss ad Dummy 0.075 0.076 0.079 0.078 0.076 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Atheist ad Dummy 0.064 0.057 0.055 0.049 0.050 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Monday 0.386••• 0.423••• 0.421••• 0.422••• 0.422••• 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant 1.975••• 1.996••• 2.000••• 1.994••• 1.995••• 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,120 
Number of groups (Topic) 4 4 4 4 4 
Adj. R-squared 0.131 0.150 0.149 0.151 0.151 
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Table 6 – F-test for the Differences between the Coefficients on Models 3, 4 and 5 
Variable Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Ban > Clear 
 
p=0.442 
 
  
 
Misleading > Harmful/Offensive  
 
p<0.01 
 
 
 
H2: Ban – Misleading > Ban – Harmful/Offensive 
 
  p<0.001 
 
H3: Clear – Harmful/Offensive > Clear – Misleading 
 
  p=0.706 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that articles on Harmful/Offensive cases have a greater effect on future complaints 
than articles on Misleading cases when ASA does not uphold the case (Clear decision). The 
coefficients of the Clear-Harmful/Offensive (ß=0.059, p<0.001) and Clear-Misleading (ß=0.048, p<0.05) 
are positive and statistically significant. Row 4 of Table 6, however, shows that the difference 
between the two coefficients is positive but not statistically significant (p=0.706). Hypothesis 3, 
therefore, is only partly supported. Figure 4 shows graphically the difference in the coefficients of 
the four sub-groups. Taken together, these results suggest that people’s evaluations of the 
appropriateness of companies’ advertising are influenced by the proper evaluations and decisions of 
an external organization—the ASA. More importantly, this influence is moderated by the type of 
norm. The number of complaints following ASA’s decisions to ban an advertisement increases more 
when social norms are well-established (Misleading) than when norms are open to interpretation 
(Harmful/Offensive). However, when ASA decides to clear an advertisement, the number of 
complaints increases more norms are not well-defined and therefore no specific rules can be relied 
upon to evaluate companies’ advertisements (Harmful/Offensive).  
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Figure 3 - Marginal Effects of Misleading and Harmful/Offensive Articles on the Number of Future 
Complaints 
 
 
The two coefficients are statistically different (see Table 6). 
 
Figure 4 - Marginal Effects of Ban–Misleading, Clear-Misleading, Ban-Harmful/Offensive, and Clear-
Harmful/Offensive articles on the Number of Future Complaints 
 
 
 
All coefficients are statistically significant at different levels (see Table 5). Ban – Misleading (steepest 
line) is significantly different from Ban – Harmful/Offensive (flattest line). Clear – Harmful/Offensive is 
steeper than Clear – Misleading, but the two are not statistically significant. See Table 6 for the 
statistical values. 
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5.1 Robustness Checks 
We conducted several additional analyses to probe the robustness of our results with alternative 
model specifications and measurement issues. First, previous literature has  
mostly focused on the impact of offline (Deephouse, 1996; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Vergne, 
2012) versus online media outlets. Results in Table 7 compare the effect of offline (Models 6 and 7) 
versus online (Models 8 and 9) outlets. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 
5, though the coefficient of the variables of theoretical interest are more significant for online (both 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported) than for offline (only Hypothesis 2 is supported) media, thus 
suggesting that previous studies’ results may underestimate the influence of social media on people’s 
behavior. Second, we treated our dependent variable as a count variable and estimated a negative 
binomial model controlling for ‘topic’ fixed-effects (Table 8). The results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported before. 
 Table 9 reports the results for the full model re-estimated separately for each of the four 
main topics (Children, Human Dignity, Production Claim, and Other). Coefficients now vary in 
significance depending on the topics but continue to exhibit the same basic patterns. Product Claim is 
the topic for which norms are more clearly defined and hence easier to enforce; in fact, assessing 
what is considered misleading on a claim is easier to prove than what is misleading for topics 
concerning children or human dignity subjects. Consistent with our previous results, we found the 
Product Claim topic fosters more complaints for Ban-Misleading cases—when ASA adjudicates that a 
complaint is substantiated, people feel encouraged to complain even more. In contrast, cases dealing 
with Human Dignity or Children topics are inherently more personal and the corresponding norms 
more open to interpretation. As a result, when ASA decides to clear a company’s advertisement, 
people are more likely to react—the coefficient of Clear-Harmful/Offensive is positive and significant 
for both topics.  
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 Finally, we tested whether our models are sensitive to the type of companies involved. This 
test is important because different adjudications involving different types of firms could receive 
greater media coverage and therefore more strongly influence people’s complaints. Accordingly, we 
split our sample into two distinct subsamples, one for international and the other for domestic 
companies. The results, which are reported in Table 10, are qualitatively similar to the main results: 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are supported for both international and domestic companies. Table 
11 reports the test for the difference between the coefficients Ban-Misleading, Ban-
Harmful/Offensive, Clear-Misleading and Clear-Harmful/Offensive among the models.  
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Table 7 - Offline and Online Media Effects on the Number of People’s Future Complaints 
• p<0.05; •• p<0.01; ••• p<0.001 – Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include year, quarter, 
and topic fixed-effects. This  compares the effect of online versus offline articles. 
 
 Model 6: Model 7: Model 8: Model 9: 
Variable Only offline 
outlets 
Only offline 
outlets 
Only online 
outlets 
Only online 
outlets 
     
Hypothesis 1     
Adjudications (d + [d-1]) 0.076•••  0.084•••  
 (0.015)  (0.011)  
Hypothesis 2     
Ban – Misleading (d + [d-1])  0.084•••  0.088••• 
  (0.018)  (0.012) 
Ban – Harm/Offence (d + [d-1])  0.036  0.031• 
  (0.021)  (0.013) 
Hypothesis 3     
Clear – Misleading (d + [d-1])  0.033  0.046 
  (0.046)  (0.025) 
Clear – Harm/Offence (d + [d-1])  0.055  0.053•• 
  (0.032)  (0.018) 
Specific/Other (d + [d-1]) 0.062••• 0.064••• 0.048••• 0.050••• 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
General (d + [d-1]) 0.060••• 0.060••• 0.157••• 0.158••• 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
% International  (d + [d-1]) 0.167••• 0.176••• 0.124•• 0.144••• 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.039) (0.039) 
% Public (d + [d-1]) 0.077 0.072 -0.039 -0.049 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.042) (0.042) 
Heinz Kiss ad Dummy 0.142•• 0.142•• 0.083 0.085 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
Atheist ad Dummy 0.094• 0.091• 0.066 0.063 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Monday 0.379••• 0.379••• 0.428••• 0.426••• 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant 2.270••• 2.273••• 2.038••• 2.040••• 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,120 
Number of Topics  4 4 4 4 
R-squared  0.107 0.108 0.169 0.170 
Adj. R-squared 0.103 0.103 0.165 0.166 
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Table 8 - Negative Binomial Fixed-Effects Model 
Variable Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
      
Hypothesis 1      
Adjudications (d + [d-1])  0.085•••    
  (0.008)    
Ban (d + [d-1])   0.072•••   
   (0.008)   
Clear (d + [d-1])   0.055•••   
   (0.011)   
Misleading (d + [d-1])    0.080•••  
    (0.008)  
Harm/Offence (d + [d-1])    0.045•••  
    (0.009)  
Hypothesis 2      
Ban – Misleading (d + [d-1])     0.074••• 
     (0.009) 
Ban – Harmful/Offensive (d + [d-1])     0.031•• 
     (0.010) 
Hypothesis 3      
Clear – Misleading (d + [d-1])     0.041• 
     (0.017) 
Clear – Harmful/Offensive (d + [d-1])     0.051••• 
     (0.013) 
Specific/Other (d + [d-1]) 0.066••• 0.058••• 0.059••• 0.060••• 0.060••• 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
General (d + [d-1]) 0.141••• 0.110••• 0.111••• 0.111••• 0.113••• 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
% International  (d + [d-1]) 0.151••• 0.076•• 0.086••• 0.096••• 0.103••• 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
% Public (d + [d-1]) -0.006 -0.041 -0.038 -0.039 -0.037 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Heinz Kiss ad Dummy 0.020 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.025 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Atheist ad Dummy 0.047 0.037 0.034 0.030 0.030 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Monday 0.375••• 0.416••• 0.414••• 0.414••• 0.413••• 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 1.309••• 1.366••• 1.369••• 1.363••• 1.364••• 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,120 
Number of Topics 4 4 4 4 4 
 
 
• p<0.05; •• p<0.01; ••• p<0.001 – Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include year, quarter, 
and topic fixed-effects. The dependent variable is not logged. 
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Table 9 - Predicting the Number of People’s Future Complaints (per Topic) 
 Model 5: Model 5.a: Model 5.b: Model 5.c: Model 5.d: 
Variable Fixed-effects 
by topic 
Only 
Children 
Topic 
Only Human 
Dignity 
Topic 
Only 
Product 
Claim Topic 
Only Other 
Topic 
      
Ban – Misleading (d + [d-1]) 0.089••• 0.061 0.034 0.099••• 0.048•• 
 (0.011) (0.048) (0.057) (0.019) (0.018) 
Ban – Harm/Offence (d + [d-1]) 0.031•• 0.083•• 0.024 0.000 0.062•• 
 (0.012) (0.027) (0.020) (0.050) (0.021) 
Clear – Misleading (d + [d-1]) 0.048• 0.124 -0.188 0.043 0.061 
 (0.023) (0.117) (0.215) (0.036) (0.033) 
Clear – Harm/Offence (d + [d-1]) 0.059••• 0.065• 0.103••• -0.041 0.057• 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.030) (0.127) (0.026) 
Specific/Other (d + [d-1]) 0.058••• 0.056•• 0.046• 0.060•• 0.068••• 
 (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) 
General (d + [d-1]) 0.130••• 0.113••• 0.123••• 0.142••• 0.145••• 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) 
% International  (d + [d-1]) 0.112••• 0.077 0.131• 0.118• 0.139•• 
 (0.028) (0.069) (0.056) (0.057) (0.049) 
% Public (d + [d-1]) -0.052 -0.192•• -0.112 -0.023 0.045 
 (0.030) (0.074) (0.062) (0.058) (0.053) 
Heinz Kiss ad Dummy 0.076 0.116 0.078 0.025 0.076 
 (0.047) (0.096) (0.090) (0.098) (0.091) 
Atheist ad Dummy 0.050 0.004 0.110 0.046 0.053 
 (0.037) (0.076) (0.072) (0.079) (0.072) 
Monday 0.422••• 0.431••• 0.379••• 0.422••• 0.469••• 
 (0.025) (0.051) (0.048) (0.052) (0.049) 
Constant 1.995••• 1.370••• 1.676••• 2.010••• 2.892••• 
 (0.039)  (0.080) (0.075) (0.082) (0.077)  
Observations 4,120 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
Number of Topics 4     
R-squared 0.155 0.150 0.132 0.192 0.206 
Adj. R-squared 0.151 0.135 0.117 0.178 0.193 
 
• p<0.05; •• p<0.01; ••• p<0.001 – Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include year and 
quarter fixed-effects. Model 5 includes topic fixed-effects. 
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Table 10 - Comparing Predictive Models of People Future Complaints for International vs. Domestic 
Companies 
 
 Model 15: Model 16: Model 17: Model 18: 
 
Variable 
Only International  
companies 
Only International  
companies 
Only Domestic 
companies 
Only Domestic 
companies 
     
Hypothesis 1     
Adjudications (d + [d-1]) 0.100•••  0.068•••  
 (0.009)  (0.011)  
Hypothesis 2     
Ban – Misleading (d + [d-1])  0.100•••  0.074••• 
  (0.011)  (0.015) 
Ban – Harm/Offence (d + [d-1])  0.053•••  0.015 
  (0.013)  (0.020) 
Hypothesis 3     
Clear – Misleading (d + [d-1])  0.078••  0.044 
  (0.026)  (0.040) 
Clear – Harm/Offence (d + [d-1])  0.072•••  0.067•• 
  (0.020)  (0.026) 
Specific/Other (d + [d-1]) 0.059••• 0.060••• 0.066••• 0.067••• 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
General (d + [d-1]) 0.137••• 0.139••• 0.155••• 0.155••• 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Heinz Kiss ad Dummy 0.089 0.088 0.067 0.069 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Atheist ad Dummy 0.049 0.044 0.073 0.076• 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
Monday 0.414••• 0.413••• 0.387••• 0.386••• 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Constant 2.006••• 2.007••• 2.012••• 2.012••• 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,120 
Number of Topics  4 4 4 4 
R-squared  0.149 0.150 0.130 0.130 
Adj. R-squared 0.146 0.146 0.126 0.126 
 
• p<0.05; •• p<0.01; ••• p<0.001 – Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include year, quarter, and topic 
fixed-effects. This  compares the effect of public versus private companies. 
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Table 11 - F-test for the Differences between the Coefficients among the Models (testing H2 and H3)  
Variables 
Model 5 
Main model 
Model 7 
Offline outlets 
Model 9 
Online outlets 
Model 14 
Negative 
Binomial 
Model 16 
International 
companies 
Model 18 
Domestic 
companies 
 
Ban-Misleading  
 
0.089
•••
 0.084
•••
 0.088
•••
 
 
0.074
•••
 
 
0.100
•••
 
 
0.074
•••
 
 
Ban-Harmful/Offensive  
 
0.031
•
 0.036 0.031
•
 
 
0.031
••
 
 
0.053
•••
 
 
0.015 
H2: Ban – Misleading >  
Ban – Harmful/Offensive  
p<0.001 p<0.1 p<0.05 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.05 
 
Clear-Misleading  
 
0.048
•
 0.033 0.046 
 
0.041
•
 0.078
••
 0.044 
 
Clear-Harmful/Offensive  
 
0.059
•••
 0.055 0.053
••
 
 
0.051
•••
 0.072
•••
 0.067
••
 
H3: Clear – Misleading <  
Clear – Harmful/Offensive 
p=0.706 p=0.697 p=0.830 p=0.664 p=0.854 p=0.634 
 
p-values for the differences in the coefficients are in bold 
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6  DISCUSSION 
Previous research on the influence of social norms on individuals’ behavior usually assumes 
normative convergence among the evaluations of different audiences. But while some norms are 
codified, others are open to multiple interpretations, thus leaving unexplored the question of 
whether such evaluations are truly independent or if (and how) they affect each other. Drawing from 
sociological and socio-cognitive research on norms, we argue that the type of norms a company’s 
advertisement is presumed to infringe is a key determinant of how audiences’ evaluations influence 
each other. We tested our hypotheses by looking at people’s complaints about companies’ 
advertisements to the UK Advertising Standard Authority (ASA), a self-regulatory organization that 
uses various sanctions to ensure advertising conforms to specific norms. We proposed and found 
that people are more likely to complain when ASA bans an advertisement that is presumed to 
infringe rule-based norms because the ban reinforces people’s reasons for voicing their complaints. 
Similarly, people also will complain more when ASA clears an advertisement that was perceived to 
infringe norms more open to individual interpretation (such as those related to decency, for 
instance). Thus, the extent to which people react to ASA’s decisions depends on both the type of 
decision made and the type of norms violated by companies’ advertisements. 
Our study has important ramifications for research on social norms and organizations. First, 
it brings center-stage an essential actor who has been overlooked in recent research, or whose 
actions have been lumped with other phenomena: people. People’s reactions have been ignored or, 
at best, pooled with other identifiable organizations such as social movements, contestation, or 
entrepreneurship (e.g., King and Soule, 2007). Most studies examine how firms react to these 
movements and other challenges emanating from society (King, 2008; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; 
Vergne, 2012). We reversed the focus of attention and studied people’s reactions to a firm’s specific 
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behavior—advertising—in relation to existing norms and a self-regulatory organization. The saliency 
of ASA’s decisions increases how much people voice their concern. 
In this respect, this study speaks to research on mass communication and agenda-setting 
theory (e.g., Cohen, 1963; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). While many 
empirical studies have found people to be concerned with issues receiving extensive media coverage, 
there is still debate about whether this translates into actual behavior (Griffin, 2003; McCombs, 
2005). Besides increasing awareness of the existence of a self-regulatory organization to which 
people can complain, media coverage also draws people’s attention to whether or not companies’ 
behavior is socially acceptable and desirable (Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012). This study 
estimates the effect of media reports directly on people’s actual behavior (complaints) and not 
merely on their perceptions. It emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between rule-based and 
interpretable norms in studying people’s reactions to firms’ communications and behavior in 
general. People’s behavior depends not only on the amount of media coverage, but also on the 
content—namely, the type of ASA decisions and the type of norm infringement.  
Second, while previous studies have recognized that the presence of distinct audiences in a 
domain might affect the independence of their evaluations, for purposes of analytical clarity most of 
them focus on one audience at a time, and usually the most prominent in the chosen context—e.g., 
regulators in the banking industry (Deephouse, 1996), security analysts in the financial market 
(Zuckerman, 1999), the media in the VC market (Pollock and Rindova, 2003), the Michelin guide in 
French cuisine (Durand et al., 2007), and distributors in the movie industry (Cattani et al., 2008). As 
a result, prior research has left to future work the task of probing what constitutes acceptable and 
appropriate behavior in the presence of multiple audiences (Suchman, 1995; Hannan, Pólos, and 
Carroll, 2007). A key claim of this study is that the extent to which those evaluations are 
independent or affect each other depends on whether or not norms have been translated into 
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specific rules that can be used to decide what to do in concrete situations (Becker, 1963; Dubois, 
2003). For instance, when norms cannot be translated into specific rules, people voice their concerns 
more when the third-party organization decides against prior complaints. Focusing on the type of 
social norms at stake has important implications for current neo-institutional research. By examining 
the conditions under which two audiences (here, people and a self-regulatory organization) influence 
each other, the present study sheds light on the determinants of acceptable and appropriate 
behaviors, so paving the way for a multidimensional view of legitimacy (e.g., Ruef and Scott, 1998; 
Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006) where the implications of considering different types of social 
norms are explicitly examined.  
Third, recent studies adopting an audience-candidate interface framework suggest that 
audiences evaluate candidates by classifying them according to existing categories. Membership in a 
category comes with a set of (default) normative expectations about the features and behaviors that 
characterize a candidate (individual or organization) as a legitimate member of that category. As they 
gauge a candidate, audience members find it difficult to make sense of normative infringement. As a 
result, candidates whose attributes and behaviors defy existing classification invite ignorance, 
contestation, and penalties (e.g., Zuckerman 1999; Zuckerman et al., 2003; Hsu, 2006). Our study 
adds to research on the negative consequences of norm infringement by looking at the 
interdependence between the evaluations of different audiences and identifying the conditions under 
which these evaluations are more or less likely to reinforce each other. As the results of our analysis 
indicate, it is the type of norms that candidates are presumed to have infringed that complicates 
audiences’ efforts to make sense of candidates’ behavior, not whether this behavior fits neatly into 
an existing category or corresponds to a prototype. 
An important strength of our study is that ASA has long been considered a legitimate actor 
in the UK advertising industry and one of the most successful examples of self-regulation 
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organizations in the world. Over the years, ASA gained legitimacy within the industry, vis-à-vis the 
public (people), and the state. An additional strength of our research design is that it is reasonable to 
assume that during the study period no significant normative change affected ASA’s decisions or 
people’s complaints. Previous research has shown how societal level changes (Rao et al., 2005) or 
generational shifts in audience membership (Cattani et al., 2008) produce changes in values and 
norms that are used to evaluate candidates’ behavior. In the case of Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), for example, the introduction of a new movie ratings system in the US in 1968 
marked a significant departure from the old system (the so-called Hays Code). While the old system 
“deemed certain material taboo, the new one essentially assumed that adults could consume any 
content. Ratings would serve solely as guidance for parents who wished to shelter their children 
from exposure to certain scenes and subjects, including profanity, nudity, sexuality, violence, and 
drug use” (Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011: 544). Given the relatively short time period of our 
study, we can exclude broader societal or audience membership changes as possible sources of norm 
ambiguity—besides and beyond their level of interpretability. As a result, our paper offers a more 
reliable test of the impact that ASA’s decisions have on people’s future complaints, accounting for 
the type of norm being violated.  
Despite overall support for the hypotheses, this study has important limitations, which in 
turn suggest directions for future work. First, people are likely to react differently to the same news. 
Unfortunately, we do not have fine-grained data on who complains and most of the complainers 
complain only once. Although our key informants emphasized how complainers may constitute a 
rather diverse group along several demographic characteristics such as gender, age, etc., we do not 
have data to determine whether a particular profile of complainers is more or less likely to submit a 
complaint to ASA. While we expect that individual level characteristics are likely to affect the 
likelihood of making a complaint, we cannot support this claim in our study. We share this limitation 
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with many media studies in mass communication literature. Second, we see ASA’s decisions that are 
reported in the media, but not how the decisions were made. Studying the process through which 
ASA makes a specific decision would shed further light on the challenges encountered when 
harmful/offensive cases are adjudicated and the rationale for the decision to either ban or clear a 
specific advertisement. Third, we study a context in which a regulatory organization is well-
established and enjoys both high visibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its main stakeholders. 
Different results might have been observed if the analysis had focused on those (early) periods in 
which ASA faced lower legitimacy and greater contestation. Fourth, we treat all media outlets the 
same way, even though they may differ in terms of how they report ASA’s decisions, their policies, 
and the type of readership they target. Finally, questions about the extent our findings can be 
generalized only can be answered by examining other contexts. In particular, it would be interesting 
to replicate this study across different institutional contexts. Given that advertising self-regulation is 
now established in more than forty countries around the world, this context can open up 
opportunities for cross-national studies. The context of advertising is flexible enough to allow future 
researchers to explore all these possibilities. Experimental studies may help clarify some of the causal 
mechanisms that produce the effects we found in our field study. These represent fruitful areas for 
further investigation that we hope will contribute to a better understanding of the complex and 
fundamental relationships linking norms, social evaluations, and people’s action in favor or against 
organizations. 
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 
WHAT IS THE SHARE PRICE REACTION TO ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL MISCONDUCT? 
 
While the consequences of committing illegal misconduct are undoubtedly negative, 
the outcomes of social misconduct, a behavior that contravenes the values and 
norms of society, are unclear. Combining literature on organizational misconduct 
and institutional theory, this paper develops a theoretical framework predicting that 
social misconduct harms companies’ performance more when (a) the norm is less 
ambiguous, (b) when the infringement is more salient and (c) it is committed in the 
company’s local environment. Results from this event study analysis show that social 
misconduct does not generate negative price response, not even when the norm is 
less ambiguous and the infringement receives high media attention. Thus, this paper 
adds a new piece in the puzzling picture that links non-conforming actions to 
performance. Contributions to organizational misconduct, institutional theory and 
strategy research are discussed. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Companies are subject to external and internal pressures to make actions that conform to the norms 
of the environment where they operate. Actions need to conform to the country’s laws and 
regulations as well as to the values and social norms of the environment where the firms operate 
(Suchman, 1995; Webb et al., 2009). The threat of sanctioning deviant behaviors is usually the main 
reason to conform (Strachan, Snith, and Beedles, 1983). Literature on organizational misconduct has 
widely studied illegal behaviors and there is high consensus on the fact that they directly or indirectly 
harm companies’ performance (Surroca, Tribó, and Waddock, 2010). Therefore, news about illegal 
actions are usually followed by a drop in the share price (Wier, 1983; Strachan, Snith, and Beedles, 
1983; Reichert, Lockett, and Rao, 1996). Instead, social misconduct, a behavior that contravenes 
social norms, not necessarily laws, have received less attention in this literature (Greve et al., 2010; 
Warren, 2003). 
 On the other hand, institutional theory has focused on illegitimate actions, behaviors that 
contravenes the social norms of a given group. The traditional argument in institutional theory is 
that illegitimate behaviors trigger sanctions by actors in the environment, thus they should negatively 
impact companies’ performance or performance-related outcomes (Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). However, other scholars found that this relationship is non-linear 
(Deephouse, 1999; Smith, 2011) or positive (Kraatz and Zajac 1996; Durand, Rao and Monin 2007; 
Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Part of this puzzling literature (Heugens and Lander, 2009) is due to the 
difficulties to specify the relevant reference group (Warren, 2003) and measure the corresponding 
violation  (Vergne, 20110). In fact, literature on legitimacy has mainly focused on a specific industry 
group, not necessarily a violation that affects the social norm or values of the overall society 
(Vergne, 2011). Therefore, the effects of social misconduct are, at best, understudied. This paper 
focuses on the financial consequences of social misconduct. While we expect that social misconduct 
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financially penalizes the companies involved, the variation in this penalization is much less clear. 
Therefore, we address the following research question: Why are companies financially penalized to a 
greater or lesser degree for their social misconduct?  
 Specifically, this paper develops a theoretical framework explaining how and why news of 
social misconduct, defined as actions that break the social norms or values of the collective society 
(Suchman, 1995; Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006), affect the share price of the companies 
involved. Unlike illegal misconduct, social misconduct is punished mainly through informal 
sanctions. Therefore, investors are likely to sell their shares if they think that the image of the 
company has been harmed (Mishina, Block, and Mannor 2012; Sullivan, Haunschild, and Page 
2007). However, given that social norms are ambiguous (Becker, 1963; Dubois, 2003) and 
sanctioning is uncertain (Ingram and Silverman, 2002), this effect is highly contextual (Fauchart and 
Hippel, 2008). We hypothesize that the main effect is negative, but it would manifest itself more 
when (a) the norm is less ambiguous (Becker, 1963; Dubois, 2003), (b) the infringement is more 
salient (Pollock and Rindova, 2003; King, 2008; Pollock et al. 2008) and (c) it is committed in the 
company’s local environment (Hechter and Opp, 2005; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002). 
 This study contributes to three different streams of research. First, it contributes to 
organizational social misconduct. This literature looks both at behaviors that break laws and social 
norms, without a clear distinction between the two (Greve et al., 2010). We suggest the importance 
of distinguishing between illegal misconduct and social misconduct, as these two behaviors follow 
different mechanisms and have different consequences for companies. Second, it makes 
contributions to institutional theory, in particular to the literature that studies the consequences of 
making deviant behaviors. Prior studies have focused on actions that break the norms of a specific 
sector (Meyer and Scott, 1983; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996) or competitors’ group (Miller and Chen, 
1996; Deephouse, 1999; Smith, 2011) not necessarily of society. This paper is one of the first studies 
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that looks at the effect of illegitimate actions across industries and norms’ violations. Also, the two 
main mechanisms studied in this paper (the ambiguity in the assessment of social norms and the 
uncertainty in their sanctioning) can shed light on some of the contrasting results in previous 
literature on deviant behaviors. Third, it contributes to strategy research and to the emerging 
literature that brings institutional theory into strategy research (Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Peng et 
al., 2009; Ahuja and Yayavarama, 2011). In particular, this literature has been criticized (Durand, 
2012) to be too unbalanced towards the economic approach of institutional theory (North, 1990) 
overlooking the sociological one (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 2008). By looking at the effect of social 
misconduct to a key strategic outcome (CAR) this study clarifies the mechanisms on how social 
norms can directly impact companies’ performance 
 
2  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Norms, deviant behaviors and financial performance 
Norms are cultural phenomena that prescribe and proscribe behavior in specific circumstances 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott. 2008; North, 1990). The cost of making deviant behaviors is usually 
the main reason for companies to comply. Literature on organizational misconduct has a long 
tradition in economics and sociology. Greve et al. (2010) provide an in-depth literature review as 
well as one formal definition of organizational misconduct: 
 
We define organizational misconduct as behavior in or by an organization that a 
social-control agent judges to transgress a line separating right from wrong; where 
such a line can separate legal, ethical, and socially responsible behavior from their 
antitheses. 
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To them, organizational misconduct is a behavior that needs to be labeled as deviant by a social-
control agent, an actor “that represents a collectivity and that can impose sanctions on that 
collectivity’s behalf” (p. 56). Examples of social-control agents are “world polity (i.e., international 
governing bodies), the state (i.e., national and local governmental bodies), and professional 
associations (e.g., the American Medical Association, the American Bar Associations)”. One of the 
shortcomings of this definition is that it puts together legal, ethical and socially responsible behavior. 
Instead, distinguishing between laws and social norms can be very important for companies 
(Hechter and Opp, 2005).  
 Laws and social norms are indeed different. Laws are the formal ‘rules of the game’ from 
which companies cannot easily escape if they want to operate in a given country (Webb et al., 2009). 
For laws, it is clear which the social-control agent that monitors, judges and sanctions companies’ 
behaviors is. Laws are explicitly specified in written texts – such as civil and penal codes.  Behaviors 
are unambiguous because a designed body categorizes them either as legal or illegal. Enforcement of 
sanctions is assured by third parties, like the state, courts and police (Hechter and Opp, 2005; 
Ingram and Silverman, 2002). Sanctions for each deviant behavior are clearly defined ex-ante and 
include fines and imprisonment (Reichert, Lockett, and Rao, 1996). However, given the social 
gravity of illegal behaviors, they may be also sanctioned informally, i.e. by other social parties that 
interact with the company. Illegal behaviors may raise the cost of capital (Komisarijevsky, 1983), 
decrease the quality of network partners (Sullivan et al.. 2007), induce clients to leave (Jensen 2006), 
negatively affect the tone of the media (Zavyalova et al., 2012) and damage companies’ reputation 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). As a result, researches have long since found that news about illegal 
behaviors usually result in a drop in share price (Wier, 1983; Strachan, Snith, and Beedles, 1983; 
Reichert, Lockett, and Rao, 1996). 
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 To the contrary, social norms are spontaneous rather than deliberately planned (Hechter and 
Opp, 2005). They are entrenched in the reference group (Warren, 2003), as part of its heritage and 
behaviors (Hackman, 1976). They are mostly oral or shared in the form of tacit knowledge 
(Feldman, 1984). Social norms differ from laws in two major ways. First, social norms are 
ambiguous to a certain degree. Sociological (Becker, 1963) and socio-cognitive (Dubois, 2003) 
literature on social norms usually regards norms as stemming from values. Values are “vague and 
generalized statements of preference” (Becker, 1963: p. 65), while norms aim to be “precise; one 
knows quite accurately what he can and cannot do and what will happen if he does the wrong thing” 
(Becker, 1963: p.65). However, “even if they are far less ambiguous than values, [norms] too may 
cause us difficulty in deciding on courses of action” (Becker, 1963: p.66). In fact, the boundary 
between appropriate and inappropriate behaviors can be blurred (Dubois 2003). Second, they work 
as “decentralized institutions” that rely on “diffuse individuals (often those directly affected) to 
punish” their violations (Ingram and Silverman, 2002: 10). Sanctions (or rewards) are uncertain; they 
depend on the judgments of individual actors and rely on their ability and willingness to enforce it 
(Scott, 2008). Literature on legitimacy has long studied the performance consequences of behaviors 
that break the social norms of a specific group, known as “illegitimate behaviors”. However, given 
the ambiguity in the interpretation of the norms and the uncertainty in their sanctioning make the 
outcome of illegitimate actions much less clear. 
 The traditional argument in institutional research is that illegitimate behaviors should harm 
companies through social sanctions given by actors in the reference group (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 1987; Fauchart and Hippel, 2008).  As a result, companies that make illegitimate actions have 
less survival chances and lower performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). These 
predictions hold especially in high-institutionalized and non-profit sectors, like education and health 
(Meyer and Scott, 1983). However, subsequent studies have found contrasting results. Among the 
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first papers to challenge this hypothesis were the studies of Elsbach and Sutton 1992 and Kraatz and 
Zajac (1996). Elsbach and Sutton (1992) proposed that, given that social norms are open to different 
interpretability, organizations can use impression management techniques to manipulate 
controversial events and increase their visibility and public acceptability. Kraatz and Zajac (1996) 
studied a highly institutionalized sector, the art liberal schools. They found that the decisions of 
schools to add business courses (a highly illegitimate behavior according to their peers) increased the 
survival chances of the schools and the number of students enrolled. This is because what other 
members of the education field considered illegitimate was actually beneficial for the customers 
(students and parents) of the schools. Since then, many other studies have found opposing results 
between different types of deviant behaviors and performance - or performance related - outcomes. 
Deephouse (1999) found that it is beneficial to depart from the competitive norms up to a certain 
point, a theory he called ‘strategic balance’. Similarly, Smith (2011) found that non-conformity 
simply raises the risk that companies face. Fund investors that depart from the norms of their 
sectors are excessively rewarded if their strategy paid out, but excessively penalized if it did not. 
Instead, Durand et al., (2007) found that, contrary to their expectations, code-violations increase, 
instead of decreasing, external valuations. French chefs borrowing elements from a competing code 
category (classical vs. nouvelle cuisine) on average foster external evaluations. In fact, code-violating 
actions ‘may be a way to attest the mastery in both codes, and a way to hedge identification and 
categorization risks associated with code-violating changes’ (Durand et al., 2007:468). 
 The main problem in institutional literature is the identification of the reference group 
(Warren, 2003). In fact, Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy broadly refers to actions that are 
“desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions.” (p. 573). Therefore, the definition of Suchman (1995) can be applied to any 
reference group. Literature has usually focused on a specific industry (Meyer and Scott, 1983; 
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Durand et al., 2007) or a strategic group (Deephouse, 1999; Miller and Chen, 1996), whose 
violations do not necessarily involve breaking the values or norms of the collective society. This 
paper focuses on social misconduct that we define based on the literature on organizational 
misconduct and legitimacy I define social misconduct as the following: 
 
Organizational social misconduct is an evaluation made by a social-control agent that 
an organization’s behavior contravenes the system of values and norms of society. 
 
However, we consider social-control agent more broadly than in Greve et al. (2010), which refer 
only to actors that can infringe direct penalties to the organizations. Instead, as literature on 
legitimacy shows, infringements of social norms are informally penalized by individual actors. In 
case of social misconduct, the role of social-control agent is still instrumental in labeling a behavior 
as deviant, however not in the enforcement of the sanction. The main cost of a social misconduct is 
not in the direct sanction that the social-control agent provides, but in the informal sanctions that 
such evaluation may or may not induce. 
 This paper looks at the impact of social misconduct on the share price of the company’s 
involvement. We argue that the financial impact of social misconduct depends on (1) the degree of 
ambiguity of the norms and (2) on the likelihood that social actors (consumers, business partners…) 
will punish the companies, thus impacting their future top-line.  
 
2.2 Social misconduct and CAR 
An event influences the share price of companies if investors expect that it will affect their future 
performance (Wier, 1983; Strachan, Snith, and Beedles, 1983; Reichert, Lockett, and Rao, 1996). 
Social misconduct, as defined here, is a  behavior that contravenes the values and norms of society 
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where the company operates. When such a behavior is made, investors would anticipate that the 
firm would incur into two types of costs. First, there are direct costs. These costs do not take the 
form of explicit fines inflicted by a central authority (Ingram and Silverman, 2002), but they can be 
still significant. Firms will have difficulties in recovering the sunk costs associated with the 
corresponding action. An action that is labeled as socially deviant needs to be revoked or, anyway, it 
would generate less revenues than expected; this would impact the future top line of the company. 
Moreover, there is time, attention (Ocasio, 1997) and money spent by managers in the company to 
manage the event with internal stakeholders (top management team, employees…) and external 
stakeholders, such as media (Westphal et al., 2012) or government (Bonardi et al., 2005). These costs 
vary with the type of actions, but they can be also considerable. For example, the decision of FIAT, 
the Italian automobile manufacturer, to move a factory from Italy to Romania for cost saving, 
created a point of order with the Italian government that drained the attention of its CEO and top 
management team for many weeks. 
 Second, there are indirect costs. Social misconduct harms the image of the company and is 
sanctioned by social actors (Ingram and Silverman, 2002). Some consumers would decide to avoid 
buying products or services of the companies or to buy fewer quantities; indeed, consumers are 
more likely to buy from socially responsible companies (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). Also, even one 
behavior can create a snowball effect by giving origins to boycott (King, 2008; Robertson and 
Crittenden, 2003). In our setting the decision of Heinz to withdraw an advertising campaign that 
showed a homosexual kiss triggered the reaction of gay associations who called for a boycott of 
Heinz’s products. Moreover, it affects the loyalty with the company; some consumers will feel 
betrayed by such behaviors and this will harm the emotional connection between them and the 
company (Kotter, 2008). Similar arguments hold with other stakeholders of the company. When the 
image of the companies has declined, employees can become demotivated, business partners can 
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decide to limit the transaction with the company (Sullivan et al. 2007) and regulations can become 
stronger. Also in this case, companies would need to invest significant resources in terms of time, 
attention (Ocasio, 1997) and money to recover from this image loss and regain the relationship with 
their consumers and other stakeholders. In summary, a social misconduct turns into direct and 
indirect costs that affect companies’ bottom- or top-line. Investors should anticipate it, thus we 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Social misconduct is negatively associated with the CAR of the company involved 
 
2.3 Ambiguity in assessing the norms 
Previous literature has had difficulties in assessing the marginal effect of each type of cost – direct 
costs vs. indirect costs – because they are usually cofounded within illegal events (Tipton, 
Bharadwaj, and Robertson, 2009). However, even in cases of illegal actions, scholars have found that 
not all the actions produce a statistical significant impact on the share price (Davidson et al., 1994; 
Tipton, Bharadwaj, and Robertson, 2009)5. This is even more compelling in the case of social norms. 
Social norms are ambiguous to a certain extent (Dubois, 20030), therefore there is variation within 
the population of a given country of what is considered legitimate or not (Webb et al., 2009). 
However, some norms are more clearly defined than others (Becker, 1963). When norms have clear 
evaluation criteria, a larger part of the population would converge on the fact that the company had 
violated the norm. In this case, the two mechanisms identified before become stronger. First, 
companies would have a harder time to recover the sunk cost of the action and spend more time 
and money in trying to contain the negative event. Second, the negative impact on its image will be 
                                                        
5 Davidson et al. 1994 found that not all the infringements were negatively correlated to the CAR, while investors 
penalized bribery, trade secrets, financial reporting violations, other behaviors, including violations with governmental 
contracts criminal fraud, securities law violations and overcharging customers, were immune. 
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stronger. More people will agree that a violation was made; thus increasing the likelihood of 
sanctioning.  
 The opposite occurs if norms are evaluated based on cultural and social judgment, e.g. in the 
case of “obscenity” (Becker, 1963:p.63). In this case, the response will be more heterogeneous: what 
some audience consider inappropriate, can be totally acceptable by others (Webb et al., 2009). If no 
violation is perceived, no sanction will occur (a situation that Becker defines “secret deviants”). In 
extreme cases companies can even purposely make social misconduct to attract public attention to 
their activities (like Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Taken together, these considerations suggest that the 
ambiguity of the norm is likely to affect investors’ reactions. When norms are less ambiguous, 
investors would expect the company to incur in higher costs than when norms leave more latitude 
to interpretation by different groups of the population. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Social misconduct that involves less ambiguous norms are more negatively associated with the CAR 
than social misconduct that involves more ambiguous norms 
 
2.4 Uncertainty of social sanctions 
Besides ambiguity in their assessment, the second trait that characterizes social norms is the 
uncertainty in the degree that individual actors would punish the company (Ingram and Silverman, 
2002). Social misconduct lacks a quantifiable metric to measure the gravity of an action6. In this 
situation, investors are likely to use contextual variables as a proxy to form their predictions 
(Schijven and Hitt, 2012). we analyze two such variables: saliency and localness.  
 
                                                        
6 For illegal actions this is less problematic as one observer could use the amount of the fine as a proxy of the gravity of 
the actions.  
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2.4.1 Saliency 
Already Becker (1963) recognizes that perceptions matter more than real behaviors; a behavior is 
considered in breach of a norm if it is publicly labeled as a violation, even if it is not committed (a 
situation he calls “falsely accused”). To the contrary, if a behavior does break the norm, but it is not 
perceived as such, it does not suffer any consequences (a situation he calls “secret deviant”). 
Therefore, the saliency of a social misconduct informs about the social consequences that such 
behavior will have. The concept of saliency has been widely studied by mass communication 
literature (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Mass communication literature has extensively analyzed the 
influence of the media under what is known as agenda setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). 
According to this theory, the media is able to align its agenda to the one of the public: the more a 
piece of news is reported in the media, the more it is salient in the eye of the people. For example, 
Lowry et al. (2003) found that the public perception of crime reflects more the Network TV Crime 
reporting than the FBI Crime statistics (similarly findings were already in Davis, 1952). Therefore, 
salient topics are both the ones that attract more media and public attention.  
 The greater the saliency of an event of social misconduct, the greater the harm to the image 
of the companies; the more people know about it, the more severe it becomes (Lowry et al., 2003). 
As a result, companies are more likely to react to these events. Deephouse and Heugens (2009) show 
that firms are more likely to adopt social issues, which have been adopted by news media or other 
similar mediated organization. Similarly, King (2008) found that corporate targets are more likely to 
concede to boycotts that generate high levels of media attention. Therefore, if an infringement is 
more salient, companies will be more likely to put in place resources to contain the negative event 
and, if they do not succeed, the effect on the company’s image will be stronger. As a result, investors 
can use the saliency that receives the organizational social misconduct to predict the costs that the 
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company will incur; the greater the saliency of the event the greater the cost for the company. Thus 
the drop of the share price will be greater. This leads to the next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The greater the saliency of the event, the greater social misconduct is negatively associated 
with the CAR 
 
2.4.2 Localness 
Social norms are embedded in a country’s culture, tradition and history (Hechter and Opp, 2005; 
Scott, 2008); thus, where the misconduct happen is likely to influence the reaction of the investors.  
We distinguish between local companies, the ones that are located in the same environment where 
the social norms are violated, and foreign companies, the ones that are located in a different 
environment. For environment is defined as having a unique system of values and norms. Given 
that systems of values are nested in one another, localness is a relative concept. For the butcher in 
the corner, its local environment is probably the neighbor, while for a listed company it can be the 
country where it is listed. 
 What is considered socially acceptable in one environment can be considered inacceptable in 
another (Scott, 2008). This knowledge is often tacit (Feldman, 1984; Hackman, 1976), thus local 
companies are in a better position to decode the norms of an environment and to evaluate if a 
behavior is considered acceptable or not. Given that local companies have the advantage to have a 
greater understanding of what is considered an appropriate or inappropriate behavior, if they 
commit an infringement in their environment, they will be seen as more responsible and their image 
would be harmed more. 
 Moreover, local companies are more socially embedded in the environment where the 
violation happens than foreign companies. Therefore, if local companies make misconduct, it 
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increases the number of actors that could punish the companies; socially embedded companies have 
more ties with local organizations on which they depend for their economic performance and 
survival (Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002). Local organizations are in a better position to sanction deviant 
behaviors (Fauchart and Hippel, 2008) because they may be afraid of negative spill-over if they do 
not (Barnett and King, 2008; Zavyalova et al. 2012; Jensen, 2006). As a result, investors would 
expect that local companies would incur in greater costs for similar misconduct compared to foreign 
companies. Therefore, investors will react more if misconduct is made by a local company compared 
to a foreign one: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Social misconduct that is committed by a local is more negatively associated with the CAR than 
the one that is committed by a foreign company 
 
3  METHODS 
The main focus of the paper is on organizational social misconduct defined as an action that a social-
control agent evaluates as contravening to the system of values and norms of the society. Previous 
studies have mainly looked at actions that departed the norms of a specific industry - such as 
hospital, liberal arts college (Meyer and Scott, 1983), French cuisine (Durand et al, 2007), banks 
(Deephouse, 1999) or airlines (Miller and Chen,1996) -  which are not necessarily in breach of the 
norms of society. When considering actions that break the norms of the collectivity, previous studies 
have focused on a single event, e.g. corporate downsizing in Japan (Ahmadijian and Robison, 2003). 
However, this research design is unsuitable in this case given the wider scope of this analysis - across 
industries and type of norms. This paper relies on a unique context - the UK advertising self-
regulation system - that provide the possibility of measuring social misconduct while allowing for 
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variation in the norm’s violation, the saliency of the events and the location of the company that 
makes the action. 
 
3.1 Setting 
Advertising reports and influences the norms and values of a society. By looking at advertising in the 
1970s we could project the society in that period, while in 40 years from now, our advertising will 
inform about ours. Therefore, advertising is an ideal setting to study social norms. In an attempt to 
avoid free riding by some companies, in many countries advertisers fund7 a third-organization - self-
regulatory organization to ensure that any form of advertising or marketing communication is ‘legal, 
honest, truthful and decent’ (Advertising and Marketing Communication Practice 2011 Code, p. 6) 
because if an advertising is misleading, people won’t buy the second time and if it is offensive or 
harmful, people won’t buy the first time. The UK has one of the longest traditions in the advertising 
self-regulation. Its self-regulatory organization is called the Advertising Standards Authority 
(hereafter ASA), which was founded in 1961. After 50 years, ASA is today a recognized entity in the 
advertising regulation in the UK to the extent that the UK governmental Office of Communication 
contracted out its responsibility to control broadcast advertising to ASA in 2004. Therefore, since 
2004 ASA is the “one-shop stop” for complaints about broadcast and non-broadcast advertising in 
the UK.  
 ASA operates in the following way. Any person in the UK can submit a complaint to ASA, 
either in the role of citizen or on behalf of a company (companies’ complaints account only 10% of 
the total). British people take advantage of the possibility of complaining and voicing their concerns; 
ASA receives around 25,000 complaints a year, 50% of the total complaints about advertising made 
                                                        
7 Usually the advertisers do not give money to the self-regulatory organization directly, but they do so 
through an intermediate company in order to assure the independency of the regulatory body. 
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in Europe. The complaints are then passed on to a Complaints Executive, who assigns it to the type 
of violation (Misleading, Harmful/Offensive), a topic (e.g., Children, Environment, etc.), and a 
complexity category. Companies can respond to ASA by providing studies, evidence and any other 
information they believe can support the claims of their advertisement. The documentation is then 
passed to the ASA Council that can either upheld (the advertisement is banned) or not upheld (the 
advertisement is cleared) the complaints. The ASA Council consists of 12 members (besides the 
Chairman): four from the industry and eight independent. The four members of the industry are 
chosen based on their expertise in the field of advertising and sit at the Council as individuals and 
not as spokesmen from the industry. Once the ASA Council has issued its decisions, adjudications 
are then published within the following 14 days on the ASA website. Adjudications are published 
every (and only on) Wednesday and receive a significant coverage in all media types: national, local, 
trade, consumers, offline and online. Media visibility of ASA’s adjudications is one of the main 
sanctions for advertisers who do not conform to the code.  
 Each case is assessed based on its likelihood to mislead, offend or harm the average UK 
consumer:  
 
The likely effect of a marketing communication is generally considered from the 
point of view of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed. 
(CAP Code 2010: 113, italic added) 
 
Thus, we consider the decisions of the ASA Council as a direct (less problematic) proxy for the 
society collective beliefs that a companies’ advertising is ‘proper, or appropriate within’ the UK 
system of social norms. Thus, ASA’s decisions to ban an advertisement are treated as social misconduct. 
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The ban of an advertisement can be costly for the companies: companies lose the production cost of 
developing the advertising (sunk costs) and they become sensitive to adverse publicity.  
 This setting enables us to measure the marginal effect of the other theoretical variables in 
this study, which are the main focus of this paper. First, ASA’s code involves two types of norms’ 
violations, one less ambiguous (misleading) and the other more ambiguous (harmful/offensive), thus 
allowing for testing Hypothesis 2. Second, adjudications receive different media attention, thus 
allowing the measuring of the impact of saliency (Hypothesis 3a). Third, adjudications involve 
companies that have operations in different locations (Hypothesis 3b). 
 
3.2 Data 
The study period starts in August 2006 (first data available from ASA) and it terminates on 31st 
August 2010 because in September 2010 a new edition of the British Code of Advertising Practice 
(12th Edition) was released. Since articles have only been available online since October 2007, 
Hypothesis 3a will be tested as from then (observations for the first year are lost). ASA publishes the 
adjudications weekly every Wednesday on its website. In the study period, there are a total of 151 
weeks and 2,153 adjudications. We only focus on adjudications to ban advertising. The number of 
companies affected by adjudications was 1,643, of which 382 (23%) were listed. These companies 
are responsible for 469 events. We focus only on events with companies listed in the UK (London 
Stock Exchange), the other main European markets (Italy, France, Frankfurt, Madrid, Switzerland, 
Ireland) and to US (both New York Exchange and Nasdaq). Missing data and co-founding events 
reduced the sample to 317 events and 114 companies Given that articles were available only form 
October 2007, for Hypothesis 3a the number of observations goes down to 251.  
 Articles about ASA adjudications were collected through LexisNexis and Factiva databases 
for printed and broadcast news; while Meltwater – ASA’s media agency – provided online news. 
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Previous studies using media articles have mainly focused on the use of printed newspapers given 
their prominence in society (Deephouse, 1999; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Rindova et al., 2011). 
However, in the last years, online media outlets have increasingly become a critical source of 
information for people. Given, that online and offline media do not always overlap, we inserted 
both to make the media coverage as comprehensive as possible. Specifically, we included printed 
and online newspapers, broadcast news, consumers and trade magazines, national and regional 
outlets. As a result, we cover almost the total universe of the articles that mention ASA in the UK 
during the study period. Several steps to ensure the reliability of this data collection were taken. 
First, we contacted Meltwater – the media reporting agency of ASA. Meltwater monitors 140,000 
websites, most of them in the UK and in English speaking countries and was able to trace media 
articles back to October 2007. These articles were then cleaned by eliminating double counting of 
the same news on the same website (sometimes the same webpage has two URLs). Meltwater 
provided me with the algorithm used to search media articles about ASA. 
 The second step was to adopt the same Meltwater algorithm to extract data from Factiva and 
LexisNexis. Factiva and LexisNexis are leading companies in media analysis and often used in 
academic research (e.g., Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Unlike other studies, we cross-checked the 
results between the two databases to increase the reliability of the results. The two databases cover 
the same major UK media outlets, even though they can differ for regional or minor outlets, which 
are still very important in our study. The two databases overlap for most of the articles – but 20% of 
the articles were in LexisNexis and not in Factiva. This analysis results in 19,176 articles (25% offline 
and 75% online). Not all these articles are about adjudications of ASA, but they cover any of the 
activities of ASA. We skimmed through the articles and retained those that refereed to an 
adjudication in the title or in the first three paragraphs. These articles were easy to identify because 
most of them referred to the adjudication already in the title. Then, with the help of a research 
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assistant we assigned each article to the corresponding ASA’s adjudication. Usually each article only 
reported a single adjudication. When multiple adjudications were reported, the principal one was 
chosen (the one mentioned in the title or in the first 3 paragraphs). The 251 events were covered by 
3,340 articles; mostly published between Wednesday (72%), when the adjudication is made public, 
and Thursday (12%).  Financial data (share price, total assets, ebitda) were retrieved by Datastream. 
 
3.3 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) on day 2. CAR is a measure on 
how much a share’s value deviates from its expected value in a given temporal window. It is a 
standard way, both in finance and organizational literature (Barnet and King, 2008), to measure the 
impact that individual events have on the evaluations of the investors. A statistical positive CAR 
indicates that investors attach a positive estimation of the event to the future performance of the 
company. A negative CAR indicates that the event has damaged the economic evaluation of the 
company. One of the challenges of this methodology is to determine the right temporal window to 
measure the impact of the event. The trade-off is between the ability to link the CAR to the event of 
interest (short windows) and the time needed for the market to elaborate and reflect the information 
contained in the event (long windows). This decision is mostly context-specific (Barnett and King, 
2008). In this setting, ASA publishes the adjudications every Wednesday. In order to account for 
information leakage, event studies usually begin the event window prior to the actual event. ASA 
provides online access to the adjudications to a selected number of journalists since Monday with 
embargo (journalists are forbidden to publish the news) until Wednesday. During the focal period 
3% of articles were published on Monday or Tuesday, 72% on Wednesday, 12% on Thursday and 
the rest afterwards. Therefore, we chose to set my temporal window from Monday (-2) to Thursday 
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(+1). The CAR is calculated using the standard procedure as in Barnett and King 2008. Appendix B 
reports it.  
 
3.4 Independent Variables 
Hypothesis 1 holds that social misconduct is negatively associated with the CAR. To test for this 
hypothesis, we consider the effect that the adjudications of ASA to ban a company’s advertising has 
on the CAR of the companies involved. Following CAR methodology, this hypothesis is supported 
if the constant term is negative and statistically significant (Barnett and King, 2008).  Hypothesis 2 
focuses the ambiguity of the norm’s violation. ASA identifies two categories of norm violation: 
misleading vs. harmful/offensive. Misleading cases are linked to the norms of honesty and 
truthfulness; they involve misrepresentation of facts. Instead, harmful and offensive cases are linked 
to taste and decency; they are assessed based on the following principle:  
 
 ‘Marketers should take account of the prevailing standards in society and the context 
in which a marketing communication is likely to appear to minimize the risk of 
causing harm or serious or widespread offence’ (The UK Code of Non broadcast 
Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct Marketing, p. 24). 
 
While a misleading claim is based on hard evidence and it is likely to be considered misleading in any 
country, a harmful/offensive advertising is more linked to the cultural and social environment where 
it is broadcasted, therefore it is more difficult to judge. In the ASA’s code, the description of 
misleading cases is 7 pages long, while the description of what is considered harmful/offensive is 
only 2 pages; this shows the difficulties of specifying ex-ante what is considered harmful/offensive 
versus what is considered misleading. Therefore, we consider misleading advertising as cases for 
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which the norm is more clearly defined and less ambiguous than for harmful/offensive. ASA 
provided us with the category assigned - misleading vs. harmful/offensive - for each adjudication. 
More than 90% of adjudications are attributed to only one of these two categories, confirming that 
consumers consider them quite differently. The variable Norms Less Ambiguous is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for misleading cases and 0 for harmful/offensive cases. Appendix A reports 
one representative example for each of them. 
 Hypothesis 3a focuses on the saliency of the topic. Given the importance of the media as 
key stakeholders (Deephouse and Heugens, 2009, McCombs and Shaw, 1972) the variable Saliency is 
a count variable equal to the number of media articles that each adjudication received on the day 
when the adjudication is published (Wednesday) and the day after (Thursday). Among these two 
days ASA’s adjudications received 2,813 articles. Each of them was uniquely attributed to the 
respective adjudication. Finally, Hypothesis 3b deals with the location of the company. Local - UK is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is listed in the London Stock Exchange 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.5 Control Variables 
Following literature using CAR methodology, we controlled for the assets and the performance of 
the company (Barnett and King, 2008; Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011). Total Assets is the log of the 
total assets that the company reports in a given year and Performance is the log of the ebitda of the 
company. 
 Also, we control for other context specific variables. Television is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the advertising banned was broadcasted on TV. In fact, TV advertising is more 
costly to develop, so they involve higher sunk costs in case of banning. Total complaints is a count 
variable that indicated the number of complaints that the advertising had received. A higher number 
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of complaints may signal to the investors that a higher reaction from the public would occur. Both 
Television and Total Complaints are expected to have a negative impact on the CAR. 
 Finally, the effects on adjudications can vary among industries. In some industries it can be 
more acceptable to make advertisements that are at the edge of the code (e.g. offensive 
advertisements in fashion industry); in other industries, competition is so fierce that companies 
constantly play tit-for-tat strategies (e.g. pricing advertising for supermarket chains). Therefore, we 
used a fixed effect specification to control for industry effect.  
 
3.6 Model specification and estimation 
In order to test the hypotheses, we use a linear regression model with fixed effect by industry: 
CARij = a + B Xij + ul + eij 
where CARij  is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i  five days following event j, Xij  is a vector 
of independent variables for firm i  at the time of event j (Articles and Number of Complaints) and ui is 
the industry unobservable.  
 
4  RESULTS 
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation values. Correlations are generally low. 
we checked for multicollinearity in the models by evaluating the variance inflation factors (VIFs). 
VIFs were below the recommended threshold of 10 (values below 2). Table 13 reports the effect of 
the Abnormal Return (AR) in each of the day before the events. The AR is negative both on 
Monday and Thursday, but none of the ARs are significant in a given period.  Table 14 uses the 
CAR -2/+1 as the Dependent Variable; it tests for all the hypotheses.  
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Table 12 – Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 1 2 3 4 
1. AR -2 317 -0.002 0.03 -0.34 0.25 1 
   
2. CAR -2/+1 317 -0.002 0.05 -0.45 0.25 0.54 1 
  
3. Saliency 251 11.21 26.70 0 304 0.05 0.00 1 
 
4. Norms Less Ambiguous 317 0.87 0.34 0 1 -0.01 0.03 0.00 1 
5. Local - UK 317 0.41 0.49 0 1 -0.13 -0.06 -0.11 0.21 
6. Other European Markets 317 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.07 
7. Total Assets 317 16.65 1.92 10.58 22.11 0.07 0.08 0.15 -0.02 
8. Performance 317 13.36 5.90 -14.97 18.26 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.04 
9. Complaints Received 317 5.29 29.83 1 519 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.17 
10. Television 317 0.34 0.47 0 1 -0.03 0.05 0.12 -0.17 
Variable 5 6 7 8 9 10 
   
6. Other European Markets -0.47 1 
       
7. Total Assets -0.33 0.24 
       
8. Performance -0.13 0.08 0.44 1 
     
9. Complaints Received -0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.04 1     
10. Television -0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.00 0.14 1    
 
Table 13 – Abnormal return by day (0 is the day of the event)  
Week day Wednesday Thursday Friday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Day from the event -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 
         
Constant 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
Observations 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 317 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
In CAR models the constant term (ai) is crucial to verify the hypothesis of the direct effect. It 
represents the average variation in the share market price of the events. Therefore, for the direct 
effect, the null hypothesis is rejected (or fails to be rejected) based on the statistical significance of 
the constant term. Hypothesis 1 states that social misconduct has a negative statistical effect on the 
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share price reactions. Model 1 in Table 14 shows the results of the first hypothesis. The constant 
term is negative, but not significant. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the 
effect is different from zero. Among the control variables only Total Assets is significant, though only 
at 10% level. 
 Model 2 reports the results for the second hypothesis, namely that the clarity of the norm 
negatively affects the association between social misconduct and CAR. This hypothesis is supported 
if the dummy Norms Less Ambiguous has a negative coefficient. However, the coefficient is not 
significant (and even positive). Investors do not penalize more social misconduct that involves less 
ambiguous norms. Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
 Model 3 provides a test for Hypothesis 3a, namely that the saliency of the events (measured 
as the number of total articles that an adjudication receives) has a negative impact on the share price. 
The coefficient of Saliency is negative, but non significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is not 
supported. 
 Model 4 tests for Hypothesis 3b. The coefficient of Local - UK is negative, but not 
significant. This means that companies listed in the UK are not more likely statistically to be 
penalized by investors than companies that are listed somewhere else (both in other countries in 
Europe or elsewhere in the world). In Model 5, we insert another dummy for companies that are 
listed in other European countries (Other European markets). In this case, the coefficient of the 
variable Local - UK becomes significant at 10% level. This means that companies that have an 
adjudication by ASA experience a loss of 0.014% if they are listed in the UK rather in the US. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is supported, but only at 10% statistical level. Model 6 presents all the 
variables together; the coefficient of the variable Local - UK is still negative and significant at 10% 
level. 
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 As a result, only Hypotheses 3b finds a small statistical support at 10% significant levels. The 
other hypotheses are not supported.  
 
Table 14 – Linear regression model with sector fixed effect using CAR -2/+1 as dependent variable 
Dependent Variable: 
CAR -2 / +1 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Norms Less Ambiguous  0.004    0.008 
  (0.010)    (0.013) 
Saliency   -0.000   -0.000 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Local – UK    -0.012 -0.014 † -0.019 † 
    (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Other European Markets     -0.005 -0.008 
     (0.009) (0.011) 
Total Assets 0.003 † 0.003 † 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Performance -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Complaints Received -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Television 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Constant -0.064 -0.068 -0.066 -0.045 -0.042 -0.045 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.071) (0.063) (0.063) (0.074) 
       
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 317 317 251 317 317 251 
R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.076 0.074 0.075 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 In Model 3 and Model 5the number of 
observations drop to 251 because data on articles were not available for the first year. 
 
4.1 Robustness Checks 
We performed various robustness checks. we split the sample between (1) companies in the UK vs. 
others, (2) Misleading vs. Harmful/Offensive decisions. Also, we focused only on the sub-group of 
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the companies in the UK. Finally, we test with different temporal windows (CAR 0, CAR 0/1, CAR 
-2). Results have the same structure.  
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Understanding the performance impact of companies’ actions is a key concern for managers and 
strategy scholars. In the last years, the demand of the normative environment has become a key 
factor for companies (Scott, 2008; Peng et al., 2009). However, despite this growing importance, 
previous literature has shown inconsistent results. The purpose of this study was to clarify the 
mechanisms through which social misconduct is linked to performance. Building from 
organizational misconduct literature  (Greve et al., 2010) and institutional theory in sociology (Meyer 
and Scott, 1983) and in strategy (Ingram and Silverman, 2002), we propose that the impact of social 
misconduct is highly contextual; it depends on the clarity of the norm’s violation and on the 
likelihood that critical companies’ performance gatekeepers (consumers, business partners…) will 
penalize the company subjected to the infringement. 
 Current results do not support the theoretical model. Social misconduct does not have a 
statistically negative effect on the CAR of the company involved. This shows that investors do not 
think that social misconduct would affect the bottom- or top-line of the companies involved in this 
study, not even when the norm’s infringed is less ambiguous and the event is very salient. However, 
there is a feeble effect (p<0.10) for local companies (i.e. those that are listed in the UK). Given the 
current lack of support of this analysis, we start by highlighting some empirical limitations of the 
study before discussing its contribution. 
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5.1 Limitations of the study 
The main strength of this analysis is in its scope. Thanks to a novel operationalization, unlike 
previous research, this study enables us to study the impact of social misconduct across industries, 
norms’ violation and companies’ locations. Therefore, the lack of support of the Hypotheses is 
somewhat surprisingly. Few reasons can be discussed. 
 First, given the dependent variable under investigation – CAR, the results are limited to 
listed companies. Its generalization to private companies is not clear. On one hand listed companies 
are those that are subject to a greater scrutiny by the public opinion and greater pressure to conform 
(Ahmadijian and Robison, 2003). Therefore, they should suffer a greater cost for making deviant 
behaviors than private companies. On the other hand, given their size, listed companies are able to 
amortize the effect of their misbehaviors more and they can have more resources to manage the 
impact on their image. This would suggest that the impact of social misconduct should be greater 
for private companies.  
 Second, the lack of support of the hypotheses can be due to the idiosyncrasies of the setting 
used in this analysis. Someone would argue that the lack of statistical supports is due to the fact that 
in communication “any publicity is good publicity”, this would not explain why companies spend so 
much money and effort to assure that advertising complies with a code, nor thus it explain the 
support found for the other hypotheses. Also, the role of ASA is the recognized advertising 
regulator of the UK. Even if it does not provide fines, its role is the one of a well-established and 
respected social-control agent.  
 In order to improve the robustness of the results, future research can expand this study in 
further directions. First, it can look at new benchmark for listed companies, for example looking at 
industry benchmark instead of the overall index of the stock market.. Second, it can look at different 
way to measure financial performance (e.g. ROI/ROA); or look at symbolic performance (such as 
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reputation or brand rankings). Finally, it would be very interesting to expand to private companies, if 
data availability allows.  
 
5.2 Contribution to Institutional Theory 
This study contributes to institutional theory, in particular to the literature that studies the 
consequences of making deviant behaviors. A puzzle in this literature is to understand the 
inconsistency in the outcome of behaviors that break the norms of their environment (Meyer and 
Scott, 1983; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Miller and Chen, 1996; Deephouse, 1999; Smith, 2011). The 
theoretical framework proposed here argues that part of this inconsistency can be explained by the 
three elements. First, it is important to understand the right reference group. In particular, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the reference group versus whom the norms is violated (e.g. the 
liberal art college in the case of Kraatz and Zajac, 1996) and the group that can impact the 
performance of the company (e.g. the students in Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). Second, it is important to 
consider that social norms are open to different interpretability, while institutional theory has usually 
considered norms a monolithic concept (Vergne, 2011). As literature on norms suggest, when norms 
are ambiguous less people will consider a certain behavior as deviant; in this case, no punishment 
will occur (Becker, 1963). This ambiguity in the norm’s interpretation can explain why some studies 
find positive effect of illegitimate actions. What is considered a code violation, can indeed be 
interpreted as the ability of a chef to master both codes (Durand et al., 2007); alternatively, 
companies can use impression management technique to change the impression that, what was 
considered inappropriate actions, is actually justified under a different social value (Elsbach and 
Sutton, 1992). Third, it is crucial to understand whether and to what extent the social actors that 
affect companies’ performance are likely to punish the company subjected to violation. In fact, 
different actors can agree on a violation, but they are not necessarily willing to punish the company.  
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5.3 Contribution to institution-based view of strategy 
While the belief that institutions exert an important pressure on companies is not new (Coase, 1937; 
North, 1990; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), it is only recently that strategy scholars have tried to 
integrate the institutional prospective in the strategy literature (Ingram and Silverman, 2002; Peng et 
al., 2009; Ahuja and Yayavarama, 2011). So far, this literature has been criticized (Durand, 2012) to 
be too unbalanced towards the economic approach of institutional theory (North, 1990) overlooking 
the sociological one (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 2008). As an example, in the last 30 years, many papers 
have studied the impact of illegal actions, i.e. actions that break laws, on the CAR, but none have 
tried to identify the marginal effect of social misconduct, i.e. of actions that deviate from the social 
normative environment. Given the limited statistical supports to the hypothesis of this paper, more 
studies are needed to understand whether, when and to what extent illegitimate actions harm (or 
benefit) companies’ performance. This would be of great interest to advance strategy research. Laws 
are common to all companies and so are the costs of their infringements. To the contrary, social 
norms are open to interpretability and the social cost of their violation are heterogeneous among 
companies; they depend on the companies’ social positioning, status, visibility etc. Some companies 
can make social misconduct without incurring in the costs that their competitors will suffer. 
Therefore, the normative environment can be an important source of competitive advantage for 
companies.
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CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 
SCANDALS AS SOCIAL DISTURBANCES AND STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES:   
NEWSPAPERS’ EVALUATIONS AFTER CALCIOPOLI8 
 
Scandals are events of severe social misconduct that attract a disproportionate amount 
of media and public attention. Given their dramatic tension and frequent occurrence, 
scandals have long been investigated by sociologists and organizational scholars. One 
of the main areas of research has been in understanding the origins of scandals; why 
they start, develop and finish. This leaves relatively unexplored the question of what 
happens after a scandal. Previous literature has mainly focused on the consequential 
effects on a scandal for the actors involved; less attention has been given to the 
consequences at society level. This paper proposes that scandals act as “social 
disturbances” that alter social evaluations and may open up “strategic opportunities” 
that organizations can leverage. We focus on the impact of a scandal on media 
evaluations. We investigate how journalists change their evaluations based on the social 
characteristics of the actors under evaluation; the degree of interpretability of the 
norms involved and the preferences of the readers of the media outlets. We empirically 
test our predictions on the scandal that affected the Italian soccer league in 2006 – 
Calciopoli – and find a general support of our hypotheses; a scandal creates a “liability 
of status” – high-status referees are more contested than low-status ones - and 
increases the disagreement among media outlets. This paper contributes to scandal, 
organizational and strategy literature; moreover, it is one of the first studies in this 
literature to relax the assumption that the media is a homogenous audience.
                                                        
8 This essay is under development and intended to be a joint collaboration with Rodolphe Durand and Joe 
Porac. However, the current version of the chapter has been entirely written by Marco Clemente, including 
the coding and the analysis. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Scandals are ubiquitous social phenomena at any age in history. It is difficult to think of a society 
that has not suffered scandals. Scandals can have disastrous impact on the actors involved (Jensen, 
2006), their affiliations (Pontikes, Negro and Rao, 2010), even on the country where they occurred 
(Weeber, 2008). More importantly, as normative and moral events, scandals can influence the culture 
and history of a nation; they can become historical events of the collective society to reinforce or 
transform norms, like in the case of the Impressionists (Adut, 2008). However, most of the literature 
on scandals has focused on the antecedents of a scandal, on understanding which conditions 
facilitate or prevent scandals to blow out (Thomson, 2000).  One of the most recent new theories on 
scandals is the one by Adut (2005, 2008) who shows how scandals are the results of the social 
interaction among the actors who try to leverage these events to their advantage. While the same 
Adut (2005, 2008) incidentally talks about what happens after the scandal, his theory is focused 
mainly on understanding why a scandal blows out and on the moral consequences of a scandal. In 
general, less attention in the scandal literature, and broadly in the literature on organizational 
misconduct (Greve, Palmer and Pozner, 2010), has been given to the social and strategic 
consequences that scandals produce. 
 Already Thomson (2000) proposes a social theory of scandal that tries to fill this gap. He 
identifies four theories of scandals. First, the “no-consequence theory”, for which scandals are 
events that have consequences only for the actors involved in the scandal, but they are 
inconsequential for the overall society. Second, the “functionalist theory of scandal”: scandals are 
events of social palingenesis that society needs to reaffirm the collective identity. According to the 
third theory – the “trivialization theory” – scandals have no actual consequences; scandals are 
orchestrated by the elite class to entertain the mass and distract the public from substantive events; 
To the contrary, the fourth approach – “the subversion theory of scandal” – focuses on the 
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intentionality of the popular press – such as tabloids – to create scandals in order to give voice to the 
“people” and “bash the power-bloc” (Thomson, 2000: 5472).  In contrast to the previous literature, 
Thomson proposes a new theory according to which scandals are “struggles over symbolic power in 
which reputation and trust are at stake” (Thomson, 2000). Scandals affect the “symbolic capital” of 
the politicians and undermine the trust that exists between the public and the political class. 
However, while Thomson refers to the social consequences of the scandal, his theory is very 
focused on the political arena and exclusively to the idea of reputation and trust.  
 Building on Thomson’s (2000) insight, we enlarge the model of Adut by analyzing how 
scandals can affect the social evaluation of different members of an audience. While Adut stresses 
the role of scandals as “moral disturbances” (2005, 2008) we conceive scandals as social disturbances, 
which can open up strategic opportunities for some actors. Given that evaluations are specific to a 
certain audience (Bitektine, 2011; Greve et al., 2010), we focus on one audience – the media, and in 
particular newspapers and journalists. The media have a pivotal role in scandal formation (as a blow 
whistler), but its role is also crucial during and after the scandal as it keeps on influencing the public 
opinion. Newspapers monitor the behaviors of social actors (Greve et al. 2010) and can decide 
which of them are salient, (worthy to be reported to the overall public) and, among them, which of 
them should be contested. It is not a surprise that the overall level of public attention and control 
increases after misbehaviors (Desai, 2011; Zavyalova et al. 2012; Jensen, 2006); as a result the 
number of episodes contested (our dependent variable) increase after a scandal. However, it is also 
evident that this increase does not affect evenly all the actors involved and all types of behaviors. We 
propose that this heterogeneity is affected by three main elements: first, the social characteristics of 
the actors under evaluation; second, the different degrees of interpretability of the norms involved 
and, third, the readers’ taste of each of the media outlets.  
CHAPTER 4 
 
 108 
 While in normal conditions high-status actors have an advantage (Merton, 1968) and new 
actors suffer a liability of newness, in conditions of “disturbances” we predict the opposite. We 
hypothesize that high-status members – versus low-status ones – experience a greater contestation 
after a scandal as they lose their moral licensing (Polman, Pettit and Wiesenfeld 2013). This liability of 
status happens together with an advantage of newness: a scandal benefits new actors as they can easily 
attest their extraneousness to the scandal. Both effects should be stronger for norms that are more 
ambiguous as they leave more latitude to the interpretation versus the cases in which norms can be 
assessed with concrete evidence (Becker, 1963; Dubois, 2003). Finally, we propose that the number 
of episodes contested depend on the specific motives of each media outlets. Newspapers are 
companies that serve their readers, therefore they might face a conflict when trying to report or 
contest episodes that can please or hurt their readers. We expect the level of contestation to be 
different among the newspapers according to their readers’ taste. How will a scandal affect this 
heterogeneity? The traditional argument in the previous literature is that scandals should produce a 
great amount of normative convergence. As for Adut’s model (2005), it is in the best interest of the 
actors to take their distance from the scandals to avoid “contamination”. Eventually, this effect 
triggers normalization of what is acceptable or not, thus decreasing the divergence among the 
perspectives of the members of an audience. 
 We challenge this perspective and propose that scandals can have the effect of stratifying an 
audience, namely making the members of an audience more in disagreement in their evaluation. This 
is possible when two conditions are met. First, the audience needs to be already segmented into rigid 
factions before the scandal; second, the scandal needs to contaminate one specific faction more than 
the others. In this situation, the scandal has the effect of increasing the barriers among the different 
segments of an audience and create a phenomenon called “pluralistic ignorance” (Allport, 1924; 
O’Gorman, 1986; Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Westphal and Bednar, 2005) that increases the 
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divergences among the different segments of the audience. This can be leveraged by media outlets 
which can use scandals as a strategic opportunity to increase the loyalty of their readers and augment 
their differentiation vis-a-vis with their competitors. In a political context, one can think of left vs. 
right groups, in managerial context on the rivalry when the market is segmented between only 2 or 
few companies (Apple users vs. Galaxy users, Coca Cola vs. Pepsi drinkers…) and in sport when 
there is rivalry among different clubs.  
 We test our hypotheses in the scandal named Calciopoli, which affected the Italian Serie A in 
2006, and look on how it affected the evaluation of the three main Italian sport dailies, Corriere 
dello Sport (Corriere hereafter), Gazzetta dello Sport (Gazzetta hereafter) and Tuttosport. The day 
after a match, each newspaper evaluates the decisions of the referee in a special column called 
“Moviola”. The three newspapers have their headquarters in three different cities (Rome, Milan and 
Turin), which also represent their major share of their readers. Each of them has two local teams, 
namely teams that play in the city where they have the headquarters: Roma and Lazio for Corriere; 
Milan and Inter for Gazzetta; Juventus and Torino for Tuttosport.  We look at how the contestation 
of the referees (number of episodes contested in a match) is affected by the scandal. In support of 
our hypothesis, we find that the scandals increase the contestation for high-status referees more than 
low-status ones (liability of status). Also, we find that the variance in contestation before and after 
the scandal only affects the episodes for which the referee has higher latitude to decide (yellow and 
red cards, penalty, fouls) than those that are more objectively assessed (offside calls). Instead, we do 
not find support for an “advantage of newness”; after the scandal. new referees are not less 
contested than before. Finally, we do find that the number of the episodes contested depend on the 
identity of the team. Newspapers report more contested episodes and are more in disagreement for 
matches that exhibit local teams. This is due to the fact that each newspaper is more likely to report 
episodes that put the local teams under a good light (referees make mistakes against the local team). 
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After the scandal, both the contestation and disagreement increase. Therefore, the scandal did 
stratify the media outlets, at least in the period of social disturbance that happens after a scandal.  
 
2  CALCIOPOLI AS A “DISRUPTIVE PUBLICITY OF A TRANSGRESSION” 
Under many aspects, Calciopoli seems to be a prototype of the model of scandal proposed by Adut 
(2005, 2008). According to Adut, scandal is a “disruptive publicity of a transgression”. Adut 
identifies four necessary elements for a scandal to happen – the transgression, the publicizer, the 
public and high-status actors. However, these elements are not sufficient to give rise to a scandal; 
three more processes are needed: publicity, contamination and provocation. We look at each 
element and process as it appeared in Calciopoli. 
 
2.1 The elements of a scandal 
2.1.1 The transgression 
Adut identifies the transgression, either real or alleged, as the base of a scandal. However, a 
transgression is not a sufficient condition; there are many transgressions (even severe ones) that do 
not originate a scandal. Indeed, it is only when the transgression is publicized that a scandal may rise. 
For example, Oscar Wilde’s homosexuality was known long before Oscar Wilde stood trial and was 
convicted. And Oscar Wilde was among many high-status actors that were suspected or known to 
be homosexual. However, it is only when it became of public knowledge through the libel trial that 
the scandal blew out (Adut 2005). Similarly, illegal party financing in Italy and France and sexual 
misconduct in USA were carried out for years previous the wave of scandals in the 1990s. 
 In Calciopoli, allegations of misbehaviors were around much before the season under 
investigation - 2004/2005. Moggi became general director of Juventus in 1994, nominated by the 
managing director Antonio Giraudo. At that time, Moggi had more than 20 years in the football 
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arena covering different roles for important Italian teams such as Roma, Lazio, Napoli and Torino9. 
He stayed in this position until May 2006, when he resigned following the scandal that saw him as 
one of the main protagonists. These 12 years were the most successful of his career, and one of the 
most successful cycles in the history of European football. Juventus won the Italian championship 
(“scudetto” in Italian) 7 times (though, two were revoked after the scandal), 1 Cup of Italy, 4 
Supercups of Italy, 1 Champions League, 1 Intercontinental Cup, 1 Supercup UEFA, 1 Intertoto 
Cup. Besides, Juventus played 2 final matches of the Cup of Italy, 3 of Champions League and 1 of 
Cup of UEFA. This was the period known as the “years of the triad”, which included Moggi, 
Giraudo and Roberto Bettega, the Juventus vice-president. However, some people had the feelings 
that these victories were not achieved exclusively on the field, but “outside the field, even before the 
kick off: from the doping, drug abuse… [Juventus had a process on doping in the 1990s] but also 
from the capillary control on referees, players’ agents, directors of the Football Association, 
journalists and even on the directors of other clubs” (Travaglio 2012, p. 8)10. Luciano Moggi has 
been accused of being at the center of this system, also because his son, Alessandro Moggi, was the 
director of GEA, a leading society for agents of footballers11. During the criminal process, Narducci, 
the public prosecutor, mentions that the “Moggi system” may have started “probably already in the 
period just after the appointment, in 1999, of the two administrators who select the referees, Paolo 
Bergamo and Pierluigi Pairetto, who were still active in the season 2004/2005” (Narducci, 2012, p. 
32). In particular, Narducci refers to the match Juventus – Parma 1-0 in the season 1999/2000, 
                                                        
9 Moggi started his career as a talent scout for Juventus in the early 1970s. Before he was a football player for few years 
and worked for the Italian train monopoly company.   
10 Stefano Travaglio is one of the most known investigative journalists in Italy. He is famous for his book called “La 
Casta” (“The Caste”), where he denounced the privileges of the Italian politicians, and for being a regular guest in many 
Italian programs dealing with politics and scandals. Travaglio is also a Juventus supporter. 
11These included many sons of eminent people in the Italian society and sport. Chiara Geronzi, journalist of Tg5 and 
son of Cesare, banker in Capitalia; Giuseppe De Mita, son of the democratic political Ciriaco; Francesca Tanzi, daughter 
of banker Calisto, ex managing director of Parma; Andrea Cragnotti, son of the banker Sergio, ex-managing director of 
Lazio; Davide Lippi, son of Marcello, ex coach of Juventus and at the time coach of the Italian national team; Riccardo 
Calleri, son of Gianmarco, ex president of Lazio and Torino (Travaglio 2012). 
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where the referee Massimo De Santis (who is the leading accused referee in the Calciopoli) revoked 
a regular goal to Parma at 90th minute. This gave an enormous advantage to Juventus as this was the 
second to last match of the season.1213 
 Italian football has assisted many scandals in its history, as early as 1927, when Torino was 
accused of having bribed Luigi Alemmandi, the lateral defense of Juventus, in order to win the derby 
Torino-Juventus played on the 5th June 192714. In more recent years, two big scandals, in 1980 and in 
1986, involved clubs of Serie A and Serie B, which were found guilty of arranging matches in order 
to benefit from bets (in Italian these two scandals were known as “Calcioscommesse” or 
“Totonero”15). However, Calciopoli was different from these other scandals. It was not aimed to 
bribe some players to counterfeit specific matches in order to make money out of the betting 
systems (or other short term outcomes). Calciopoli was defined as “a systemic corruption” during 
the trial. Narducci refers to it with a term usually reserved to Mafia language: a “Cupola”16, which 
was presided by Moggi and included referees, directors of the football associations and journalists. 
This Cupola was accused of influencing the regular execution of the Italian championship. 
 The beneficiaries of this system were Juventus and the teams associated with it. The verdict 
of the sport trial penalized Juventus, Lazio, Fiorentina, Reggina and Milan. Juventus was the only 
team that was relegated to the lower division (Serie B). Lazio, Fiorentina and Reggina were accused 
                                                        
12
However, Juventus ended up losing the championship in favor of Lazio. For Prioreschi this was due to the incredible 
public disapproval and buzz that this clear mistake created. 
13Of course, these are only allegations and are not proved misconduct. An opposing interpretation is that managers of 
the losing teams used these allegations to justify their failures and that supporters found a way to express their 
dissatisfaction (libro verita’ su Calciopoli, location 178) 
14the amount for bribing was 50,000 lire (corresponding to 28 $ in face value). Torino won the match, indeed. However, 
Allemandi was one of the best players in the field. Therefore, the director of Torino, Nani, who tried to bribe him, 
refused to pay the balance of the sum (25,000 lire). Allemandi complained to him. The journalist Renato Farminelli who 
was sleeping in the same boarding house overheard this discussion. Farminelli wrote a column called “C’e’ del marcio in 
Danimarca” that gave start to an investigation from the Italian Football Association. The sentence became clear when 
the investigators found a broken letter where Alemmandi was demanding the balance of the bribe. The scudetto of 
Torino was revoked and Allemandi was interdicted from playing for many years. 
15which comes from the fusion of Totocalcio, the name of the football bet contest managed by the Italian State 
Monopoly, and the word “nero”, which is the Italian for black) 
16 The term Cupola in Italian is usually associated to the Mafia Commission. 
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of having been favored by Moggi and his associates for few specific matches. While Milan was also 
found guilty of having direct contacts with the referees and the two administrators Pairetto and 
Bergamo; a behavior similar to the one of Moggi, but less deep-rooted and systematic. Lazio, 
Fiorentina, Reggina and Milan were penalized but they were not relegated. Similar charges were 
moved during the criminal process. According to the prosecution, Moggi and his associates were 
able to maneuver the appointment of referees (done through a complicated system of grids and 
extractions), in order to have “friendly” referees considered in selected matches. In particular, Moggi 
had an ongoing and constant relationship with the two administrators who selected referees, Pairetto 
and Bergamo. In the season 2004/2005, the referees were assigned through the following procedure. 
The matches of Serie A and Serie B were divided into three grids: A, B and C (in decreasing order of 
importance). The appointment of a match to a given grid was at the discretion of the two 
administrators, Pairetto and Bergamo, and it was based on its importance and complexity. Similarly, 
referees were divided into the three grids, based on their quality and mental momentum. Grid A 
consisted of the most important matches and the best referees of the moment, grid C the least. After 
the appointment was made, the two administrators extracted randomly matches and referees (one 
administrator extracted a ball containing a match on a given grid and the other administrator 
extracted the ball containing a referee in the corresponding grid). The prosecution reports the 
following tapping between Moggi and Bergamo used by the prosecutor as evidence that Moggi was 
able to influence the creation of the grids (and maybe even the final extraction). Moggi, the 
managerial director of Juventus, and Bergamo, one of the two administrators who assign referees, 
talk about which teams and referees assign to grid A: 
Moggi: Let me take a note….I looked at it today, carefully…so, I put Inter-Roma 
Bergamo: Yes 
Moggi: Juventus-Udinese 
Bergamo: Yes 
Moggi: Reggina-Milan 
Bergamo: Yes 
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Moggi: Fiorentina-Parma, which needs to be put here …and Siena-Messina 
Bergamo: Yes 
Moggi: I chose 5 matches, but it could be also of 4…but, Siena-Messina seems to be 
quite important…it seems.  
Bergamo: Yes, then there is also Livorno-Sampdoria, that in the previous match was 
a mess…anyway, go on, this does not change much 
Moggi:  There are t…there are two teams…Livorno e Sampdoria…that are more 
quiet 
Bergamo: Hence, go on…anyway this changes little, it is possible to add one, if we 
want…but I do not have many referees for grid A…tell me what you’d put 
Moggi: I’d put Bertini 
Bergamo: Uhm 
Moggi: Paparesta who comes back  
Bergamo: No, Paparesta is not back by then 
Moggi He comes back on Friday 
Bergamo: Are you sure? 
Moggi: Sure 
Bergamo: But Gigi [Pairetto, the other administrator] told me that he has a 
commitment with the Uefa [The European Football Association] and he will be out 
until the 12 
Moggi: And he told you… and the 12 is what day?  
Bergamo: Saturday 
Moggi: He comes back on Friday night… Bertini, Paparesta, Trefoloni, 
Racalbuto…I also put Tombolini, but Tombolini made a mess with Lazio…I do not 
know if it is right to put him here…i.e., he made a mess, he gave a penalty… 
Bergamo: Uhm 
Moggi: And these were the referees that I have put on this grid… 
Bergamo: and what about Rodomonti instead of Tombolini, doesn’t it? 
Moggi: Rodomonti instead of Tombolini, it can work 
Bergamo: Ok, so we did the same, as you can see… 
Moggi: I think this can be a grid 
Bergamo: Rather, I do not have…Paparesta. I had Bertini, Racalbuto, Rodomonti, 
Trefoloni…and sincerely, Tombolini I wanted to have him stopped for a round 
because he made a mistake…otherwise, you never punish these. (Narducci, 2012: 143) 
 
The actual grid A on the 11 February 2005 was in line with this discussion. The matches assigned to 
grid A were indeed: Fiorentina-Parma, Inter-Roma, Juventus-Udinese, Reggina-Milan, Siena-
Messina. The referees assigned to grid A were: Bertini, Paparesta, Racalbuto, Rodomonti and 
Trefoloni. The “friendly” referees were supposed to help Juventus and the other teams in two ways. 
First, referees would use yellow and red cards to send out a player, so that this would miss the next 
game (e.g. these may have happened with the players Pinzi, Muntari, Di Michele and Jankuloski in 
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Udinese-Brescia, which missed the following game with Juventus17). Second, referees or linesmen 
could use a behavior aimed to favor the teams during the match. For example, in case of doubtful 
decision, the referees and the linesmen would choose to give the advantage to Juventus or to its 
associated teams. As the prosecutor pointed out, and the sentence of 1st grade sanctioned, it is 
important to note that the influence of a referee is not only in big decisions, but also in its attitude 
during the match18. This can be more subtle and difficult to recognize, but eventually very 
influential. 
 What was the advantage of the referees to be part of the system? According to the 
prosecutor, the referees were pushed to comply because of four mechanisms. First, Moggi was able 
to influence the career of the referees. By being appointed for the most important matches, referees 
could gain visibility and experience, thus being more likely to be chosen by the European and 
Worldwide Football Association, respectively UEFA and FIFA, for international matches. 
International matches are very prestigious for the referees and are well paid. 
 Second, the formal assessment of the referee could be influenced. At the end of the match, 
the referee was given a grade on his performance. Besides, doubtful situations were then reviewed 
during the weekly meetings held by the two administrators in the presence of all the referees. During 
the trial Nucini, a referee of Serie A at the time and one of the main accusers of the Cupola, testified 
that referees’ mistakes were assessed differently, based on the team which was advantaged or 
disadvantaged. In particular, mistakes against Juventus were magnified and the corresponding 
referees were publicly shamed, even if the mistake was debatable. Similar mistakes, which were in 
favor of Juventus, were dismissed or incurred less penalties (Nucini, 2009). Penalties include the 
suspension of the referees for a given number of weeks. 
                                                        
17 Udinese- Juventus 0 -1 played in Udine on 3th October 2004 
18As an example, a referee could give few yellow cards to players within the first minutes, thus conditioning the rest of 
the match. Moreover, he can be stricter in some decisions. 
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 Third, referees’ media reputation was affected. Moggi was accused of influencing the media 
image of the referees in popular TV programs such as “Processo di Biscardi” [“The Trial of 
Biscardi”, hosted by the presenter Aldo Biscardi]. Given the importance of soccer in Italy, there are 
many TV programs that talk about soccer and review referees’ behaviors. The “Processo di 
Biscardi” was on air every Monday. One of the guests, Baldas, was an ex-referee and was in charge 
of the assessment of the referees during the program. In one tapping, Moggi and Baldas talk about 
one referee’s decision in favor of Juventus that turned to be a mistake on TV:  
Baldas: Trezeguet was in a clear offside 
Moggi: The referee needs to be acquitted 
Baldas: If you say so… though, I mean…it is clear that there is 50 cm of offside! 
Moggi: You need to shorten the 50 cm. They need to become 20! 
  
 In addition, in Italy, soccer, politics and business are very interwoven. Families that lead the 
Italian politics or economy own the major teams. Family Agnelli, the owner of FIAT (the leading 
Italian automotive company), is the owner of Juventus; Silvio Berlusconi is the owner of Milan and 
Massimo Moratti, the president and owner of Saras (an important public company in the energy 
industry),  is the proprietor of Inter. Most other teams in Serie A and Serie B are owned by families 
that run rich and influential businesses in Italy or worldwide. In some tappings, there were allusions 
to gifts that some of the teams (Juventus, Milan, Inter) could give to referees or to the 
administrators. In others, there were allegations to the fact that the directors of the team could have 
helped the referees in their own business. Indeed, in Italy, referees are semi-professionals and they 
have a profession (e.g. attorneys) in parallel to their referees’ careers. However, despite these 
allegations, no evidence was found during the trials on direct favors that Moggi or other managers 
could have given to referees. 
 One of the most controversial aspect of the criminal trial was about the episode of “Swiss 
phone cards”. Moggi was accused (and this was partly confirmed by the sentence of I grade) of 
CHAPTER 4 
 117 
having given Swiss phone cards to administrators and referees. Many conversations were assumed to 
happen on these “other” numbers, therefore making it more difficult to know the entire 
conversations carried among the actors involved. Moggi justified the usage of these phone cards 
because he was afraid that he was under industrial espionage by Inter. Indeed, Inter had relationship 
with Telecom Italia, the Italian leading telecommunication company that used to be owned by the 
state. Another trial proved (sentence of 1st grade) that Inter had the ability to spy footballers. In 2012 
Inter was sanctioned to pay 1 million Euro to Christian Vieri because it asked Telecom Italia to 
secretly tap him in 1999 and between 2002-2004. Christian Vieri was a top high-paid striker of Inter 
at that period, known for having a worldly lifestyle; the Inter direction wanted to understand why his 
performance fell during that period. 
 
2.1.2 The publicizer 
Scandals are often the scenario of a power battle between actors who gain an advantage by the status 
quo and those who are dissatisfied with it. This dissatisfaction was among the causes of Calciopoli. 
Calciopoli started from an investigation called Off-side by the tribunal of Naples. The original aim of 
the investigation was about presumed rigged matches in Serie A and Serie B in October 2004 (the 
usual betting scandal). Two months before, the tribunal of Turin had started an independent 
investigation with phone tapping on three of the people, who were involved in the process later: 
Luciano Moggi, Antonio Giraudo and Pierluigi Pairetto. Independently, the tribunal of Naples kept 
on doing phone tapping for the entire season 2004/2005 and covered additional actors, such as the 
President of AIA Tullio Lanese, the Vice President of the Italian Football Federation Innocenzo 
Mazzini and the referee Massimo De Santis. The interrogatories started in May 2006 (after the first 
phone tapping and indiscretion leaked into the newspapers). At that time, part of the investigation 
of Turin were merged with the one of Naples, while the rest, the ones relative to the investigation of 
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GEA (the company managed by Alessandro Moggi on the managers of the players) became subject 
of another trial that took place in Rome (Narducci, 2012 p. 31,32). 
 According to Maurilio Prioreschi, the defensive attorney of Luciano Moggi, the investigation 
of the tribunal of Turin had an anonymous informer, Franco Baldini, who at that time was manager 
of Rome and presumably an antagonist of Luciano Moggi. According to the defense, Franco Baldini 
was about to be substituted in his role by the son of Moggi, Alessandro. Therefore, Baldini started a 
campaign to attack the power of Moggi. As evidence, Prioreschi brings one of phone tapping where 
Baldini was talking to Innocenzo Mazzini and mentioned that he was about to do a  “ribaltone” 
(trigger a “big change” in the Italian soccer power system). There was similar discontent among the 
referees and the directors of the teams who believed they were unfairly penalized by the Moggi 
system. The referee Nucini, as mentioned before, was one of the main accusers in the trial and 
brought sufficient evidence.  
 Therefore, the transgression was discovered for two reasons. First, there was some chance 
involved: the authorities were looking at a different type of crime – illegal betting, however they 
eventually discover this system. Second, insiders in the soccer field seemed to help the authorities to 
unveil the misconduct because they were dissatisfied with the current power equilibrium. 
 
2.1.3 The public 
The public is the last key element in a scandal; without a public a scandal does not blow out or it 
extinguishes quickly. Given the importance of soccer in Italy and the interest around it, the public of 
Calciopoli was obvious very large. Moreover, Calciopoli started one month before the World Cup; 
this created even more buzz around it. Then, this scandal was not about rigging specific matches to 
win money with sport betting; it was a scandal about the overall soccer system and what happened 
in the back-office, which is usually kept secret to the majority of people and surrounded by a kind of 
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mystery. Finally, it regards referees’ mistakes, which are the common subject of conversations 
among friends on Mondays at the bar. One of the most interesting counterintuitive idea in the 
Adut’s model is that a scandal may not occur if the public would feel contaminated by the scandal 
itself. This was actually true for the supporters of Juventus, which is the most successful team in the 
Italian soccer. One can imagine that Juventus supporters would have preferred not to have 
Calciopoli and presumably they would have tried to prevent it from happening if they could have 
had. However, Juventus is also one of the most hated team by the fans of the other clubs. 
Therefore, for all the supporters of the other teams, Calciopoli was a way both to amuse themselves 
and a revenge for many years of alleged disfavors by the referees. 
 
2.1.4 High-status actors 
The presence of high-status actors is a necessary condition for a scandal to occur. High-status actors 
are necessary because they both attract visibility and are the symbols of the norms and values of 
society. So, their transgressions are both more visible (Graffin et al., 2012) and are seen as challenge 
to the core values of society (like in the case of Oscar Wilde).  While it is usually the case that the 
actors who make a transgression are high-status, it works as well if the publicizer is high-status. For 
example, a transgression made by common people can scale up to a scandal if a high-status journal 
publishes it. Usually, these specific cases are used as examples of widespread transgression that 
happen on a large scale and which have been ignored or kept secret. 
 In Calciopoli, the main actors involved, Moggi and Juventus were the highest, or at least 
among the highest actors, in the soccer field; both because of their power and because of their 
history of success. This even without considering that the scandals involved other prominent teams 
such as Milan, Lazio and Fiorentina, together with their well known directors. Finally, all the major 
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Italian newspapers could not lose the possibility of following the scandal once the first information 
leaked.  
 
A transgression, a publicizer, a public and high-status actors are four necessary elements to give 
origins to a scandal. However, none of them is sufficient. Many severe transgressions are carried on 
for a long time before they create a scandal, if ever. In many cases, high-status actors are more likely 
to commit severe transgressions (Graffin et al., 2013), but high-status actors are also able to keep 
them secret thanks to a powerful network of acquaintances. According to Adut’s model, a scandal is 
a “disruptive publicity of a transgression” that gives rise to strategic interaction among the 
participants driven by contamination and provocation. So, publicity, contamination and provocation 
are the three necessary processes for a scandal to originate. We discuss and apply these three 
processes in our setting.  
 
2.2 The processes of a scandal 
2.2.1 Publicity 
At the beginning, the tapping does not seem to show any crime. The public attorney Raffaello 
Guariniello dismissed his investigation in Turin in July 2005 as he believed there was not enough 
evidence for criminal behavior to justify more tapping. He recognized that the behavior was deeply 
inappropriate, but not illegal. The Italian Football federation was given these files, but they were 
kept secret; someone said because they would have liked to prevent a scandal to blow out before the 
World Cup started in the summer. However, in May 2006 information leaked into the major Italian 
newspapers; Repubblica was the first one to publish the first news, followed by Gazzetta, Corriere, 
Tuttosport and others. Media helped to diffuse the information and the tapping added drama to it. 
In Adut’s term, the events and the alleged transgressions became “common knowledge”. At this 
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stage, no actors could help the people involved without running themselves the risk of being 
contaminated by the scandal.  The Italian Football Federation (FIGC) opened an investigation. The 
tribunal of Naples, which was running a parallel investigation, acquired the files of the Tribunal of 
Turin and began the first public interrogation. From this moment on, there was an escalation of 
news (real or alleged). 
 Even if it is not necessary, many scandals, especially big ones, are often given names (such as 
Watergate, Sexgate…). A name grants the episode “a high level of narrative coherence and enables, 
if not magnifies, collective focus” (p. 74). It enables coordinate responses, thus increasing the 
connectivity of an audience (Cattani et al. 2008). The original nickname of the police investigation 
was Off-side, but soon after the first tapping was made public, the press started to call it Calciopoli19, a 
name that evoked Tangentopoli, the scandal that put an end to a generation of Italian politicians in 
1992. The presence of tapping increased the drama of the scandal. The direct access of information 
about what was happening in the back office of this sacred and celebrative world was one of the key 
factors that created the scandal. Phone tapping is a key element in the escalation of scandals in the 
modern age (see for example the Watergate scandal). Even if they were aimed to be confidential, 
newspapers competed in trying to access the last phone tapping. The leakage of information reached 
its apex with the publication of two books by the weekly magazine L’Espresso called “Il libro nero 
del calcio” (“The black book of soccer”), and “Il libro rosso del calcio” (“The red book of soccer”), 
which reported the integral transcriptions of many conversations altogether20.  These two books 
                                                        
19 Etymologically “City of Calcio”, from Calcio=football and Poli=City. This name makes an indirect link with another 
major scandal in Italian history, Tangentopoli, that involved kickbacks (“tangente” in Italian) given to political parties in 
Italy in the 1990s (the scandal broke out in 1992) that signed the end of the Second Republic, reformed the political 
scenario in Italy and opened the opportunity to the climbing of Berlusconi in the Italian politics. Some people referred 
to Calciopoli also as “Moggiopoli”, given the leading role that Luciano Moggi had in the scandal. However, Moggiopoli 
was used much less than Calciopoli, 2,154 vs. 23,797 articles in Italian news sources (Factiva from 1 May 2006 to 1 July 
2013). 
20 The leakage of this information is illegal. The tribunal of Rome opened an investigation, which was later dismissed 
without having found the people guilty. 
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were published on 22nd May and 29th May; thanks to them, everyone could access to the phone 
tapping either by reading them on the newspapers or by listening to them on Internet.  
 At this stage, the verdict of the public opinion evolved much faster than the sport and legal 
justices. Prioreschi, the defensive attorney of Moggi, argued that, in 2006, “the only fact of having 
been tapped and published on the books of Espresso was considered a defensive sentence and a 
certified crime; if not, this was interpreted as a divinis acquittal, a kind of God’s decision of saving 
you”. (Prioreschi, 2012: 246-249). This common knowledge was facilitated by the nickname 
Calciopoli and the direct exposure of a selected number of phone tapping. To some observers, it 
seems that this common knowledge was even able to condition the decision of the sport justice 
(Prioreschi 2012). One of the judges of the Court of Federal Appeal (CAF) - Mario Serio – in an 
interview (27 July 2006), commented on the judgment that was done on 25th July 2006 (bold added): 
 
We tried to interpret a collective feeling; we tried to hear the common people and tried 
to put ourselves on the same wavelength 21 
 
The role of the media did not finish with the termination of the sport trial (October – December 
2006), but it was also crucial during the penal trial (2006 and still on in 2012). In fact, one of the 
lines of defense of the attorney of Moggi consisted in the proof that the relationship between Moggi 
and the two administrators was non-exclusive (Prioreschi, 2012; Nucini, 2009)22. This strategy was 
both suggested and limited by the fact that only between 900 and 3,000 phone tapping out of 171 
thousands were transcribed by the police. A turning point in the process was the discovery of calls 
between Bergamo, the administrator who assigned the referees, and Facchinetti, who at that time 
was the President of Inter (the team that came out with the main advantage from Calciopoli). These 
new phone tapping were used by the defensive attorneys of Moggi to try to shift the public opinion 
                                                        
21http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2006/07/27/salvati-perche-la-gente-voleva-cosi.html 
22a strategy that Travaglio (2012:23) calls “cosi facevan tutti” (“everyone did the same”). 
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in favor of Juventus and against Inter. They were published in April 2010, which corresponded to a 
revival in media and public attention on Calciopoli (see Figure 5).  These tapping gave origin to 
another investigation, called Calciopoli 2, which lasted 15 months (it terminates in July 2011) but 
that was eventually dismissed because the presumed misconduct was subjected to prescription.  
 
Figure 5 - Timeline of Calciopoli until today including the main trials (1 sport and 3 criminal) 
  
The blue line is the number of articles that mention “Calciopoli” in Italian media (Source: Factiva) 
 
Finally, it is not surprising that each the two main protagonists of the penal prosecution, the public 
attorney Giuseppe Narducci and the defensive attorney Maurilio Prioreschi, published a book in 
2012 (Prioreschi, 2012; Narducci, 2012) to inform the public opinion of the long history of the 
process of Calciopoli. The book of Narducci is called “Calciopoli - La vera storia” (“Calciopoli - The 
True Story”), while the one of Prioreschi is called “30 sul campo – Tutta l’altra verita’ su Calciopoli” 
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(“30 in the field – the Entire Other Truth on Calciopoli)”, which alludes to the number of scudetti 
won by Juventus including the 2 that were revoked for Calciopoli23. The media arena seemed to be 
an important element in both the sport and trial processes. 
 
2.2.2 Contamination 
When a scandal blows out, it diffuses and contaminates different actors and audiences that it 
touches. Not necessarily those that are directly involved. Calciopoli has been mainly a scandal of 
Juventus and Moggi. Anything that was negatively linked to Juventus became newsworthy. For 
example, Michele Padovano, an ex footballer, was under investigation about the traffic of hashish. In 
the press, this episode was presented as the conviction of a “Juventus player”, even if Padovano had 
played with many other teams besides Juventus. Also, Calciopoli contaminated the current players of 
Juventus who were about to start the World Cup competition in Germany (World Cup that was won 
by Italy with 6 players of Juventus playing the final match). Some people even proposed that they 
should have been dismissed from the national team. In particular, the Juventus goalkeeper Gianluigi 
Buffon came under investigation for illegal bets in the same period24. Moggi was one of the main 
targets of the media. A neologism was even created – “Moggiopoli” – and the perception was that 
anything linked to him was subject to a “media leprosy” (Prioreschi, 2012: 335). Moggi was 
prevented from participating in the Italian delegation for the World Cup.  
 Second, as expected, it contaminated the referees. The referee Massimo De Santis and the 
linesmen Ivaldi and Griselli were prevented from participating in the World Cup (Ivaldi and Griselli 
were acquitted later). The same happened to the ex-administrators who appointed referees – 
                                                        
23 The sentence “30 sul campo” was  
24 This trial was then dismissed, but it generated much media clamor at the time. The fact that Buffon was a player of 
Juventus did not help if it were not a worsening factor indeed.  
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Bergamo and Pairetto. Finally, the president of the Italian Referees Association – Tulllio Lanese – 
voluntarily resigned.  
 Third, Calciopoli contaminated the directors of the Italian Football Federation - FIGC. Its 
president, Franco Carraro, resigned at the very beginning of the scandal on 8th May. Instead, a 
special commissioner was appointed to supervise the sport trial. The fact was that the FIGC was 
afraid to be contaminated more and tried to take it distance from the scandal. The sentence reported 
above - “We tried to interpret a collective feeling; we tried to hear the common people and tried to 
put ourselves on the same wavelength”- suggested that the directors of the FIGC did not want to 
attract public disapproval to themselves. To many people, the penalties afflicted to Juventus were 
considered much more severe than the ones of the other teams given the evidence that was available 
at the time (Pasta and Sironi, 2007). 
 Fourth, it contaminated the supporters of the teams, in particular those of Juventus. While 
before being a Juventus fan was a pride, it became a stigma after the scandal. The fans of the other 
teams could take years of revenge of alleged unfairness. 
 
2.2.3 Provocation 
Provocation is another important process that helps fuel a scandal, especially provocation in a public 
sphere. The attitude of being over the rules, the impression of being untouchable triggers a similar 
public disapproval more than the transgression itself. As an example, Adut (2005) mentioned Oscar 
Wilde. Had Oscar Wilde not shown up in the trial with the white horses or had not defend himself 
with the attitude that he could do anything, maybe his trial would have ended differently (Adut, 
2005). In the tapping, Moggi seemed more provocative than the other team directors involved in the 
trial (e.g. Meani of Milan and Facchinetti of Inter). Indeed, Moggi was considered maybe one of the 
most hated directors in soccer, despite (or maybe because) of his success. This could explain the fact 
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that both Juventus and the FIGC gave the impression to have leveraged this scandal to kick Moggi 
out from the Italian soccer scene. Prioreschi mentions this during the trial: “Moggi was unpleasant 
because he was the best”. While not everyone thought he was the best, many people thought he was 
unpleasant and arrogant. For example, the referee Narducci provides one example that says a lot on 
the attitude and the perception that Moggi had. During the trial, Narducci talked about the meeting 
he had had with a manager of the team Reggina, who was considered one of Moggi’s friends (bold 
added):  
[the manager of Reggina] said that he would have arranged for me to rule more 
matches in Serie A through his man [Moggi]. I was stunned…I mean, ok, not just for 
the message, but for the boldness, my God. I mean, I am a referee…with 25 years 
of profession…I refereed in all the fields of the small towns…Sicily, Calabria….I 
risked to be beaten…and now here it comes! A man who tells me that he will 
arrange for me to referee in Serie A! But, can you understand this? Can you 
understand this? I mean, I have risked my life on the worst fields in Campania, 
Calabria and Sicily, I finally arrive to Serie A because I thought I deserved 
and a person comes and tells me that he will arrange for me to referee in Serie 
A? This person is not the administrator of the referees, the president of the FIGC, 
but he is the manager of a team. 
 
2.3 End of a scandal 
According to Adut’s theory, a scandal ends when there is no more interest in it. Figure 6 shows the 
media articles that mention Calciopoli in the Italian press, as a proxy for the media and public 
interest around the scandal. As every scandal there is a decreasing interest over time until April 2010 
where there was a clear revival (Calciopoli 2). There were two main trials, the sport trial and the 
criminal trial. While the sport trial terminated in December 2006, the criminal trial is still on (in Italy 
trials have up to 4 grade of judgment). Apart those two, there were other many criminal trials related 
somewhat to Calciopoli. Figure 7 shows the entire criminal trials involved that stemmed from 
Calciopoli and their timeline. 
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Figure 6 - Timeline Calciopoli – until the end of the Sport Trial 
 
The blue line is the number of articles that mention “Calciopoli” in Italian media (Source: Factiva) 
 
 
Figure 7 - Timeline with all the trials that stemmed from Calciopoli, both sport and criminal 
 
The blue line is the number of articles that mention “Calciopoli” in Italian media (Source: Factiva) 
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Finally, as predicted by Adut’s theory, scandal comes in waves. While soccer scandals occurred 
regularly in the history of Italian soccer, it actually seems to have accelerated significantly after 
Calciopoli. Figure 8 reports the main scandals in Italian soccer in the last 30 years. 
 
Figure 8 - Timeline of Italian soccer scandals since 1980s 
 
 
 
3  CALCIOPOLI AS “SOCIAL DISTURBANCE” AND “STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY” 
3.1 Newspapers’ Evaluations 
In Adut’s model, the media have a pivotal role because it creates common knowledge of the event. 
Given that the media report a transgression, none can pretend that he or she is not aware of that. In 
different terms, the media increase the connectivity among people and facilitate their consensus 
(Cattani et al, 2008); otherwise people will act as individuals ignoring what the other people know or 
think. This phenomenon is coherent within a more general theory of media known as agenda setting 
theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), which has a long tradition in mass communication literature. 
According to McCombs and his colleagues, the media have the power to align its agenda to the one 
of the public by increasing the saliency of some topics and the perspective on those topics. As a 
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result, the media are a key source for people to know what the collective society think, helping to 
create what communication scholars refer to as “public opinion” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).  
Therefore, the evaluations of journalists as appear in the newspapers transcend to be the opinion of 
a given individual – the journalist. These evaluations have a great effect of influencing the perception 
of the readers and, generally speaking, they influence the public opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). 
Therefore, even if they are not real, they become real situations in the mind of the readers and 
society. This is a sociological phenomenon known as Thomas theorem (Thomas and Thomas, 1928) 
that states: 
 
“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” 
 
Media evaluation is even more important in the case of referees, given that the referee’s association 
does not release the official evaluation of the referee. Therefore, the media rises at the role of the 
official evaluator of the referees in the eye of the public. (Not) surprisingly, the evaluations of the 
journalists were even used in the trial of Calciopoli as potential evidence of favoritism towards 
Juventus and the other teams involved. The defense lawyer, Pioreschi, asked Auricchio, the person 
who managed the initial part of the investigation of Calciopoli, about the match Juventus-Udinese: 
Prioreschi– What are the episodes through which the result of the match should 
have been impacted? 
 
Auricchio: By collecting the main sources of information: Gazzetta, Repubblica etc., 
we argued that among the episodes there was a decision to revoke a goal to the 
footballer Fava of Udinese 
 
In his book, Prioreschi used the answer of Auricchio as evidence that the investigation of Calciopoli 
was based on anecdotes, instead of concrete evidence. Prioreschi calls the investigation “da bar dello 
sport”, which alludes to the endless discussion among soccer fans that happen on Monday morning 
at the local cafeteria (“bar” in Italian). As a result, media evaluations are highly consequential for the 
actors involved. These include not only the referees, but also the teams that are the final recipients 
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of the advantage or penalization of the referees’ mistakes. Therefore, we develop our hypotheses 
along these lines. First, we look at how the number of episodes contested by the journalists are 
influenced by the social characteristics of the referees, (Hypothesis 1 and 2), then by the type of 
episodes under evaluation (Hypothesis 3a and 3b) and, finally, by the characteristics of the team 
(Hypothesis 4, 5 and 6).  
 
3.2 A scandal creates a liability of status 
In normal conditions, high-status actors incur in many privileges (Podolny, 1993). This is a well-
known phenomenon in the sociological literature that goes back to Merton (1968). Merton (1968) 
uses it to describe how eminent scientists – such as the ones who won a Nobel prize – were more 
likely than unknown researchers to get credit for similar quality research. This phenomenon can be 
summarized with the idea that “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer” (Merton, 1968: 7). 
Merton named it “Matthew Effect” after the biblical Gospel of Matthew: 
 
For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from 
him that hath not shall be taken even that which he hath. 
 
Among the advantages that high-status actors experience one particular aspect of interest is the 
effect known as “moral licensing”; high-status actors are less punished versus low-status ones for 
deviation from social norms (Rao et al., 2005; Polman et al. 2013).  
 Before Calciopoli, high-status referees gave the impression to be less challenged on their 
decisions. Pierluigi Collina is an exemplary case. Collina was among the referees with the highest 
status in the last years in Italy and in the world. He refereed, among others, the Champions League 
Final in 1999 and the World Cup final in 2002 and the UEFA Cup Final in 2004. The consequence 
of his status in media evaluations are mentioned in the process (bold added):  
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Caracciolo [a player] was sanctioned by Collina for a presumed hand ball, at 21st 
minute of the second half. The line referee validates a “phantom goal” by the striker 
Rigano of Fiorentina. Both these doubtful episodes were quoted only marginally 
by the mass media because Collina was the referee of the game.  
 
However, status also comes with responsibilities. Given their main privileges, high-status actors are 
often subject to great envy, a phenomenon called  “tall poppies” (Feather 1989). In case of 
wrongdoing, high-status actors are more severely punished than low-status ones. Graffin et al. 
(2012) discuss two reasons for this as appeared in the literature. First, high-status actors can be 
merely more responsible than low-status ones. According to this “rent-extraction” approach, high-
status start thinking that they are allowed to do everything, therefore they are more likely to make 
severe transgressions than low-status ones. In contrast, the “targeting” approach holds that high-
status actors are not necessarily more responsible, but are perceived as more responsible than low-
status ones for similar level of wrongdoing. This is because high-status actors are more visible in the 
media (Adut, 2008, Thomson, 2000), but also because their wrongdoing is seen as more intentional 
(Polman, Pettit and Wiesenfeld, 2013).  
 We propose that after a scandal, the moral licensing that high-status actors experience is 
waved. The scandal creates a situation of distrust between the people and the focal actors 
(Thomson, 2000). While before the scandal the decisions of high-status referees may have been 
accepted because high-status referees are those who help to define what is acceptable or not (Rao et 
al. 2003) - e.g. what is behavior that should be given a yellow card or not – the overall distress of a 
scandal waves this moral buffer as it is not clear anywhere if the behavior of the referee is indeed 
neutral or not.  This brings to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Liability of Status): After the scandal, the number of episodes contested increases more for high-
status than for low-status referees 
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3.3 A scandal creates an advantage of newness 
“Liability of newness” refers to the general idea that new actors in a field have a disadvantage 
compared to incumbents. This has a long tradition in organizational literature (Stinchcombe, 1965; 
Schulz, 1993) that has proved that new organizations are more likely to disappear than old 
organizations; the risk of dying is a decreasing function of time. Few reasons have been given to 
explain this phenomenon. Some of them are at market level – difficulties to create a client portfolio -
but most of them are at the individual level – such as difficulties for new members to adapt to new 
roles, the trust among members and the difficulties to build stable portfolio. Therefore, we should 
expect to find a liability of newness also for new individuals and not only for organizations. When 
changing roles or being promoted, individuals have to adapt to a new context, understand the new 
rules of the game (Durand, 2006) and make a new network. Therefore, the likelihood of failures for 
individuals is also higher at the beginning and decrease over time. 
 In our context, being appointed to the Serie A is a big jump in the career of the referee. It is 
the recognition of many years of hard work and even “having risked their lives” in the “worst” local 
fields (as the previous quote of the referee Nucini suggests). Also, referees in Serie A are highly paid, 
much more than the ones in the lower categories. However, this comes also with higher 
responsibilities. Referees in Serie A and Serie B are the most visible ones and their decisions will 
impact the fate of big and powerful clubs. Supposedly, the politics among the clubs, the Italian team 
association and the Italian referees’ association is more complicated at this level than in lower 
divisions. Finally, it may be objectively more difficult to be a referee in a match of Serie A and Serie 
B; players are more experienced and part of this experience comes also with the ability to fool the 
referees’ decisions. Finally, new referees are more likely to be targeted by journalists and newspapers. 
They are in a “probing zone”, they still need to prove that they are good enough and they are less 
linked to the logics of the system. Therefore, they are easier targets for journalists’ criticism.   
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 However, this same liability can turn into a strength after a scandal. If a referee was 
appointed after Calciopoli, there is no doubt that he was not involved in it. There are also less 
doubts that he was a guilty witness - “he knew, but he did not talk” - or that he was linked to the 
logic of the corrupted system (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804).. After Calciopoli, new 
administrators of the referees were appointed. The nominee of new referees is a an important 
institutional decision of the new administrators. Therefore, new referees are the symbol of a new 
system, which needs to be better and cleaner than the previous one (pre-Calciopoli). Any attack to 
this new system, by contrast, will be seen partly as an absolution of the one that originated 
Calciopoli. As a result, after Calciopoli journalists would be more understanding with new referees 
and give them goodwill because of their symbolic status (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). 
 Therefore, we propose that Calciopoli created an “advantage of newness”; journalists contest 
the decisions of the newly appointed referees less than for referees with longer tenure 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Advantage of Newness): After the scandal, the number of episodes contested increases less for 
referees who are newly appointed than for the referees that have a longer tenure 
 
3.4 Moderating effect of norm’s ambiguity 
According to the sociological tradition that goes back to Becker (1963), norms stem from values. 
Values provide a “criterion or standard for selection among alternatives of orientation”, but that 
they are too ambiguous and “not useful in deciding on courses of action in concrete situations” 
(Becker, 1963). In contrast, norms are social rules whose provisions need to be “precise, one knows 
accurately what he can and cannot do and what will happen if he does the wrong thing”(Becker, 
1963). Therefore, norms aim to be unambiguous and provide a clear line that separate what is 
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acceptable and what is rule-breaking behavior. However, not all the norms accomplish this task in 
the same way. Some norms retain a certain degree of ambiguity, thus allowing for greater latitude of 
interpretability by an observer. This distinction is already in Becker (1963). While it is clear to 
distinguish between those that smoke marijuana and those who do not, it is much less clear to 
distinguish between acts that are obscene and those that are not. In fact, “laws of obscenity are the 
subject of contention in society between different groups that have different standards of what is 
considered obscene or not. As a result, “various adjustments and qualification” are needed to define 
images and behaviors that are considered obscene and those that are not. 
 The norms that referees need to implement are the so-called “Laws of the Game”, 
promulgated and updated by the FIFA on a regular base. They consist of 17 laws that aim to assure 
that the game is run under fair conditions and avoid harmful or dishonest behaviors. Some of the 
laws are implemented almost in a mechanical way. For example, the rule of offside states that a 
player is in offside if “ he is nearer to his opponents’ goal line than both the ball and the second-last 
opponent”. Even if these decisions are difficult to notice during the game, they are easy to assess on 
TV camera; these leave low doubts to judge the referees’ decisions. Instead, other decisions are 
much more open to interpretability. For example, consider the decision of the referee to show a 
yellow card. Law 12 states:  
“A player is cautioned and shown the yellow card if he commits any of the following seven 
offences”: 
1. Unsporting behavior 
2. Dissent by word or action 
3. Persistent infringement of the Laws of the Game 
4. Delaying the restart of play 
5. Failure to respect the required distance when play is restarted with a corner kick, free kick or 
throw-in 
6. Entering or re-entering the field of play without the referee's permission 
7. Deliberately leaving the field of play without the referee's permission 
CHAPTER 4 
 135 
Among those seven, at least three leave much latitude in the interpretation of the referee’s decision: 
the limit between a sportive and “unsporting” behavior, the level of “dissent” words and the amount 
of the “persistence” infringement of the Laws of the Game.  In fact, the FIFA and each national 
federation of referees, organize meetings to provide examples of behaviors that are considered 
conforming to the laws and those that are considered violation. In Italy, the administrators who 
select the referee organize weekly reunions to evaluate the decision of the referees and provide 
guidelines on the way a law should be implemented. 
 Therefore, the type of norms implemented should have an influence also in the evaluation 
made by the journalists. When assessing norms that can be backed up by clear TV images (norms 
that are less ambiguous), the identity of the referees has less influence in assessing the decision. The 
TV can make a clear cut on whether the decision conforms to the laws of the game or not. In this 
case, the journalists have evidence to rightly contest (or absolve) the decision of the referee. If they 
do not, the same journalists can be accused to be inexperienced or biased and their reputation is at 
risk. On the contrary, the identity of the referee impacts more the norms that are more ambiguous. 
These situations leave much room to discussion and individual opinion. It is difficult to find 
concrete evidence that backs one’s own perspective. Thus, the identity of the referees becomes 
crucial as a starting point to assess his decisions.  
 In normal conditions, high-status referees will be allowed moral licensing compared to low-
status ones; a given decision can be considered appropriate if done by a high-status actor and norm-
violating if done by a low-status ones. However, if the scandal has the effect to wave the moral 
licensing of the high-status referee, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, the effect should be greater for 
decisions that leave more latitude to the interpretation and less for the ones that consist into a 
mechanical application of the law. This reasoning is in line with the recent findings of Polman et al. 
(2013) who distinguishes between norms that are more and less ambiguous. In normal conditions, 
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Polman and his colleagues propose and find that high-status actors have moral licensing (they are 
less punished for deviations from norms), but only if the deviations regard norms that are more 
ambiguous. In case of unambiguous norms, deviations are not disputable and high-status actors are 
more attacked than low-status ones. Similarly to Polman et al. (2013), we propose that the 
evaluations of the referees depends on the ambiguity of the norm violated, though, contrary to their 
prediction, we expect that a scandal produces a social disturbance that waves the moral licensing 
attribute to the high-status actors in normal conditions. Instead, low-status actors do not have a 
moral licensing in normal condition. This is way, the scandal has a more negative effect on high-
status referees than low-status ones. This leads to the next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3a:  After the scandal, the increase in the number of episodes contested to high-status is greater for 
decisions on norms that are more ambiguous 
 
Similarly, the degree of interpretability of the norm implemented should moderate the effect that the 
scandal has on the advantage of newness, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Also in this case, journalists 
have more latitude to contest or not a new referee only for decisions on rules that are more 
ambiguous. Therefore, we hypothesize the effect of Hypothesis 2 to be stronger for more norms 
that are more ambiguous. 
 
Hypothesis 3b:  After the scandal, the decrease in the number of episodes contested to new referees actors is 
greater for decisions on norms that are more ambiguous 
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3.5 Segmentation among the newspapers  
Until now we have focused on the effect that scandal has on the evaluation of overall media. As 
most of previous literature (Adut, 2005; Pollock and Rindova, 2003, Deephouse, 1996), we have 
considered the three newspapers all together as if they were a homogenous audience. This 
assumption is justified by the fact that journalists need to adhere to strict ethical code to be sure that 
they report the news in a truthful way and in the most objective way. However, at the same time, 
newspapers need to differentiate themselves from their competitors in order to survive and perform 
(Bourdieu, 1984). Differentiation occurs when it is based on the taste of the readers they serve. For 
example, on political perspective, dailies and magazines are usually classified in those that are left 
wing or right wing. Some newspapers are even officially linked to specific political parties. As a 
result, there is much variation among newspapers on the type of news that they report, the space 
that is dedicated to them and on the angle they are presented. As an example, when Berlusconi was 
condemned in the known “bunga bunga” process (25 June 2013), the moderate daily “Corriere della 
Sera” titled “Condanna dura per Berlusconi: sette anni” (“Hard sentence for Berlusconi: seven 
years”), while the right-wing Libero, which is close to the party of Berlusconi, titled: “Giustizia a 
puttane” (“Justice to the whores”, alluding to the fact that the trial was about prostitution, but also 
covertly criticizing the sentence of the magistrates). Therefore, within the boundaries of the 
journalistic ethical code, we expect newspapers to show some kind of implicit or explicit biases. 
Previous organizational literature has overcome this problem by either taking the total universe of 
articles from the known online academic databases (usually Factiva or LexisNexis) or by focusing on 
only one source, usually the most authoritative ones in the given context (e.g. Wall Street Journal). 
However, recent studies relax this assumption and start looking at the media as an active audience 
that organizations can manipulate to their advantage (Westphal, Park, McDonald and Hayward, 
2012). Therefore, for the next three hypotheses we relax the assumption that media is a 
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homogenous audience and consider how the heterogeneity among the newspapers affect the 
evaluations of the referees before and after the scandal. 
 In a political context, newspapers are usually divided among the political orientation of their 
readers. In a soccer context, the differentiation is based on the teams supported. Soccer fans are an 
example of an audience that is clearly divided into different segments whose boundaries are clearly 
defined and quite rigid (Noelle-Neumann, 1993); changing a team is a relatively rare event and the 
rivalry among the teams is intense. In such a context, we expect the sport newspapers to cover 
unevenly the different segments. First, news on soccer is abundant and regards different teams. 
Therefore, each segment is interested in some news more than others and will have a different 
perspective for some of the news. Second, it will be easier for newspapers to create strong ties with 
few teams instead of all. Newspapers not only report the news that their readers will like the most, 
but they also influence the view of the readers (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Therefore, clubs are 
interested in developing relationships with journalists that are more likely to influence their own 
supporters (Westphal et al., 2012). If a newspaper has more readers on a specific set of teams, it has 
more negotiation power with those teams in order to get anticipated news. In a context where the 
audience is clearly split into rigid segments, we hypothesize that the newspapers will specialize in 
some segments versus others. As a result each newspaper will have a specific sets of local teams. 
This local bias is also alleged by many actors in the soccer industry. For example, the defense lawyer 
Priorieschi mentioned it in his book: 
Soccer is the environment where boastfulness is the rule, where the bar talks are the 
rule, where everyone is coach of the national team, where everyone understands 
soccer, where people tease each other from morning to night for their team, where the 
referee is good if your team wins, and he is an ass if it loses; where if you read the 
sport daily in Rome on Lazio-Inter, it tells you that the referee has refereed badly 
because the Roman team [Lazio] has lost and if you read the sport daily of Milan you 
discover that the referee has refereed well because the team from Milan won [Inter].  
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The matches that exhibit local teams are more carefully scrutinized than those that exhibit non-local 
teams. Moreover, given that newspapers have different local teams, these matches present the most 
disagreement among the evaluation of the journalists. This disagreement is due to two factors: first, 
the newspapers try to report episodes that put their own local team under a good light (e.g. Roma 
for Corriere) and they are neutral (or even adverse) when reporting episodes of a team that is local 
to their competitors (e.g. Roma for Gazzetta and Tuttosport) 
This leads to the next two hypotheses: 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Newspapers contest more episodes to the referees in matches exhibiting local teams 
 
Hypothesis 5: Newspapers are more likely to disagree in the evaluations of the referees’ decisions in matches 
exhibiting local teams 
 
What is the effect of the scandal on this proposed local bias? Will the newspapers reduce their bias 
and become more convergence in their decisions? Or will the newspapers differentiate even more?  
 
3.6 A scandal increases the segmentation among the newspapers 
Scandals are normative events that have the power of reaffirming the values and norms of society 
(Adut, 2005; Thomson, 2000). Given their drama and emotional intensity, scandals can act as a way 
of collective palingenesis (Thomson, 2000); they reestablish what are proper and improper 
behaviors. As Adut (2005) describes, even actors that did not have any interest in the scandal to 
blow out will play strategically by following the public disapproval in order to avoid contamination 
themselves. As an example, Oscar Wilde had many powerful and high-status friends who tried to 
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help him at the early stage of his scandals, but who eventually abandoned him when his 
transgression became common knowledge, as they were afraid to end in the same way that Oscar 
Wilde did. From this perspective, scandals should result in a clear picture: the wrongdoers are 
punished and the public opinion is homogenous in condemning them. Following this line of 
thought, a scandal should smooth the divergences among members of an audience and focus on the 
commonalities. Members should put apart their individual and selfish motives and focus on the 
common values and norms of society. As a result, we should expect the newspapers to become 
more homogenous after the scandal blew out. As per Adut’s (2005) model this normative 
convergence is also strategic. Newspapers do not want to be contaminated by the scandal itself. If 
they keep or increase their supposed bias, the risk of being attacked increases. 
 However, scandals have already produced a contamination of the audience, in this case of 
the supporters of the clubs that are also the main readers of the newspapers; Juventus fans, mainly, 
and those of the other clubs involved. The scandal contaminated also the supporters of the opposite 
team, but in a positive way. They can legitimately express their rancor against the opponent teams 
that have had an unfair advantage in the last years. Under this perspective, the scandal still creates a 
normative convergence, but only among the supporters of the same team. In fact, the fans who are 
part of the teams involved in the scandals are also contaminated, thus they become more 
consolidated among them. This reduces their interaction with the fans of the other teams. The latter 
can now addict the former as a stigmatized group. This is a situation that in literature is known as 
“pluralistic ignorance” (Allport, 1924; O’Gorman, 1986; Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Society splits into 
different groups that do not interact anymore. Groups of people do not talk to each other, so there 
cannot be cross- contamination. Under this condition, media outlets are not necessarily pushed to 
become more homogeneous; actually, they have incentives to become more apart; to increase their 
differentiation vis-a-vis with their competitors and improve the loyalty of their readers. In order to 
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please their respective readers, newspapers will now be more prone to publish news that pleases 
them. So, their judgments will become more apart and will diverge more than before the scandal. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
   
Hypothesis 6: After Calciopoli, the evaluations of the newspapers are more in disagreement (6a), especially 
for matches exhibiting local teams (6b) 
 
4  DATA AND METHODS 
In order to investigate our hypotheses we needed first of all to identify the pre-scandal and post-
scandal period. The advantage of scandals is that they do have a timeline (Figure 5). We identify 
three main periods in the timeline of Calciopoli:  
1. During Calciopoli – May 2006 until December 2006. The first news of the scandal appeared in the 
newspapers in May 2006. This is when the scandal started. The scandal reached its peak 
during July 2006 when the two sport processes of Calciopoli took place. The last sentence 
was published in October 2006 and in December 2006 (depending on the team involved). By 
that time the media articles mentioning Calciopoli had reduced drastically from the 1,800 
articles in July to 350 articles. We chose the end of the sport trial as the end of the scandal of 
Calciopoli (December 2006).  
2. Pre-Calciopoli – September 2004 until April 2006. As in any event analysis (Barnett and King, 
2005), scholars are concerned to take the pre-period as close as possible to the focal event, 
while having enough data point to have reliable results. We have data from the season 
2004/2005, so we start our pre-scandal period in that season and terminate in April 2006 
(almost two full seasons).  
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3. Post-Calciopoli – January 2007 until January 2009. We had similar concerns for the post-scandal 
period. We start it just after the last sport verdict (January 2007) and terminate in January 
2009. In this way we have roughly the same number of matches to compare in the pre- and 
in the post- period. During this time, the interest on Calciopoli declined steadily with some 
small peaks due to the criminal trials, which are still on. However, the sentence of the sport 
justice was final. Only in April 2010 there was another significant peak of media and public 
interest that reached almost the same intensity of July 2006. This peak was due to the 
publication of new phone tapping of Inter that gave origins to Calciopoli 2. This is outside 
our post-scandal period. 
 
The number of matches played in the pre- and post- periods is: 
 Pre-Calciopoli: 740 matches played in 74 match days (all the 38 math days of the season 
2004/2005 and 36 match days of season 2005/2006). 
 Post-Calciopoli: 771 matches played in 76 match days (20 match days in season 2006/2007, 
38 in season 2007/2008 and 19 in season 2008/2009). 
 
In summary, we are going to treat Calciopoli as a natural experiment and compare the evaluations of 
the referees between roughly two seasons before Calciopoli and two seasons after. Out of the total 
1,511 matches some were dropped because they were not reviewed by at least 1 of the newspapers 
(condition necessary for testing hypothesis 1- 5) or they were reviewed by 2 or more of them (to test 
hypothesis 6). Figure 9 shows graphically the periods under investigation. 
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Figure 9 - Timeline of Calciopoli  divided by periods under investigation 
 
 
4.1 Newspapers’ Evaluations of Referees’ decisions - Moviola 
Newspapers have a specific column dedicated to reviewing the referees’ mistakes. This is usually 
clearly identified in the newspapers (see Appendix C for real examples for each of the newspaper). 
This column is usually known as “Moviola”. We collected all the Moviola we were able to obtain 
from the three newspapers25. Table 15 shows the number of Moviola collected for each newspaper 
in each of the focal season. Corriere and Gazzetta roughly covered the same number of matches 
(around 80%), Tuttosport covered less (67%). The three newspapers do not necessarily cover the 
same matches. Table 16 shows the breakdown of the Moviola per match. To test hypothesis 1 to 5 
we need a match to be covered by at least 1 Moviola. This happened in the 93% (1,404) of the 
                                                        
25 The Moviola from Gazzetta were the easiest to retrieve as Gazzetta had a digital archive for the focal 
period. We requested Gazzetta for their Moviola and they were sent to us by email. Corriere retains a hard 
archive of the Moviola and we were able to copy them. Tuttosport was not able to provide their articles, so 
they were manually retrieved and photocopied by the Biblioteca Comunale di Torino (Public Library of 
Turin) that keeps all the copies of the newspapers. While sometimes the newspaper does not review some 
matches, some Moviola may have been overlooked. Therefore, we contacted the Observatory of referees’ 
mistakes, a private institute that analyzes the behavior of the referees and that has been independently 
collecting the Moviola since 2006/2007. Few Moviola (less than 10%) were added to complete the dataset. 
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matches. To test hypothesis 5 and 6 (disagreement among newspapers) we need a match to be 
covered by at least 2 Moviola. This happened in the 86% of the matches (1,302). Therefore, the 
number of observations to test hypothesis 1 to 4 is 1,404. The number of observations to test 
hypothesis 5 and 6 is 1,302. The total number of Moviola is 3,507. 
 
Table 15 – Number of Moviola for each newspaper 
 
 
Table 16 – Number of Moviola per match 
 
 
As a common methodology in media articles (Pollock and Rindova, 2003, Deephouse 1996), each 
Moviola was manually coded. Many steps were identified in order to assure the reliability of the 
coding. After talking with journalists and experts in soccer, one of the authors developed a very 
detailed coding scheme. The data was coded under two dimensions: 
1. whether or not a journalist reports an episode  
2. the evaluation of the journalist 
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Eleven categories of episodes were coded. These include basically all the types of decisions that a 
referee can make during a match (penalty, red and yellow cards, offside…).  Journalist report two 
types of decisions:  
 “Type 0” decisions. The referee did take a decision (e.g. awarding a penalty kick) 
 “Type 1” decisions: The referee did not take a decision (e.g. not awarding a penalty kick) 
Therefore, each of the 11 episodes was coded in one of these two types of decision. For example, 
the episode “penalty” means that the journalist mentions that the referee awarded a penalty. The 
episode “NO penalty” means that the journalist mentions that the referee did not award a penalty. 
As a result, 22 categories of episodes were coded. Table 17 reports the breakdown by episode. 
 In total, 7,786 episodes were reported on 1,404 matches reviewed (an average of 5.45 
episodes a match). The 22 sub-categories were then aggregated into the four major categories 
regarding referee’s decisions: (1) penalty, (2) cards, (3) offside and (4) fouls and other. The four 
categories are roughly evenly split. Interestingly, the Type 0 decisions – referees “not” doing 
something – are 25% more than Type 1 decisions, confirming a “status-quo” and “0-action” bias in 
the behaviors of the referees, as reported by the journalists. Referees tend not to take a decision than 
to take it. This is quite a common effect in social psychology literature. 
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Table 17 – Breakdown of episodes by category and sub-category 
 
 
While there is little doubt whether the journalist reports or not an episode, it is more challenging to 
code the evaluation of the journalist. We chose a detailed coding system to assess the evaluation of 
the journalist. The final objective was to divide the episodes into two categories: the ones that are 
considered mistakes by the journalists and those that are not. In order to reach this objective, we 
divided the evaluations into 6 sub-categories. The point of view chosen is the one of the journalist 
who evaluates whether the referee made a mistake (“yes” – the journalist thinks the referee made a 
mistake, “no” – the journalist does not think that the referee made a mistake). Each episode was 
coded among the following 6 sub-categories: 
1. Neutral. The journalist reports the episode without any personal evaluation.  
2. No. The journalist clearly says that the referee did not make a mistake. Little doubts about it. 
3. Maybe no. The journalist says that the decision of the referee is probably correct. 
4. Images Not Clear. The journalist explicitly mentions that the TV images do not clarify if the 
referee made or not a mistake. 
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5. Maybe Yes. The journalist raises doubts on the decisions of the referee or says that it was 
probably wrong. 
6. Yes. The journalist says that the referee made a mistake. Little doubts about it. 
 
These six categories were then combined into two macro-categories: 
1. Non-Contested episodes. These are episodes in which the journalist does not challenge the 
decision of the referee or absolve it in some way. The overall impression is that the referee 
did the best he could do, considering also the fact that he could not use the TV cameras. 
This category includes sub-categories 1 to 4: “Neutral”, “No”, “Maybe No”, “Images Not Clear”. 
2. Contested episodes. These are episodes in which the journalist casts a doubt or openly 
challenges the behavior of the referee. The overall impression is that the referee did not 
adequately do his job and his decisions could have been better. This category includes the 
last two sub-categories: “Maybe Yes” and “Yes”. 
 
All the three newspapers did not necessarily report the same episodes; indeed, each episode was 
reported on average only by 1.6 newspapers26, for a total of 12,702 evaluations (Table 18 and 29). 
Interestingly the type of evaluation depends also on the type of referees’ decisions (see Table 20). 
On average the referees are more contested (+23%) for Type 0 decisions (referees not doing 
something). This is still in line with the perception of a “status-quo” bias. However, this is not true 
for offside calls where the difference between Type 0 and Type 1 decisions is negative (-23%). 
Offside episodes are contested more when the line referee makes a call, rather than when it does 
not. Moreover, this category of episode is also the one for which the TV camera usually makes the 
                                                        
26 1.6 is the mere division between 12,702 (number of episodes reported by each newspaper) and 7,786 
(number of unique episodes). However, it does not consider the fact the match was reviewed only by two or 
one newspaper.  
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evaluation of the decision easier to evaluate. This different trend may be due to the fact that, 
accordingly to the guidelines of FIFA, in doubtful situations the line referee should call an offside 
(“raise the flag”), thus making Type 1 decisions more frequent. 
 
Table 18 - Breakdown of journalists’ evaluations by category and sub-category 
 
 
Table 19 – Breakdown of Contested evaluations by category 
 
 
 
Table 20 – Breakdown of evaluations by type of referees’ decisions 
 
 
The coding scheme was tested, modified and improved. He used it to code one and half of the 
seasons (out of roughly four). The rest of the data was coded by a Research Assistant who had been 
Event Total	# Contested	# Contested	% Total	# Contested	# Contested	% Diff.	Type	0	-	Type	1
Penalty 1,284						 358														 28% 2,766				 1,434										 52% 24%
Type	0	Decisions
1,153				 86%
Type	1	Decisions
2,468						Cards 73%328														 13% 992													
36%
1,528				
1,296				
20%
48%
1,444						
763									
Offside
Fouls	and	Other
-23%
11%
627														
278														
43% 312													
618													
Total 5,959						 1,591											 27% 6,743				 3,356										 50% 23%
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carefully trained and monitored. A random sample of 4 match days (out of 38) for each season was 
extracted (2 match days for 2008/2009 as it was only half season). In total 18 match days (10.5% of 
the universe) were coded by both coders. In this sample, there are in total 879 episodes and 1,398 
evaluations. The inter-reliability among the coders was high and in line or greater than previous 
studies on content analysis (Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Deephouse, 1996). The coders proceeded in 
the following way: 
1. First, the article was decomposed into the single episodes. 88% (777 out of 879) of the 
episodes were reported by both coders. 
2. Second, the episode was then classified in the appropriate category. Out of the 777 episodes 
that were reported by both coders, 725 (95%) were classified in the same 4 categories 
(“Penalty”, “Cards”, “Offside”, “Fouls and Others”) and 655 (89%) in the same 22 sub-
categories (“Penalty”, “NO penalty”, “Yellow”, “NO yellow”…).  
3. Finally, the evaluation of the journalist was then assessed. Out of the 1,398 evaluations, 
1,226 were identified by both the coders. 95% of them were classified in the same category 
of Contested vs. Non-Contested and 84% in the same 6 sub-categories (“Neutral”, “No”, 
“Maybe No”, “Images Not Clear”, “Maybe Yes”, “Yes”). 
Appendix C reports examples of Moviola from the three newspapers.  
 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
We have two dependent variables; the variable Episodes Contested to test Hypothesis 1 to 4 and the 
variable Disagreement for hypothesis 5 and 6. 
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4.2.1.1 Episodes Contested (Hypothesis 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
To test the hypotheses 1,2 and 4, we looked at the overall contestation that a referee received in a 
given match. The dependent variable is Episodes Contested, which is defined as the simple count of the 
number of episodes contested at least by one newspaper. Therefore, Episodes Contested is a discrete 
variable between 0 (if no episodes in a match was contested) and 11 (for the three matches – 
Bologna-Juventus in season 2004/2005, Lazio-Juventus in season 2007/2008, and Roma-Juventus in 
season 2007/2008 - where the greatest number of episodes contested in a match took place). 
 However, to test hypothesis 3a and 3b we need to distinguish between norms that are more 
and less ambiguous.  We identified four categories in the decisions of the referees: penalty, cards, 
offside and fouls/other. Among those decisions, offside calls are the most mechanical to apply and 
the ones that are more easily assessed on TV. Figure 10 shows examples of offside calls that were 
reviewed by the journalists after the match. It is usually possible to draw a line that shows whether a 
player was indeed in offside or not. All the other decisions were considered as more ambiguous as it 
is usually not possible to have clear-cut images as in the case of offside; an observer will need to 
make an assessment that depends also on his or her experience and knowledge of soccer. Therefore, 
the variable Episodes Contested less ambiguous norms is the count of only contested episodes related to 
offside calls. Episodes Contested more ambiguous norms is the count of all the other contested episodes. 
Figure 10 – Examples of images of offside 
        
The straight line is designed with a computer and is in line with the last defender 
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4.2.1.2 Disagreement (Hypothesis 5 and 6) 
Hypothesis 5 and 6 focus on the disagreement among the evaluations of the newspapers. In this case 
our interest is not on whether the decision of the referee is contested, but on the mutual evaluation 
of the newspapers. We operationalize this variable in four different ways.  
 First, we simply look at the simple number of situations where a disagreement occurs. 
Evaluations of the newspapers were classified into two main categories, Non Contested Episodes and 
Contested Episodes. We coded the episodes for which a newspaper evaluates a referees’ decision in one 
category (for example, Non Contested Episodes) and at least one of the other two in the opposite 
category (for example, Contested Episodes). For a given match, the variable Episodes Disagreement is the 
count for the episodes for which there is a disagreement between at least 2 newspapers. This 
variable is quite raw, though it is still interesting. In fact, one would expect that sport journalists are 
expert at soccer rules and would (almost) always agree on the referees’ decisions especially when 
these are reviewed with TV cameras after the match. 
 However, the pure count can be misleading because it focuses only on the episodes in 
disagreement discarding the episodes in which there is agreement. In fact, if a match reports more 
episodes, it increases the likelihood that some are in disagreement. Therefore, as a second measure, 
we use the Jaccard coefficient, a common measure used in sociological and organizational literature 
(Everitt, Landau, and Leese, 2001; Hsu 2006) to assess the mutual agreement or disagreement 
among evaluations of different members of an audience.  It measures the proportion of cases on 
which each pair of sources agree on the total number of episodes that are reported by either of the 
two (it excludes cases that are not reported by the pair). It takes the following form: 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 152 
where a is the number of cases for which the two sources agree, b the sum of cases in which there 
was a positive classification by the first source and a negative by the second and c the sum of cases 
in which there was a positive classification by the second source and negative by the first. As we are 
interested in disagreement, we calculate the Jaccard Disagreement coefficient as: 1 – Jaccard 
coefficient. 
 Given the specificities of our context, we calculate two types of Jaccard coefficient. Jaccard 
Disagreement Episodes and Jaccard Disagreement Evaluation. The variable Jaccard Disagreement Episodes is the 
Jaccard Disagreement coefficient applied to the mere number of episodes that are reported by the 
three newspapers, without taking in consideration the type of newspapers’ evaluations (Contested vs. 
Non-Contested). In fact, many episodes are reported only by one newspaper and not by the others. To 
see how Jaccard Disagreement Episodes coefficient is calculated, we take as an example the match Lazio-
Juventus played on match day 19 in season 2008/2009. This match was reviewed by all the three 
newspapers. In total, there were 13 episodes reported by at least one of the newspaper. Corriere and 
Gazzetta reported 8 episodes, while Tuttosport 4. Among the 13, only 3 were reported by all the 
three newspapers and 1 by two of them. See Table 21. 
 
Table 21 – Episodes reported by each newspaper for Lazio-Juventus 
Lazio-Juventus # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 
Corriere NC NC NC C C C C C      
Gazzetta NC NC  NC NC     NC NC C NC 
Tuttosport NC   NC NC    NC     
C stands for “Contested”, NC stands “Non-Contested” and the cell is blank if the newspaper does not report 
the episode 
 
We first calculate the Jaccard Agreement coefficient for each pair: 
- Gazzetta/Corriere: 4/12 (4 episodes is reported by both, while 12 by either of the two) 
- Gazzetta/Tuttosport: 3/9 (3 episodes is reported by both, while 9 by either of the two) 
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- Corriere/Tuttosport: 3/9 (3 episodes are reported by both, while 9 by either of the two) 
The coefficient for CHIEVO-JUVENTUS is the average of the three: 
(3/9 + 4/12 + 3/9) / 3 = (1/3 + 1/3 + 1/3) / 3 = 1/3 = 0.33 
As we are interested in disagreement, the Jaccard Disagreement Episodes is 1-0.3=0.67 
 
Figure 11 represents graphically the calculation of the Jaccard Disagreement Episodes. If only 2 
newspapers cover the match, the Jaccard coefficient of the match will be the Jaccard coefficient of 
the pair of newspapers.  
 In the same season Atalanta - Reggina was played on match day 13. Also in this case all the 
three newspapers covered the match. However, no episode was reported. In this case, the Jaccard 
coefficient is 1, because all the three newspapers agree that there were no episodes. Accordingly, the 
variable Jaccard Disagreement Episodes is 0. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Calculation of Jaccard’s coefficient for Lazio-Juventus 
GAZZETTA 
#1 / #2 / #4 / #5 / 
#10/ #11 / #12 # 13 
CORRIERE 
#1 / #2 / #3 / #4 / #5/ 
#6/ #7 / #8 
 
TUTTOSPORT 
#1 / #4 / #5 / #9  
3 
    9 
3 
    9 
4 
    12 
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Jaccard Disagreement Evaluation is calculated as Jaccard Disagreement Episodes, but it takes into account 
also the evaluations of the journalists (Contested vs. Non-Contested). If two journalists report the 
same episode, but with a different evaluation (one journalist contests the decision of the referee and 
the other not or vice versa), the Jaccard Disagreement Episode will consider them in agreement, while 
the Jaccard Disagreement Evaluation would consider them in disagreement. It follows that Jaccard 
Disagreement Evaluation is always greater or equal to Jaccard Disagreement Episodes for a given match. For 
the match of Lazio-Juventus the denominator stays the same, however the numerator of changes. In 
fact, the numerator of Gazzetta/Corriere became 2 instead of 4. This is because Episode 4 and 5 is 
contested by Corriere, and non-contested by Gazzetta. Similarly, the numerator of Corriere / 
Tutosport becomes 1 (from 3) for the same reason. On overall the Jaccard Disagreement Evaluation 
for Lazio Juventus is: 1 – 1/3 * (2/12 + 3/9 + 1/9)= 0.8 
 For the fourth measure of disagreement, we took a different approach. From the perspective 
of the referees it is important to have the lowest number of episodes contested, namely episodes 
that the media label as possible or real mistakes.  In fact, the more media buzz around mistakes, the 
more likely it is that referees are going to be suspended for some time or that are even relegated to 
lower categories in the next season (especially for new referees). However, from the perspective of 
the team it is the type of mistakes that matters. The end result of a mistake is that one team got an 
advantage and the opponent was penalized (or vice versa). Referees’ mistakes can be very 
consequential for the teams as they influence the results of the match. In many cases, a single severe 
mistake conditioned the overall result (“la mano de Dios” of Maradona in the semi-final of 1990 
World Cup is maybe the most known case in the history of soccer). Therefore, from the perspective 
of the team the direction of the mistakes of the referee is more important, and hopefully they would 
like referees to make more mistakes that give their respective team an advantage. However, this 
comes at a cost. While teams that are favored by the referees’ mistakes enjoy better results, they also 
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attract public disapproval and resentment. In an ideal scenario, teams would like to have an 
advantage from the referees’ mistakes, but that this advantage won’t be publicized. Under this 
perspective the role of the newspapers is pivotal. While journalists have to follow a strict ethical 
code, they have freedom to maneuver without necessarily breaking the code. Indeed, a newspaper 
can decide which episode to report and on whether to report it in a neutral way or give an opinion 
about it. Therefore, the main variable of interest to influence public opinion is the relative number 
of mistakes that give an advantage to the team and those that give a disadvantage. The variable 
Favoritism Home is built in this way: 
 
Favoritism Home i = number of mistakes that newspaper i reported as favoring home team - 
number of mistakes that newspaper i reported as favoring team 
 
Where i is each of the three focal newspapers (Corriere, Gazzetta and Tuttosport). The variable of 
interest is the Standard Deviation of the Favoritism Home as it can be an important variable to measure 
the disagreement among the evaluations of the newspapers, taking the perspective of the teams; the 
greatest the variance the more disagreement among the evaluations of the journalists.  
 For example, let’s consider the same match Lazio – Juventus. In total, there were 13 
episodes reported (see Table 21). The three newspapers gave the following evaluations: 
1. Corriere (Lazio is local) reports 8 decisions of the referees and contested 5 of them, all of 
them in favor of Juventus. The variable Favoritism Home Corriere takes the value of 0-5=-5 
2. Gazzetta (no local teams) reports 8 decisions and contested 1 of them in favor of Lazio. The 
variable Favoritism Home Gazzetta takes the value of 1-0=1 
3. Tuttosport (Juventus is local) reports 4 episodes and dos not contest any of them. The 
variable Favoritism Home Tuttosport takes the value of 0. 
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As a result, if you read the Corriere, you get the impression that Juventus was strongly favored; if 
you read Gazzetta that Lazio was slightly favored and if you read Tuttosport you have the 
impression of a complete fair match. The average of the Favoritism among the three newspaper is    
-1.33 . Therefore, the Standard Deviation of the Favoritism Home will take the value of: √1/3 *[(-5+1.33)2 
+ (1+1.33)2 + (0+1.33)2] = 2.62 
 Each of the four operationalization focuses on a slightly different aspect of disagreement 
among newspapers. The first – Episodes Disagreement - gives importance to each event where the 
newspapers disagree. The second – Jaccard Disagreement Episodes - provides information on how 
“spread” are the episodes reported by the three newspapers (1 means that the three newspapers 
report all the same episodes, 0 means that they report all different ones). The third – Jaccard 
Disagreement Evaluations – combines the first two. All of these measures are non-directional, namely 
they do not consider which team is favored or penalized by the episodes contested. This is what is 
captured by the fourth and last measure – Standard Deviation Favoritism Home. 
  
To note that the number of observations to test Hypothesis 5 and 6 drops from 1,404 (matches with 
at least 1 Moviola) to 1,302 (matches with at least 2 Moviola). 
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
 Hypothesis 1 and 3a focuses on the status of the referee. Being appointed to the Serie A and 
Serie B is already a major peak in a referee’s career, both from a prestige and economic point of 
view. Then, the minimum objective of the referees is to be confirmed in the next season. However, 
referees in this category are not all the same. In the curriculum of the referees what is important is to 
have as many matches in the Serie A together with “critical” matches, such as “derby” (matches that 
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show two local teams in a city playing together), those exhibiting teams at the top of the league, 
finals of cups etc. After the Serie A, the next big step in the career of a referee is being appointed 
internationally. For international matches, the FIFA defines a pool of referees. These referees are 
appointed by the FIFA after the recommendation of each country, which has a specific number of 
slots. In the focal period Italy had between 7 and 10 slots per year. Usually a referee that is 
appointed internationally, stays there until he retires. This is because a referee reaches the status of 
international in his last stage of his career. In special circumstances, like evidence of wrongdoing, the 
Italian association or the FIFA can suspend a referee (as it happened to the referee Pieri in our focal 
period). Given the limited slots, the greater visibility and salary that international matches provide 
together with the lifetime appointment, make the pool of international referee very elitist27 and 
clearly distinct from the non-international referees. Therefore, we define the independent variable 
Status as a dummy that takes the value of 1 for international referees and 0 for non-international 
ones. In the focal periods, 64 referees were present. Among those, only 17 (26%) became 
international at some point (though without exceeding the given number of slots for each given 
year). Table 22 shows the number of referees who were international in each of the year of our focal 
period. 
 
                                                        
27 It is true that not all the international referees are the same. The Hall of Fame of the referees consists of 
those that referee the final match of international competition (such as World Cup or Champions League). 
However, these are rare events (e.g. World Cup is played every 4 years), thus making the different in status 
among international referees more difficult to evaluate. In the robustness checks we try to operationalize the 
variables of Status as discrete and continuous, though we find the best results when the variable is a dummy. 
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Table 22 – Referees who were international in a given year of our focal period 
 
The appointment of the referee as international is made in January of each year. Therefore, the year on the 
line 1 of the table are calendar years and not season year (a season starts in August/September and finishes in 
May/June).  
  
To test Hypothesis 4, we turn to the local teams of the newspapers. The three sport dailies in Italy - 
Corriere dello Sport, Gazzetta dello Sport and Tuttosport.- are all national, but they are unevenly 
distributed throughout Italy. Table 23 reports the distribution of the newspapers among the cities 
that host a team that played in Serie A during our focal period. Gazzetta and Tuttosport sold 12% of 
their newspapers in the city of Milan and Turin respectively. The city of Milan hosts the clubs 
“Inter” and “Milan”, while Turin is the home city of other two clubs “Juventus” and “Torino”. 
Even more skewed is the distribution of Corriere that sells almost a fourth of its newspapers in 
Rome (24%), where both clubs Roma and Lazio play. Juventus, Inter and Milan are the most 
successful Italian teams and the most known internationally. They won 65 out of 109 championships 
vested in the history of Italian league (up to 2013), besides many international trophies. Roma, Lazio 
and Torino also have successful stories in their history, they have mostly played in the Serie A and 
they are characterized by a strong and warm fans base. 
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 The distribution of the readers is in line with the location of the newspapers. In fact, the 
headquarters of Gazzetta is Milan, the headquarters of Tuttosport is Turin and the headquarters of 
Corriere is Rome. Therefore, we consider each newspaper to have two local teams, corresponding to 
the two teams that play in the city where the newspapers have most of the concentration of their 
readers and their headquarters; Milan and Inter for Gazzetta, Juventus and Torino for Tuttosport, 
Roma and Lazio for Corriere. The variable Local teams is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for matches where any of the 6 teams play and 0 otherwise (either as a home team or as an away 
team). We do not distinguish if a match exhibits local teams of different journals or just one local 
team. The variable Local teams takes the value of 1 both for a match like Lazio-Reggina, where Lazio 
is the local team of Corriere, and for Lazio-Juventus, where Lazio is the local team of Corriere and 
Juventus of Tuttosport. However, in the robustness checks we distinguish between these two 
situations. 
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Table 23 – Distribution of the readership (in %) of each daily by Italian cities with a club in Serie A 
Team City Gazzetta Corriere Tuttosport 
ASCOLI ASCOLI PICENO 0% 0% 1% 
ATALANTA BERGAMO 3% 0% 2% 
BOLOGNA BOLOGNA 1% 4% 1% 
BRESCIA BRESCIA 3% 0% 2% 
CAGLIARI CAGLIARI 1% 2% 1% 
CATANIA CATANIA 1% 1% 1% 
CHIEVO VERONA 2% 0% 1% 
EMPOLI FIRENZE 1% 2% 1% 
FIORENTINA FIRENZE 1% 2% 1% 
GENOA GENOVA 2% 0% 2% 
INTER MILANO 12% 2% 4% 
JUVENTUS TORINO 2% 1% 12% 
LAZIO ROMA 3% 24% 5% 
LECCE LECCE 1% 1% 1% 
LIVORNO LIVORNO 1% 1% 1% 
MESSINA MESSINA 1% 1% 1% 
MILAN MILANO 12% 2% 4% 
NAPOLI NAPOLI 2% 9% 1% 
PALERMO PALERMO 1% 2% 1% 
PARMA PARMA 1% 1% 1% 
REGGINA REGGIO CALABRIA 1% 1% 1% 
ROMA ROMA 3% 24% 5% 
SAMPDORIA GENOVA 2% 0% 2% 
SIENA SIENA 1% 0% 1% 
TORINO TORINO 2% 1% 12% 
TREVISO TREVISO 2% 0% 1% 
UDINESE UDINE 2% 0% 1% 
Values are percentage of the total diffusion of each daily. Data are for 2012. Source: Audit 2012 
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
Following previous literature that uses soccer as a context (Garicano and Palacio, 2005; Boeri and 
Severgnini, 2011), we measure for the main characteristics of the events: 
- Yellow match: a count variable equal to the number of yellow cards given in a match 
- Red match: a count variable equal to the number of red cards given in a match 
- Penalty match: a count variable equal to the number of penalties awarded in a match 
- Offside match: a count variable equal to the number of offsides given in a match 
- Shots match: a count variable equal to the number of shots made by the two teams 
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Moreover, four variables were included to control] the interest, relevance and visibility of the match: 
1. Difference in Final Goals. This is the absolute difference between the goals scored by the two 
teams at the end of the match. 
2. Champions. Teams ranked between one and four in order to play the international 
competition called Champions League. Teams ranked fifth and sixth are allowed to play a 
lower rank, but still important international competition called Europa League. Therefore, 
matches where at least one team is within the first attracts more attention. These are usually 
also the most interesting matches. The variables Champions is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if at least one team in the match is ranked number 1 to 6. 
 
Besides, to control heterogeneity among newspapers we use Moviola Fixed Effect.  To control any 
residual match specific heterogeneity (e.g. specific dyads of teams can have a history of intense 
rivalry), we use a Match Fixed Effect when allowed (Hypothesis 1 to 4). Instead, to control any residual 
heterogeneity among referees we use Referees Fixed Effect when allowed (Hypothesis 5 and 6). When 
Referees Fixed Effect was not allowed to be used, we control the numbers of years since a referee 
was appointed in the Serie A (Tenure Serie A). 
 
4.3 Analysis 
We proposed that scandals create social disturbances that can open up strategic opportunities for 
members of an audience. Therefore, we develop our hypotheses at two levels of analysis. At the 
referee level, we looked at how the social characteristics of the referee and the type of norms 
evaluated influenced the number of episodes contested before and after Calciopoli (Hypothesis 1, 2 
and 3). At the team level, we hypothesize how the relation between the team and the newspaper 
influenced the number of episodes contested and the disagreement among the newspapers 
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(Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6). This is why the first three Hypotheses have a fixed effect for the teams 
(match-dyad fixed effect), while the following three Hypotheses consider referees constant (referees 
fixed effect). The estimation model depends on the nature of the dependent variable. Table 24 
provides a summary on how the different hypotheses are tested. 
 
Table 24 – Overview of the different analysis to test the hypotheses 
Hypothesis H1 – H2 H3a – H3B H4 H5 – H6 
Level of 
analysis 
Referees Referees Teams Teams 
Unit of 
analysis 
Match Match Match Match 
DV 
Contested 
Episodes 
a. Contested Episodes 
more ambiguous norms 
 
b. Contested Episodes 
less ambiguous norms 
Contested 
Episodes 
Disagreement: 
 
1. Episodes Disagreement 
2. Jaccard Disagreement Episodes 
3. Jaccard Disagreement Evaluations 
4. Standard Deviation Favoritism 
Home 
Estimation 
Model 
Poisson Poisson Poisson 
1. Poisson 
2. Tobit 
3. Tobit 
4. Linear Regression 
Fixed 
Effect 
Match-Dyad Match-Dyad Referees Referees 
Table #  Table 26 Table 27 Table 28 
1. Table 29 
2. Table 30 
3. Table 31  
4. Table 32 
Robustness 
Checks   
 Table 34   
H5: Table 36, 37, 38  
H6: 39 
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5  RESULTS 
Table 25 contains the descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 
Table 25 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Values 
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Table 26 tests for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, namely that, after Calciopoli the journalists are 
more likely to contest high-status actors and less likely to contest new referee. Model 1 contains the 
control variables. Model 2 adds the variable Dummy Calciopoli, its value is positive and highly 
significant (p<0.001), showing that journalists are more likely to contest referees’ decisions after 
Calciopoli. Model 3 adds the variable Dummy Status Referees. The variable is negative, but not 
significant. This result is in line with our hypothesis, given that we expect a different effect on 
journalists’ attitude before and after Calciopoli. Model 4 introduces the variable Dummy New Referees, 
which is also not significant. Model 5 includes all the three variables. Finally, Model 6 adds the two 
interaction terms. Hypothesis 1 is supported. As hypothesized, the variable Dummy Status Referee is 
negative and highly significant (p<0.001), while the interaction term is positive and also highly 
significant (p<0.01). This means that high-status referees were less contested than low-status ones 
before Calciopoli, Calciopoli on average has increased the level of contestation for all referees, but 
more for the high-status ones. Hypothesis 2 predicts the opposite effect for new referees, namely 
that they were contested more before Calciopoli than after. Indeed, the coefficient of the variable 
Dummy New Referee is positive and its interaction term is negative; however, both the coefficients are 
not statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
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Table 26 - Poisson regression for the effect of Calciopoli on the number of contested episodes for 
high-status and new referees 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Contested Episodes 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Dummy Calciopoli   0.230***   0.227*** 0.111 
   (0.049)   (0.049) (0.070) 
Dummy Status Referees    -0.072  -0.057 -0.195** 
    (0.050)  (0.050) (0.069) 
Dummy Status Referees X Dum. Calciopoli       0.257** 
       (0.089) 
Dummy New Referee (2nd year)     -0.001 -0.018 0.022 
     (0.073) (0.073) (0.132) 
Dummy New Referee X Dum. Calciopoli       -0.027 
       (0.149) 
Champions 0.023 0.298*** 0.014 0.023 0.023 0.014 0.015 
 (0.049) (0.038) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Tenure Serie A -0.012* 0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Yellow match 0.046*** 0.062*** 0.038** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Red match 0.106** 0.061* 0.116** 0.104** 0.106** 0.115** 0.114** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Penalty match 0.186*** 0.108*** 0.181*** 0.190*** 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Offside match 0.020** 0.027*** 0.015* 0.019** 0.020** 0.015* 0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Fouls match 0.000 -0.004 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Shots match 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Difference in Final Goals -0.059** -0.033 -0.056** -0.060** -0.059** -0.057** -0.057** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Dummy Moviola Cor – Gaz - Tut 0.896*** 0.540** 0.844*** 0.891*** 0.896*** 0.842*** 0.837*** 
 (0.185) (0.173) (0.186) (0.185) (0.185) (0.186) (0.187) 
Dummy Moviola Cor – Gaz  0.518** 0.186 0.478* 0.517** 0.518** 0.479* 0.465* 
 (0.189) (0.177) (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.190) (0.190) 
Dummy Moviola Cor – Tut 0.683*** 0.473* 0.705*** 0.690*** 0.683*** 0.710*** 0.714*** 
 (0.194) (0.185) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) 
Dummy Moviola Gaz – Tut 0.651** 0.339 0.551** 0.647** 0.651** 0.552** 0.536** 
 (0.204) (0.188) (0.205) (0.204) (0.204) (0.205) (0.206) 
Dummy Moviola Only Cor 0.426 0.185 0.424 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.422 
 (0.234) (0.213) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.235) 
Dummy Moviola Only Gaz 0.122 -0.226 0.080 0.123 0.122 0.083 0.074 
 (0.251) (0.232) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251) 
Observations 1,370 1,404 1,370 1,370 1,370 1,370 1,370 
Number of Match Dyad 300  300 300 300 300 300 
Note: 27 groups (27 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group note: 3 groups (7 obs) dropped because 
of all zero outcomes. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 27 tests for Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b which states that the effect of Hypothesis 1 and  
Hypothesis 2 respectively should be stronger when the norms are more ambiguous (open to 
interpretability) than when they are less. Hypothesis 3a predicts that the increase in the number of 
episodes contested to high-status referees is greater for decisions on norms that are more 
ambiguous.  Table 27 splits the sample into two sub-samples: episodes that related to decisions on 
norms that are more ambiguous (Model 7) and episodes related to decisions on norms that are less 
ambiguous (Model 8). The coefficient of Dummy Calciopoli, Dummy Status Referees and their interaction 
is significant only for episodes that involved more ambiguous norms. In particular, high-status 
referees are contested fewer episodes than low-status ones pre-Calciopoli (B=-0.225, p-value<0.01). 
Calciopoli has the effect to increase the average number of contested episodes (B=0.166, p-
value<0.0.5) and more for high-status referees (Dum. Status Referees X Dum. Calciopoli=0.235*, p-
value<0.05). When norms are less ambiguous (Model 8), the number of episodes contested do not 
statistically depends on the status of the referee and of Calciopoli (all the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant). This shows supports to Hypothesis 3a.  
 Hypothesis 3b predicts that the decrease in the number of episodes contested to new 
referees is greater for decisions on norms that are more ambiguous. Model 6 groups all the episodes. 
This is the same model of Table 26 that was used to test for Hypothesis 2. As already shown, new 
referees do not statistically influence the number of episodes contested by the journalists. When the 
episodes contested are divided into the two sub-samples (Model 7 and Model 8) the coefficients 
remain insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. 
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Table 27 – Poisson regression for the effect of Calciopoli on the number of contested episodes for 
high-status and new referees by clarity of decisions 
 
 C=A+B A B 
Dependent Variable: 
Contested 
Episodes 
Episodes Contested 
more ambiguous norms 
Episodes Contested 
less ambiguous norms 
 (6) (7) (8) 
    
Dummy Calciopoli 0.111 0.166* -0.106 
 (0.070) (0.077) (0.168) 
Dummy Status Referees -0.195** -0.225** -0.071 
 (0.069) (0.076) (0.165) 
Dum. Status Ref. X Dum. Calciopoli 0.257** 0.235* 0.336 
 (0.089) (0.098) (0.215) 
New Referee (2nd year) 0.022 0.062 -0.204 
 (0.132) (0.145) (0.334) 
New Referee X Dum. Calciopoli -0.027 -0.143 0.569 
 (0.149) (0.164) (0.372) 
Champions 0.015 0.019 -0.008 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.118) 
Tenure Serie A -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) 
Yellow match 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.026 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.028) 
Red match 0.114** 0.139*** -0.032 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.095) 
Penalty match 0.189*** 0.241*** -0.086 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.097) 
Offside match 0.014* -0.003 0.083*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) 
Fouls match 0.005 0.009* -0.013 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Shots match 0.001 -0.001 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) 
Difference in Final Goals -0.057** -0.070** 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.049) 
Dummies Moviola Newspapers (6) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,370 1,361 1,093 
Number of Match Dyad 300 297 219 
Note: 27 groups (27 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group note: 3 groups (7 obs) dropped because 
of all zero outcomes. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Hypothesis 4, 5 and 6 look at the effect of the team on the number of episodes that newspapers 
report. In order to test for these hypotheses we cannot use match dyad fixed effects anymore with 
the variable local teams for multicollinearity reasons. On the other hand, we are now allowed to use 
referees fixed effects, which is a stricter control at the referee level. Given we use referees fixed 
effect we drop the three variables at the referees level (Status Referees, New Referees and Tenure Serie A. 
 Table 28 provides a test for Hypothesis 4, namely that referees’ decisions are more contested 
for matches exhibiting local teams. To test this hypothesis, we used the variable Dummy Local Teams. 
Model 9 contains the control variable and Model 10 introduces the variable of interest. The 
coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.001), thus supporting Hypothesis 4.  
 
Table 28 - Poisson regression for the effect of Calciopoli on the number of contested episodes in 
matches with local teams 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Contested Episodes 
(9) (10) 
Dummy Local Teams  0.501*** 
  (0.041) 
Champions 0.294*** 0.181*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) 
Yellow match 0.064*** 0.063*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Red match 0.058 0.062* 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
Penalty match 0.120*** 0.137*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
Offside match 0.029*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Fouls match -0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Shots match 0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Difference in Final Goals -0.035 -0.041* 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Dummies Moviola Newspapers (6) Yes Yes 
Observations 1,400 1,400 
Number of Referees 52 52 
Note: 4 groups (4 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group. For most robust results, we include 
referees fixed effects, therefore the three referee-specific variables (Status Referee, New Referee and Tenure 
Serie A) are not included.  Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 29 to 32 tests for Hypothesis 5 and 6.  Each of the four table has a different dependent 
variable, corresponding to each of the four types of operationalization for measuring disagreement; 
Episodes Disagreements in Table 29, Jaccard Disagreement Episodes in Table 30, Jaccard Disagreement 
Evaluations in Table 31 and Standard Deviation Favoritism Home in Table 32. Each table has five models. 
The first Model contains only the control variables, the second introduces the variable Dummy 
Calciopoli and the third the dummy variable Dummy Local Teams. The fourth Model contains both 
variables (the Dummy Calciopoli and Dummy Local teams). Finally, the fifth Model includes all the 
variables and the interaction. The estimation model is different as the variables have different 
distribution. Table 29 uses a Poisson regression as the dependent variable is discrete (with positive 
values). Table 30 uses a censored regression (the “tobit” model - Amemiya, 1984; Greene, 1993) as 
the Jaccard coefficient is bounded between 0 and 1. The same happens for Table 31. Finally, Table 
32 uses a linear regression given the dependent variable is the standard deviation. 
 As a general rule, positive values indicate an increase in disagreement, while negative value a 
decrease. Hypothesis 5 states that newspapers are more likely to disagree in their evaluations of the 
referees’ decisions for matches where local teams play. This is tested by the third Model in each of 
the regression (Model 13, 18, 23 and 28). The four models show a general support of the 
Hypothesis. The coefficient of the variable Dummy Local Teams is positive and significant in three out 
of the four models (except in Model 23 where Jaccard Disagreement Evaluations is the dependent 
variable). 
 Hypothesis 6 considers the effect of the scandal on the disagreement among the evaluations 
of the three newspapers. We predict that the disagreement will increase after Calciopoli (Hypothesis 
6a) in particular for the matches exhibiting local teams (Hypothesis 6b). Hypothesis 6a is supported 
if the coefficient of the variable Dummy After Calciopoli is positive and significant and Hypothesis 6b 
if the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant (in Model 15, 20, 25, 30). 
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Hypothesis 6a is supported only in the last table, when Standard Deviation of Favoritism Home is the 
dependent variable, while Hypothesis 6b is never supported. 
 Overall, among the four operationalizations of disagreement the last one - Standard Deviation 
of Favoritism Home - is the one that produces the best results. This is not surprising. The first three 
types of operationalization (count of disagreement and the two Jaccard coefficient) are “direction-
free”. They measure the disagreement, but they do not consider if the episodes in disagreement give 
an advantage to one team or another. Instead, we know that “who gets the final advantage” is crucial 
in this setting and this was exactly the subject of the scandal. In the robustness checks we go more 
in depth and investigate the “direction” that each newspaper chooses (Table 36 to 39). 
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Table 29 - Poisson regression for the effect of Calciopoli on the number of episodes for which 
newspapers are in disagreement in matches with local teams 
 
      
Dependent Variable:  
Episodes Disagreement 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
      
Dummy Calciopoli  0.175  0.140 -0.006 
  (0.102)  (0.103) (0.136) 
Dummy Local Teams   0.373*** 0.365*** 0.224 
   (0.084) (0.085) (0.120) 
Dum. Loc. Teams X Dum. Calciopoli     0.268 
     (0.163) 
Champions 0.236** 0.237** 0.151 0.152 0.139 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
Yellow match -0.028 -0.036 -0.027 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Red match 0.272*** 0.280*** 0.273*** 0.279*** 0.276*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Penalty match 0.321*** 0.325*** 0.338*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Offside match 0.027* 0.025* 0.023* 0.022 0.021 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Fouls match -0.004 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Shots match 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Difference in Final Goals -0.008 -0.006 -0.015 -0.013 -0.010 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
      
Dummies Moviola Newspapers  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,290 1,290 1,290 1,290 1,290 
Number of Referees 50 50 50 50 50 
Note: 4 groups (4 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group. note: 2 groups (8 obs) dropped 
because of all zero outcomes. Same results with negative binomial. Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 30 - Tobit regression for the effect of Calciopoli on Jaccard Disagreement Episodes in 
matches with local teams 
 
      
Dependent Variable:  
Jaccard Disagreement Episodes 
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
      
Dummy Calciopoli  0.026  0.022 0.041 
  (0.024)  (0.024) (0.029) 
Dummy Local Teams   0.050** 0.049* 0.070* 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) 
Dum. Loc. Teams X Dum. Calciopoli     -0.041 
     (0.037) 
Champions 0.022 0.022 0.010 0.011 0.012 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Yellow match 0.011* 0.009 0.011* 0.010 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Red match -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.058*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Penalty match -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Offside match 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fouls match 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shots match 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Difference in Final Goals 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
      
Dummies Moviola Newspapers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Dummies Referees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.501** 0.461** 0.481** 0.448** 0.433* 
 (0.164) (0.168) (0.164) (0.168) (0.168) 
      
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 
 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 173 
Table 31 - Tobit regression for the effect of Calciopoli on Jaccard Disagreement Evaluations in 
matches with local teams 
 
      
Dependent Variable:  
Jaccard Disagreement Evaluations 
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
      
Dummy Calciopoli  -0.023  -0.026 -0.030 
  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.029) 
Dummy Local Teams   0.031 0.032 0.028 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) 
Dum. Loc. Teams X Dum. Calciopoli     0.009 
     (0.037) 
Champions 0.017 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.009 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Yellow match -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Red match -0.042** -0.043** -0.042** -0.043** -0.043** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Penalty match -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Offside match 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fouls match 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shots match 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Difference in Final Goals 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
      
Dummies Moviola Newspapers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Dummies Referees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.548*** 0.583*** 0.535*** 0.574*** 0.577*** 
 (0.161) (0.164) (0.160) (0.164) (0.165) 
      
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 32 – Linear regression for the effect of Calciopoli on the Standard Deviation of Favoritism in 
matches with local teams 
 
      
Dependent Variable:  
Standard Deviation Favoritism Home 
(26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
      
Dummy Calciopoli  0.091**  0.080** 0.082* 
  (0.030)  (0.030) (0.037) 
Dummy Local Teams   0.115*** 0.109*** 0.112** 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) 
Dum. Loc. Teams X Dum. Calciopoli     -0.004 
     (0.047) 
Champions 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.076** 0.078** 0.078** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Yellow match 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Red match 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.013 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Penalty match 0.055** 0.055** 0.058** 0.058** 0.058** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Offside match 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fouls match 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Shots match 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Difference in Final Goals 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
      
Dummies Moviola Newspapers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.237* 0.139 0.171 0.086 0.085 
 (0.105) (0.109) (0.105) (0.109) (0.110) 
      
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 
Number of Referees 56 56 56 56 56 
Adj. R-squared 0.032 0.038 0.047 0.052 0.051 
Same structure of results are replicated with a Tobit regression with 0 as lower limit. Standard errors 
in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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5.1 Robustness checks 
Once appointed, referees are international until the end of their career (unless extraordinary 
circumstances happen). However, at a given time, some referees have been appointment for years, 
while others are new. Table 33 shows the number of years each referee has been international. 
 
Table 33 – International referees with the years since they became international 
 
Grey cells indicate referees that have been international for less than 4 years 
 
The question on whether status is a dummy, categorical or discrete variable is a general concern in 
literature. It usually depends on the specific context. Therefore, in the robustness check we test 
different operationalization of the status of the referee. Table 34 compares three ways to 
operationalize status: as a dummy, as a category or as a discrete variable. Model 6 is the same as the 
one in Table 26 and it operationalizes status as a dummy variable (1 if referee is international, 0 if 
not). Model 6a tests for a categorical operationalization of the variable: Status Junior International is a 
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dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the matches with a referee who has been international 
for less than 4 years, while the variable Status Senior International is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for matches with a referee who has been international for 4 or more years. The referee 
points are matches with referees that are not international. The referees that belong to the variable 
Status Junior International are the ones whose cells are grey in Table 33. Model 6c operationalizes 
status as a discrete variable (Status Number Years) that is simply equal to the number of years that a 
referee has been international. Results show that in our contest status it is best operationalized as a 
dummy variable, either a referee is international or is not. In model 6c, the discrete variable Status 
Number Years is not significant.  In model 6b only the variable Status Senior International and its 
interaction are positive and significant, though the F-test between the coefficient of Status Junior 
International and its interaction is not significant (p>0.05). Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the variable Status Junior International is equal to Status Senior International and so it is for the two 
interaction terms.  
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Table 34 - Robustness Check (Hypothesis 2) – Poisson regression on the number of contested 
episodes for high-status referees, with different operationalization of status 
 
                                    Dependent Variable: 
                                    Contested Episodes  
(6) (6a) (6b) 
Operationalization 
of Referee Status 
    
Dummy Calciopoli 0.111 0.123 0.197** 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.063) 
Dummy 
Dummy Status Referees -0.195**  
 
 (0.069)   
Dummy Status Referee X Dummy Calciopoli 0.257**   
 (0.089)   
Categorical 
Status Junior International (<4)  -0.152 
 
  (0.086)  
Status Junior International X Dum. Calciopoli  0.208  
  (0.112)  
Status Senior International (4+)  -0.241**  
  (0.091)  
Status Senior International X Dum. Calciopoli  0.252*  
  (0.109)  
Discrete 
Cumulative 
Status Number Years   -0.021 
   (0.013) 
Status Number Years X Dummy Calciopoli   0.021 
   (0.015) 
     
 New Referee (2nd year) 0.022 0.049 0.101 
  (0.132) (0.135) (0.132) 
 New Referee X Calciopoli -0.027 -0.041 -0.119 
  (0.149) (0.150) (0.145) 
     
 Other control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
     
 Dummies Moviola Newspapers Yes  Yes 
     
 Match Fixed-Effects Yes  Yes 
     
 Observations 1,370  1,370 
 Number of Matches 300  300 
Note: 27 groups (27 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group note: 3 groups (7 obs) 
dropped because of all zero outcomes. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05 
 
In the results section we showed that Hypothesis 5 was supported in 3 out of 4 operationalizations 
of disagreement. The main mechanism underlying the disagreement among newspapers (Hypothesis 
5 and 6) is that they try to put in good light their local teams and, potentially, under a bad light the 
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local teams of their competitors. If this is true, we would expect to have the most disagreement 
among the newspapers for matches that exhibit two local teams and the least in matches where both 
teams are not local to any newspaper. See Table 35.  
 
Table 35 – Type of matches based on the local teams of each newspaper 
 
 
Table 36 and Table 37 replicate Tables 30 and 33 respectively. As Table 29 and 32 they use the 
variable Episodes Disagreement and Standard Deviation Favoritism Home respectively as dependent 
variables. Unlike Table 29 and 32 they split the Dummy Local Teams into two dummies Dummy 
Local-Local (Quadrant II Table 35) and Dummy Local – Non-Local (Quadrant I Table 35).  The former 
takes the value of 1 if both teams are local, the value of 0 otherwise. The latter takes the value of 1 if 
only one of the team is local and the other is not. The reference point is the matches where both 
teams are non local. As an example, in the match Lazio-Juventus (Lazio is local for Corriere and 
Juventus is local for Tuttosport) the Dummy Local-Local=1 and Dummy Local – Non-Local=0, in the 
match Lazio-Reggina (only Lazio is local for Corriere), the Dummy Local-Local=0 and Dummy Local – 
Non-Local=1 and finally in the match Chievo-Reggina (no teams is local to any newspapers), both 
Dummies are 0. Model 35 in Table 35 and Model 39 in Table 37 shows both the Dummies together. 
The coefficient of both Dummies is positive and significant (p<0.001). This means that these 
matches show more disagreement than those where both teams are non local. More interestingly, 
the coefficient of the Dummy Local-Local Matches is statistically greater than the coefficient of the 
 
Newspaper 2 
Non Local Local 
Newspaper 1 
Non Local I. Non Local ; Non Local IV. Non Local – Local 
Local II. Local ; Non Local III. Local – Local 
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Dummy Local-Non Local. This means that the matches with the most episodes contested are those 
where both teams are local. This provides a further support to Hypothesis 5. However, this further 
division does not provide more support to the Hypothesis 6. As before, Hypothesis 6a is supported 
only when the dependent variable is Standard Deviation of Favoritism Home; the coefficient of Dummy 
Calciopoli is positive and significant in Model 40 in Table 37. Instead, the coefficient of the 
interaction terms is insignificant for both the operationalizations (Model 35 of Table 36 and in 
Model 40 of Table 37).  
 
 
Table 36 – Robustness Check (Hypothesis 5) - Poisson regression on the number of episodes for 
which newspapers are in disagreement in matches with local teams by the identity of the opponent 
team (local vs. non-local) 
 
      
Dependent Variable:  
Episodes Disagreement  
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) 
      
Dummy Calciopoli  0.175  0.128 -0.011 
  (0.102)  (0.104) (0.136) 
Dummy Local – Local Matches   0.616*** 0.599*** 0.372 
   (0.147) (0.148) (0.259) 
Dum. Local – Local X Dum. Calciopoli     0.384 
     (0.316) 
Dummy Local – Non Local Matches   0.337*** 0.331*** 0.208 
   (0.087) (0.087) (0.124) 
Dum. Loc.al – Non Local X Dum. Calciopoli     0.242 
     (0.169) 
      
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Dummies Moviola Newspapers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Referees Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,290 1,290 1,290 1,290 1,290 
      
Number of Referees 50 50 50 50 50 
Note: 4 groups (4 obs) dropped because of only one obs per group. note: 2 groups (8 obs) dropped 
because of all zero outcomes. Same results with negative binomial. Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 37 – Robustness Check (Hypothesis 5) - Linear regression for the effect of Calciopoli on the 
Standard Deviation of Favoritism in matches with local teams, by the identity of the opponent team 
(local vs. non-local) 
 
      
Dependent Variable:  
Standard Deviation Favoritism 
(36) (37) (38) (39) (40) 
      
Dummy Calciopoli  0.091**  0.075* 0.078* 
  (0.030)  (0.030) (0.037) 
Dummy Local – Local Matches   0.263*** 0.252*** 0.139 
   (0.050) (0.050) (0.077) 
Dum. Local – Local X Dum. Calciopoli     0.187 
     (0.101) 
Dummy Local – Other Matches   0.095*** 0.091*** 0.111** 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) 
Dum. Loc.al – Other X Dum. Calciopoli     -0.032 
     (0.049) 
      
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Dummies Moviola Newspapers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 0.187 0.098 0.127 0.051 0.052 
 (0.106) (0.110) (0.106) (0.110) (0.111) 
      
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 1,302 
Number of Referees 56 56 56 56 56 
Adj. R-squared 0.036 0.042 0.059 0.062 0.064 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
The mechanisms we used to predict the disagreement among journalists (Hypothesis 5 and 6) were 
that newspapers want to support the image of their own team. If this is true, each newspaper should 
report more episodes against their local teams and more episodes in favor of their competitors’ local 
teams. This is what Table 38 and 39 test. The dependent variable of both tables is Favoritism Home as 
defined before. The unit of analysis is now the dyad newspaper-match; this allows us to separate 
matches that exhibit the local team of a newspaper and the local team of their competitors. This 
raises the number of observations by almost three times from 1,302 to 3,507 (the entire universe of 
the number of Moviola available). Positive values of the variable Favoritism Home means that the 
home team is given an unfair advantage compared to the away team. The constant term is positive 
CHAPTER 4 
 181 
and significant (around 1.074). This means that on average home teams are given one more 
advantage versus away teams. This is in line with the well known home bias (Garicano and Palacio, 
2005), which is a consolidated finding in sport and management research. Table 38 looks on what 
happens when the home team is local to the given newspaper (again the unit of analysis is the dyad 
newspaper-match), and when it is local to their competitors versus to when it is non local. For 
example, in the match Lazio-Chievo the Dummy Own Local Home takes the value of 1 for Corriere 
(Lazio is its local team) and 0 for Gazzetta and Tuttosport. For the same match, the Dummy 
Competitor Local Home is 0 for Corriere and 1 for Tuttosport and Gazzetta dello Sport. The non-local 
category is the reference category. Therefore, positive (negative) values of the dummies mean that 
the journalist reports more (less) favoritism than when a non-local team plays. In line with our 
prediction, the coefficient of Dummy Own Local Home is negative and the coefficient of Dummy 
Competitor Local Home is positive. This means that newspapers are more likely to report that their own 
local teams have been penalized and their competitors’ local teams favored. Model 43 tests both the 
dummies together. Even if the Dummy Own Local Home loses its significance, its coefficient is 
statistically different (smaller) from the one of Dummy Competitor Local Home (p<0.000). Similarly, 
Models 44 to 46 apply the same logic when the local team is playing away. In case of Chievo-Lazio, 
the Dummy Own Local Away takes the value of 1 for Corriere and 0 for both Gazzetta and 
Tuttosport. The variable dummy Competitor Local Away takes the value of 0 for Corriere and 1 for 
Gazzetta e Tuttosport. Now the coefficients switch signs. The coefficient of the Dummy Own Local 
Away is positive, while the coefficient of Dummy Competitor Local Away is negative.  This means that 
when its own team plays away, newspapers are more likely to say that the home team has been given 
an advantage by the referees, thus their own local team has been penalized. To the contrary, when 
the away team is the local team of their competitor, a given newspaper is more likely to say that the 
home team has been penalized, thus the competitor local team has been given an advantage. On 
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overall results in Table 38 provide a robust test for Hypothesis 5. Not surprisingly given that 
matches with local teams are  more visible, newspapers are more likely to report contested episodes. 
 
Table 38 – Robustness Check (Hypothesis 5). Linear regression for the effect of the identity of the 
team (Local, Competitor or Non Local) on the advantage or penalization that the home team 
receives from the referees 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Favoritism Home 
 Identity Home Team 
(Local / Competitor vs. Non Local) 
Identity Away Team 
(Local / Competitor vs. Non Local) 
  (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) 
        
Dummy Own Local Home  -0.189*  -0.146    
  (0.079)  (0.085)    
Dummy Competitor Local Home   0.229*** 0.213**    
   (0.064) (0.068)    
Dummy Own Local Away     0.269**  0.217* 
     (0.083)  (0.090) 
Dummy Competitor Local Away      -0.287*** -0.262*** 
      (0.067) (0.072) 
        
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Newspaper Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Referees fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant  0.844*** 0.825*** 0.833*** 0.841*** 0.845*** 0.849*** 
  (0.176) (0.176) (0.175) (0.175) (0.174) (0.173) 
        
Observations 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 
Adj. R-squared  0.002 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.010 
Cluster by match is included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
 
 
Table 39 replicates Table 38 and adds the Dummy Calciopoli and the interaction term. In order to test 
for Hypothesis 6b we need to look at the interaction terms. The coefficients should be significant. If 
the hypothesis is supported the coefficient of Local Home X Calciopoli and Competitor Home X Calciopoli 
should be positive, while the coefficient of he Competitor Home X Calciopoli and Local Away X 
Calciopoli should be negative. Out of the four, the first Local Home X Calciopoli is the one significant 
CHAPTER 4 
 183 
and with the expected sign. This means that after Calciopoli, newspapers increase their biases 
towards their local teams. This provides some support to Hypothesis 6b. 
 
Table 39 – Robustness Check (Hypothesis 6). Linear regression for the effect of the identity of the 
team (Local, Competitor or Non Local) on the advantage or penalization that the home team 
receives from the referees before and after Calciopoli 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Favoritism 
7Identity Home Team 
(Local / Competitor vs. Non Local) 
Identity Away Team 
(Local / Competitor vs. Non Local) 
(34) (34a) (34b) (34c) (37) (34a) (37b) (37c) 
         
Dummy Calciopoli  -0.016 -0.021 0.052  -0.016 -0.013 0.002 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.063)  (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) 
Dummy Own Local Home -0.146  -0.145 0.119     
 (0.085)  (0.085) (0.114)     
Local Home X Calciopoli    -0.474**     
    (0.167)     
Dummy Competitor Local Home 0.213**  0.214** 0.309***     
 (0.068)  (0.068) (0.093)     
Competitor Home X Calciopoli    -0.175     
    (0.134)     
Dummy Own Local Away     0.217*  0.218* 0.236* 
     (0.090)  (0.090) (0.118) 
Local Away X Calciopoli        -0.033 
        (0.178) 
Dummy Competitor Local Away     -0.262***  -0.262*** -0.223* 
     (0.072)  (0.072) (0.099) 
Competitor Away X Calciopoli        -0.070 
        (0.142) 
         
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Newspaper Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Referees fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.833*** 0.852*** 0.855*** 0.790*** 0.849*** 0.852*** 0.863*** 0.849*** 
 (0.175) (0.188) (0.187) (0.190) (0.173) (0.188) (0.185) (0.186) 
Observations 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 
Adj. R-squared 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.010 
Cluster by match is included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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A different way to see these results is to consider three simple scenarios: 
1. Penalized. The home team is penalized (the same of contested episodes in favor to the home 
team is less than the contested in favor of the away team) 
2. Neutral. the home team and away team received the same amount of episodes contested 
3. Favored. The home team is favored (the same of contested episodes in favor to the home 
team is more than the contested in favor of the away team) 
 
Table 40 shows the distribution of these three scenarios for all teams and for each of the four cases 
we mentioned: own local / competitor local vs. home / away. White cells indicate when the % is 
greater than the one of all matches, light-grey cells values when the % is lower. Therefore, light-grey 
values means that the specific % occur more than on average, white values less than average. The 
trend is the same. Home teams are seen as favored more than average when they are the local of 
their competitors or when they play against their own local teams. Instead, home teams are seen as 
more penalized than average when they play against their competitor local teams or when they are 
the newspaper’s local team. 
 
Table 40 - Evaluation of the newspaper on whether the home team has been favored or penalized 
based on the identity of the home team and the away team 
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One may interpret these results suggesting that it is the referee who gives a real advantage to these 
local teams. Indeed, two of the six local teams were involved in Calciopoli. To rule out this 
hypothesis, we created a variable called Extra Favoritism Home that calculates the extra advantage that 
a newspaper gives to the home team for a given match versus the average of their competitors. The 
variable Extra Favoritism Home is calculated in the following way: 
 
Extra Favoritism Homei = Favoritism Homei – Average of (Favoritism Homej ; Favoritism Homez) 
 
Where i is the focal newspaper and j and z are the other two newspapers. For example, in the case of 
the match Lazio – Juventus, we know that the variable of Favoritism Home had the following values 
for each of the newspapers; 
 Favoritism Home Corriere     = -5 
 Favoritism Home Gazzetta  =+1 
 Favoritism Home Tuttosport =  0 
For this match the variable Extra Favoritism Home i takes the following values: 
 Extra Favoritism Home Corriere= - 5 – average (+1; 0)= -5 – 0.5=-5.5 
 Extra Favoritism Home Gazzetta = + 1 – average (-5;0)= +1 +2.5=+3.5 
 Extra Favoritism Home Tuttosport = 0 – average (-5,+1)=+2 
We replicated Table 36, 37 and 38 by substituting the dependent variable Favoritism Home with the 
variable Extra Favoritism Home. The results improved. Therefore, these patterns are really due to the 
evaluations of the newspapers and not to the actual behavior of the referees in the field. 
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5.2 Summary of findings 
Table 41 summarizes the results on each hypothesis for the different analysis made. “Yes” means 
that the hypothesis is supported, “No” that the Hypothesis is not supported. 
 
Table 41 – Overview of the support of Hypotheses 
 Table 26 Table 27 Table 28 
Hypothesis 1 Yes   
Hypothesis 2 No   
Hypothesis 3a  Yes  
Hypothesis 3b  No  
Hypothesis 4   Yes 
 
 Table 29 Table 30 Table 31 Table 32 
Dependent Variable 
Episodes 
Disagreement 
Jaccard Disagreement 
Episodes 
Jaccard Disagreement 
Evaluations 
St Dev. 
Favoritism Home 
Hypothesis 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hypothesis 6a No No No Yes 
Hypothesis 6b No No No No 
 
 
 Table 36 Table 37 Table 38 Table 39 
Hypothesis 5 Yes Yes Yes  
Hypothesis 6a No Yes   
Hypothesis 6b No No  Partly 
 
 
6 DISCUSSION 
This paper proposes a theory of scandals as events that create social disturbances and opens up 
strategic opportunities for members of an audience. Contrary to normal conditions, we predict that 
scandals create a liability of status (Hypothesis 1) and an advantage of newness (Hypothesis 2). We 
find support to the first and not to the second. Then, we hypothesized that both effects are stronger 
for norms that leave more latitude to interpretation (Hypothesis 3a and 3b). Also in this case we 
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found support only in the case of high-status referees (Hypothesis 3a). The following three 
hypotheses focused on the way the identity of the team – whether it is local or not to a newspapers 
– influences the way journalists report and evaluate the episodes contested to the referees. In line 
with our hypothesis we find that newspapers are more likely to contest episodes in the matches that 
exhibit local teams (Hypothesis 4) and such matches create more disagreement among journalists’ 
evaluations (Hypothesis 5). Hypothesis 6 predicts that the disagreement increases after the scandal 
(6a), especially for local teams (6b). These hypotheses are supported for one type of 
operationalization (Hypothesis 6a) and when we focus on the match-newspaper unit of analysis 
(Hypothesis 6b). So, we can affirm that Calciopoli has made the three newspapers more in 
disagreement on the evaluations of the referees under some dimensions.  
 This paper makes three main contributions to extant theory of organizational misconduct 
and scandals. First, the media is known to be a key social-control agent (Greve et al. 2010) that is 
able to influence the perspective of the public (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Pollock and Rindova, 
2003). While previous literature has treated the media as a homogenous audience, we show that the 
evaluation of each media outlet can be biased towards the preference of the readers. This opens up 
new exciting avenues of research for organizational scholars to investigate under which conditions 
the evaluation of media outlets converge or diverge.  
 Second, it enlarges the model of scandal by Adut (2005,2008) and Thomson (2000). We 
propose that scandals provoke social disturbances that impact the social structure of society. One 
reason is that scandals influence the way actors are evaluated; in our context Calciopoli has increased 
the overall level of mistrust and suspicious on the referees’ category; as a result, this scandal waved 
the usual moral licensing that high-status referees experience. Another reason is that a scandal 
influences the homogenization or stratification of an audience. An audience is usually divided in 
multiple segments that have different views or preference. We ask the following question: “Will a 
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scandal make these segments more or less in agreement?”. We propose that a scandal increases the 
disagreement only when the segments are rigid, members of each segment do not easily switch from 
one to another, and when the scandal involves one segment specifically. In our context, newspapers 
(and their readers) do not switch their teams easily. If one supports Juventus one day, he or she does 
not support Roma the next. Also, Calciopoli was a scandal mainly of Juventus. Therefore, the 
scandal made the fans supporting Juventus more homogenous among themselves, but more apart 
from the other fans. Using Adut’s terminology, we say that scandals homogenize the members of an 
audience that are contaminated by the scandal, but stratify the overall audiences by making the 
different segments of an audience more in disagreement. However, this is true only when the 
segments of an audience are rigid, in the sense that one member is not willing to change easily the 
segment he belongs to. For example, in case of a scandal that affects a pasta producers (like in the 
case of Barilla in September 2013), it is likely that the Barilla consumers were less likely to defend 
Barilla’s behavior and more likely to switch to another pasta producer than the supporters of 
Juventus changing their team.  
 Finally, we empirically contribute to studies that measure agreement and disagreement 
among members of an audience. We operationalize disagreement in four ways. Three of them, 
including the known Jaccard coefficient, are symmetric measures, namely they do not consider the 
direction of the disagreement. We propose a fourth asymmetric measure of disagreement that 
measures which party gets an advantage. This produces the best results in our context and we 
propose to use this measure for contexts where the direction of the disagreement matters. 
 In summary, this paper theory and findings call for a more integration between sociological 
research on scandals and organizational literature. Not only scandals directly affect the organizations 
and other actors involved, but it can have more profound and lasting consequences for all the whole 
society, therefore to the organizations and actors that are part of.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this dissertation was to investigate social evaluations in a multiple-audience context. 
The previous literature has focused mainly on the way one audience evaluates an organization’s 
actions, which constitutes the so-called “candidate – audience” framework (Zuckerman, 1999). The 
evaluating audience (Bitektine, 2011) has usually been the most relevant audience in a given 
context—such as the media, critics, and rating agencies. This audience carries out the role of a 
social-control agent, which has the power to monitor and enforce sanctions on companies that 
misbehave (Greve et al., 2010). In the case of multiple audiences, scholars have either assumed 
convergence in their evaluations (Deephouse, 1996; Greve et al. 2010) or have treated each 
evaluation as independent from the others (Pontikes, 2012). The study for this dissertation has 
investigated the dyad “audience evaluation – audience evaluation”, the objective being to unpack the 
black box concerning the way audience evaluations may influence each other.  
 In particular, it focuses on the relationship between the evaluation of a “social-control 
agent” and the evaluation of “another audience.” In fact, in the context of social norms, the social-
control agent may not be able to punish directly organizations that misbehave, but it may do so by 
influencing the evaluation of another audience. Therefore, it is crucially important to understand 
how the evaluation of a social-control agent may influence the evaluation of another audience. This 
dissertation investigates, in particular, the way one type of social evaluation—organizational social 
misconduct—influences the evaluation of three other audiences: people, investors, and the media. 
Throughout the three foregoing essays, three common mechanisms have emerged: the ambiguity of 
norms, saliency, and localness. These mechanisms aid us in understanding the way social norms 
affect organizations and society. Based on these findings, I propose that social norms are better 
understood in a triadic framework: candidate – social-control agent – another audience. Though the 
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evaluation of the social-control agent does influence the evaluation of another audience, this 
influence is not mechanical and is, hence, worth investigating (Chapters 2 and 3). On the other hand, 
in the case of social norms, the evaluation of a social-control agent may not be totally impartial 
because it can be influenced, as well, by the opinion of other audiences, such as the readers of 
newspapers (Chapter 4). It would be well for future research to unpack this black box further in 
order to improve our understanding of how and why the evaluation of one audience influences the 
evaluation of another. The findings here contribute theoretically and empirically to the literature on 
institutional theory, social misconduct, and strategy, providing information to managers and strategy 
practitioners as well.  
 
1  MAIN RESULTS 
The specific research question that this dissertation has proposed is as follows: Why does an 
audience change its evaluation after organizational social misconduct? The research question was 
then developed in three parts, which were empirically analyzed in two contexts: the first two 
chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) deal with UK advertising regulations while Chapter 4 examines the 
Calciopoli scandal, which affected the top Italian soccer league in 2006. Chapter 2 shows that for 
relatively light social misconduct—advertising banned by an industry self-regulatory body—the 
saliency of the event increases the number of complaints that people will make regarding 
inappropriate advertising. However, this increase is moderated by the ambiguity of the norm 
involved. When the ASA decides to ban an advertisement, the number of complaints increases more 
than when the norms are less ambiguous. Instead, when the ASA decides to absolve a company’s 
advertisement, people’s reactions are more dispersed, showing no statistical difference between 
norms with high and low degrees of interpretability (i.e., more or less ambiguous). In sum, people do 
react to the social misconduct of companies by increasing the number of complaints they make. 
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However, this reaction depends on the saliency and the ambiguity of the norm violated. It is easier 
for people to agree with the decision of the regulator on misconduct that involves less ambiguous 
norms, whereas norms that are more ambiguous leave more latitude to individual interpretation and 
reaction. 
 In contrast, the same social misconduct is not enough to penalize the companies involved 
financially, not even when they are very salient or in relation to infringements of less ambiguous 
norms (Chapter 3). The non-result here adds to the already puzzling picture of the literature that 
looks at the performance implication of non-conforming actions. One limit of Chapter 3 is that it 
looks only at listed companies; hence, it may simply be that the cost of such misconduct is not 
enough to affect significantly the performance of corporations that have large market capitalization. 
However, these findings are surprising if we consider them in the context of the results of Chapter 
2. If the number of complaints increase after such social misconduct, it is likely that dissatisfied 
consumers are going to affect the top-line of the companies involved. Therefore, while it is now 
proven that the market is able to incorporate negative news in a short period (Barnett and King, 
2008), this study suggests that it may be difficult for the market to assess the economic loss of social 
misconduct if direct fines are not involved. 
 While relatively minor social misconduct can have consequences for the focal industry (by 
increasing the number of people complaints), severe social misconduct—for example, scandals—can 
have a more profound effect on society overall. Chapter 4 finds that high-status actors were the ones 
more contested by newspapers after Calciopoli, as they had lost their moral licensing (Polman et al., 
2013). In fact, this liability of status affects only norms that are ambiguous and leaves more latitude 
to the interpretation of the evaluator; for less ambiguous norms, there is no statistical difference 
between the evaluation of high-status actors before and after the scandal. More important, Chapter 4 
shows the importance of considering the media as a heterogeneous audience wherein each member 
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has its own motive. While the media are able to align their agenda with that of the public (McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972; Pollock and Rindova, 2003), it is also true that the agenda of the readers influences 
the agenda of each media outlet. Therefore, each newspaper is more likely to contest referees’ 
decisions in order to put in good light their own local teams, those supported by the newspaper’s 
readers. This chapter raises the question of whether the scandal may serve to alleviate differences in 
the evaluation of the newspapers and, in general, among the different audience segments. Our 
theory and results show that the answer to this question depends on two conditions. When (1) an 
audience is divided into rigid segments whose members are unwilling to move from one to another 
and (2) if only specific segments are involved by the scandal, the scandal drives the different 
segments further apart and the disagreement among evaluations becomes greater. 
 Figure 1 in Chapter 1 presents the overall structure of the dissertation. Now, in the 
conclusion, it is possible to complete the picture and add both the direct effects and the three 
moderators that have emerged from the three chapters (Figure 12). The direct effects are already 
intriguing: social misconduct increases the number of people complaints but has no statistical effect 
on the evaluation of the investors (even if our theory would predict a negative effect). Finally, 
scandals negatively affect the evaluations of the newspapers, increasing the number of episodes 
contested to the referees. Though the direct effects are interesting, it is actually the three moderators 
that advance our knowledge on the mechanisms whereby the evaluation of one audience influences 
the evaluation of another. First, the ambiguity of the norms negatively moderates this relationship. 
When norms are more ambiguous, social misconduct is more debatable; thus, the negative effect of 
social misconduct is softened. Second, saliency increases the effect of social misconduct. When 
social misconduct is more salient, more individuals know about it and can potentially sanction it. 
However, saliency is also important because it can be a proxy for the gravity of the social 
misconduct. The third and last moderator is localness. Social norms are embedded in a given 
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environment; therefore, where they are infringed upon and who infringes them are important 
contextual factors. The theory developed in Chapter 3 predicts that UK-listed companies should be 
penalized more for social misconduct in the UK than should foreign firms. This is because a local 
firm is presumed to know the social norms better in a given country, and it has more consumers that 
can penalize it. Indeed, the only feeble statistical effects found in Chapter 3 are in line with this 
hypothesis. However, Chapter 4 presents an opposite argument: that newspapers become more loyal 
to their teams after cases of misconduct. Adut’s model (2005, 2008) provides a solution to this 
puzzling picture. The social misconduct of local actors attracts most attention because it has 
“contaminated” the local people, who will react more strongly. However, if the populace feels too 
involved with such actors (too much contamination happens) the effect will be the opposite: people 
will try to avoid or negate the social misconduct in order to avoid a negative effect on themselves. 
Adut (2008) uses this theory to explain the evolution of political sexual scandals. In recent years we 
have assisted to more scandals than in the 1950s and 60s; so one could conclude that society today 
has become more puritan. Indeed, it is the opposite: in the 1950s and 60s the society was so puritan 
that it was not even acceptable to talk about sex. So, scandals were less likely to blow out but similar 
transgressions happened. 
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Figure 12 – Theoretical contribution: three mechanisms that explain why social misconduct changes 
the evaluation of another audience 
 
 
Though each chapter has its own positioning, contribution, and findings, the three chapters are still 
highly interwoven. Taken together, they suggest that social norms are not simply about the dyad 
“candidate – social-control agent” but are better understood as a triad of “candidate – social-control 
agent –audience,” wherein the evaluation of a social-control agent may influence the evaluation of 
another in a non-mechanical way. 
 
 
1.1 Social norms are about triads: Toward a “Candidate – Social-control agent – Other 
audience” framework 
 
The literature on legitimacy has focused mainly on the candidate-audience framework (Zuckerman, 
1999) by looking at how the candidate’s proposals are evaluated by a given audience. The evaluating 
audience has usually been considered as the one able to provide legitimacy to an organization (the 
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so-called “source of legitimacy”); these include the media, the state, and industry (Bitektine, 2011; 
Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Deephouse, 1996). At the same time, scholars have recognized that 
multiple audiences can assess candidates simultaneously, and recent studies have shown how 
audiences can disagree on their evaluations (Pontikes, 2012). Similarly, literature on organizational 
misconduct has focused on social-control agents—namely, audiences that have the power to 
monitor organizations’ behaviors and provide sanctions on behalf of the community. As per Greve 
et al. (2010), social-control agents cover almost the same audiences treated in the legitimacy 
literature—state, industries, and, under some circumstances, the media. Therefore, the literature on 
both legitimacy and organizational misconduct have focused on the dyad of “candidate – social-
control agent (main audience),” assuming that the evaluation of a social-control agent would be 
enough to punish companies’ behaviors. 
 One of the shortcomings of this view is the assumption that norms can be monitored and 
enforced by a central authority, an evaluating audience, or a social-control agent, depending on the 
literature. While this assumption can be correct for laws, it can be problematic for social norms. As 
Ingram and Silverman (2002) have pointed out, social norms differ from laws precisely because they 
are monitored and enforced by diffuse actors instead of by a central authority. “Diffuse actors” are 
individuals in their various roles of employee, citizen, consumer, or customer. Undoubtedly, these 
individuals are influenced by the opinion of any of the social-control agents, though it is misleading 
to assume a simple mechanical effect. As Chapter 2 shows, social-control agents can become 
candidates in the perception of individuals, whose evaluations can differ according to the type of 
norms. In other cases, the evaluation of social-control agents can be financially inconsequential for 
the companies in the short term (Chapter 3). In addition, social-control agents are organizations 
themselves; sometimes, their evaluations are not necessarily as independent and super partes as the 
ones of a third party, such as the state. Their decisions can actually depend on the taste of the 
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audience, such as the readers, they are influencing (Chapter 4). If a social-control agent is biased, 
how can it influence the overall collectivity, as Greve et al. 2010 proposes? 
 Taken together, these findings show that the evaluation of an audience concerning the 
appropriateness of a candidate’s actions does not happen in a vacuum. It is influenced by the 
evaluation of another audience. This is because social norms are inherently ambiguous, are in 
constant evolution, and are endogenously created by the actions of the candidates (Djelic and 
Durand, 2010). The core of this view can be summarized in the following way: social norms are 
about triads. This means that the evaluation of an audience on the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of a candidate’s action depends on the evaluation made by another audience.  
 In summary, this dissertation proposes that social norms are better understood in terms of 
triadic interaction; a framework characterized as “candidate – social-control agent – another 
audience,” in which the evaluation of an audience on the appropriateness of a candidate’s action is 
influenced by what another audience thinks. Figure 13 represents one example of this interaction 
based on Chapter 2. The evaluation of a social-control agent (ASA) at time t influences the 
evaluation that another audience (people) makes at time t+1. However, this is only one type of 
possible interaction. For example, as Chapter 4 shows, the arrow can also go from the box “Other 
audience evaluation” to the “Social-control agent evaluation” 
Figure 13 – Social norms are about triads 
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2  CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 
These findings contribute theoretically and empirically to different streams of research. First, to the 
literature on institutional theory and organizational misconduct, which were used to define the 
concept of social misconduct. Second, because social misconduct is a type of social evaluation, this 
dissertation contributes also to the broad literature on social evaluations. Finally, there are important 
implications for strategy scholars and practitioners. In this section, I discuss each of these 
contributions in detail. 
 
2.1 Contribution to institutional theory literature 
This dissertation makes several contributions to the literature on institutional theory, in particular to 
that which focuses on legitimacy. First, in the introduction, I propose that some of the problems in 
the literature arise from confusion in the terms used, the unit of analysis, and the reference group 
considered. Literature on organizational misconduct is helpful in addressing and solving some of 
these ambiguities. In particular, using the construct of organizational social misconduct versus 
illegitimate action can be one way to obtain more clarity in the literature and to focus the attention 
of scholars working in this area. Second, scholars in institutional theory have long advocated that 
legitimacy is a multidimensional construct (Suchman, 1995; Bitektine, 2011); however, the marginal 
effect of each of the dimensions has been unclear (Vergne, 2011; Philippe and Durand, 2011). This 
dissertation is one of the first studies to address variations in types of conformity to and violation of 
the norms. It confirms that violation of different types of norms produce different outcomes, thus 
opening a new venue of research for institutional scholars.  
 Third, it contributes to the studies that investigate the link between non-conforming actions 
and performance. The theoretical framework was aimed at reconciling some of the contrasting 
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results found in the previous literature, but the results did not confirm the model. Therefore, even if 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation did not solve the puzzle, it at least provided a new piece. Fourth, it 
contributes to the plentiful literature on institutional theory that has treated the media as an 
important evaluating audience (Deephouse, 1996, 1999; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Rindova et al., 
2010, Zavyalova et al., 2012). All these studies have considered the media as a homogenous audience 
that is crucial for organizations and to which organizations are quite passive. Contrary to previous 
literature, this dissertation shows that the media effect can be insignificant (Chapter 3) and that the 
media are not a neutral audience (Chapter 4); the media can have an agenda that organizations may 
use to their advantage (Westphal et al., 2012). 
 
2.2 Contribution to the literature on organizational misconduct and scandal 
From the other side, literature on organizational misconduct can also benefit from an integration 
with part of the literature on legitimacy. In particular, it will be useful to distinguish between social 
misconduct—actions against social norms—and illegal misconduct—or actions against laws. Making 
this distinction can open new avenues of research in this area. For example, the role of a social-
control agent will differ in the two cases. In illegal misconduct, the role of social-control agents is 
clearly defined: they have the authority to monitor and enforce laws on behalf of the community. 
Therefore, it can be rightly said that for illegal misconduct, “it takes two to tango.” For social norms, 
however, social-control agents function as a part of the audience that judges the behaviors of 
organizations. They are influential in the sense that they influence the opinion of the collectivity, 
though their evaluations are themselves subject of evaluation by individuals who constitute the 
ultimate audience that can inflict sanctions on the organizations. Therefore, for social norms it may 
actually take “three to tango”: organizational action, social-control agents, and individuals or another 
audience that can directly punish the companies. 
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2.3 Contribution to strategic management literature 
Many recent papers have pointed to the newness of strategic management and the problems of its 
adolescence (Nag, Hambrick and Chen, 2007, Hambrick and Chen, 2008), starting with the 
difficulties in reaching an agreement on its definition (Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin 2012).  
Two main challenges undermine strategic management research. First, it lacks a grand theory of 
strategy. Today, the strategic management field is characterized by a few loosely linked theories. 
Most scholars recognize two main theories in strategy: the industry-based view, which has its roots 
in the work of Porter (1980), and the resource-based view, which is based on the work of Penrose 
(1959) and later, Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991). These two theories are based on different 
assumptions, and their integration seems difficult. What is becoming known as the institution-based 
view is the newcomer in the strategy tripod (Peng. et al., 2009; Ahuja and Yayavarama, 2012). 
Research on institutions has a long tradition in both the economic and sociological literature. 
Therefore, an institution-based view could have been a good candidate to create a higher-level 
theory that could reconcile both industry- and resource-based strategy. However, today the 
institution-based view has been proposed only as a complementary view of strategy, and it has been 
unbalanced as opposed to the economic approach on institutionalism rather than the sociological 
one (Durand, 2012).  
 A second challenge in strategy research is the difficulties in creating a dynamic view of 
strategy. All three theories are inherently static, making the strong assumption that in most cases, 
contextual factors are exogenous to a firm’s strategy: the industry factors in the industry-based view, 
the value of a resource in the resource-based view, and the institutional context in the institution-
based view. Therefore, companies should seek the best positioning, acquire the best resources, or 
attempt to outperform their competitors in the way they manage their formal and informal 
institutions. Some scholars have tried to propose a dynamic view of strategy (Porter, 1991; Grimm, 
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Lee and Smith, 2006). Without entering into the discussion on whether or not they were successful 
in doing that, these theories are seen as an alternative theory to strategy, and they do not provide a 
more general framework.  
 The organizational evolution and strategy (OES) model by Durand (2006) is one of the few 
attempts to provide both an integrated model of strategy research—a grand theory of strategy that 
can put together the industry, resource, and institutional perspective—and a dynamic model of 
strategy. According to this model, companies’ objective is to change the selection criteria or to 
preserve them (Durand, 2006, Durand et al. 2007). Selection criteria are specific to a given society 
and industry. In some cases, the criteria can be the industry factors (industry-based view), economic 
and normative institutional frameworks (institutional-based view), or the factors that influence the 
value of a resource (resource-based view). However, companies can influence these selection criteria 
at different levels of analysis: industry, organization, and competitive advantage. This dissertation 
contributes to this theory by showing that the normative selection criteria - the boundary of what is 
considered acceptable or not - are possibly the most strategic for companies because they are in 
continuous change in the environment, and companies are an important entity in this negotiation. 
As Figure 13 showed, the triad is the minimum unit of analysis that can influence the level of 
acceptability of a given behavior, and companies are a part of this triad. Thus, their actions can 
influence the boundary between what is considered acceptable or not, thus putting companies in a 
condition of advantage or disadvantage vis-a-vis with their competitors.  
 The recent case of the Barilla – the leading Italian pasta company - provides an example. We 
can observe how companies’ actions influenced the normative context of Italy and, thus, had 
consequences for other companies. Table 42 shows the different stages. Stage 1 shows a May 2012 
advertisement from IKEA for the opening of a new store in Sicily, the region in the south of Italy. 
The advertisement proclaimed that IKEA is “open to all kind of families” and showed two men 
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holding hands. This advertisement opened a discussion in the Italian press about whether it was 
appropriate or not and received some contestation from the more conservative parties and citizens 
in Italy. Stage 2 relates to the interview given by Guido Barilla in September 2013 wherein he said 
that Barilla is not considering a TV commercial with homosexual couples because they believe in a 
“traditional family”. Probably the fact that IKEA’s advertisement was criticized induced Guido 
Barilla to underestimate the impact that his words would have on consumers. The reaction was 
much stronger than the one to IKEA’s advertisement, and a boycott of Barilla’s products begun. 
Barilla’s action opened a strategic opportunity to its competitors. Both Garofalo and Buitoni, two 
leading companies in the pasta industry, released a statement that they were open to all kind of 
families, thus welcoming homosexual couples to eat their pasta. At this stage, IKEA came back to 
the same advertising (Stage 3). This strong reaction to Guido Barilla’s statement is likely to make TV 
commercials with homosexual couples more acceptable than they were before September 2013 
(Stage 4). This example shows how social norms are endogenous to the actions of the companies 
and how they can open up strategic opportunities for some companies (as in the cases of Garofalo, 
Buitoni, and IKEA) and be detrimental to others that misjudge them (as in the case of Barilla).  
 
Table 42 – Companies’ actions that influenced the acceptability of featuring homosexual couples in 
Italian advertising 
 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TV commercial 
with homosexual 
couples will be 
more acceptable 
in Italy.  
CHAPTER 5 
 
 202 
2.4 Contribution to the social evaluation literature 
I opened this dissertation with a broad reference to the literature on social evaluations and identified 
four current trends in that literature. Then, I narrowed down to a specific social evaluation—social 
misconduct—and articulated a research question in three parts. It is now possible to see how this 
investigation and its findings contribute to the overall literature on social evaluations. Concerning 
the four current trends identified in the literature, the main is about the candidate- (single) audience 
perspective, leading to the main literature gap I have addressed in my dissertation. I already 
investigated how this dissertation proposes a triad—candidate – social-control agent – audience 
framework—for a better understanding of social norms. However, this framework is not exclusive 
to social misconduct. It can be potentially applied to any other social evaluation, such as reputation, 
status, or celebrity. Indeed, each of these constructs consists of an evaluation of one audience, which 
does not need to be the same as that of another audience. However, it is likely that evaluations of 
different audiences will somehow influence each other. 
 A second trend in the literature on social evaluations is to explore how each construct has 
multiple dimensions that may have a different impact on organizational outcomes. The literature on 
reputation has already investigated how reputation has different dimensions (Mishina et al., 2010). 
This dissertation shows how norms that differ in their degree of interpretability produce a different 
effect in the way one audience influences another. This finding stresses the importance of breaking 
down each construct into different layers or dimensions. Third, the recent literature has focused on 
the way these constructs are interrelated and may interact. From this perspective, the findings of 
Chapter 4 are of particular interest. They show how the moral licensing of high-status actors is 
waived following a scandal. It stresses the importance of studying two or more social evaluation 
constructs in a given study in order to investigate better the mechanisms underlying each construct. 
Finally, a fourth trend relates to the fact that the previous literature has focused mainly on few and 
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homogenous audiences. Chapter 2 pays attention to an important but understudied audience: people 
in their role as citizens. This audience differs from interest groups, which are studied rightly in the 
literature of social movements, and it cannot be associated merely with media opinion, as most of 
the literature has proposed (Deephouse, 1996). Indeed, Chapter 4 looks exactly at the way multiple 
media outlets can carry out their own agenda on certain topics, thus opening up the question as to 
whether media outlets reflect the opinion of society or just that of their readers. 
 
2.5 Empirical contribution – Advertising (regulation) as a context for studying social norms 
Many streams of literature from different disciplines (e.g., sociology, economics, organizational 
theory) have studied various aspects of social norms. A continuous challenge in all of this literature 
relates to their definition and measure. It seems there is a misalignment between an intuitive 
understanding of what social norms are and scientific studies of these norms. Indeed, it is common 
knowledge that social norms are tied to particular societies and time periods; social norms differ 
from one country to another and, in a given country, from one age to another. Thus, one might say 
that social norms were different in the UK in the 1960s than they are today, but it would be difficult 
to measure this quantitatively. Social norms are about boundaries of acceptability. These boundaries 
move throughout time; it is difficult (if not impossible) to identify an exact time in which they may 
have changed. As shown in Figure 13, organizations as well people are in constant negotiation on 
what is acceptable or not.  
 Advertising can be a novel context for opening new possibilities in the study of social 
norms. The advertising context cannot answer all research questions that scholars might want to ask; 
however, many important features make advertising a promising context for this kind of research. 
Advertising is strongly linked to the norms of a society at a given time; if one looks at an 
advertisement from the 1960s, for example, it is likely that everyone would recognize that it is not 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 204 
from today, and the advertisement almost certainly could provide some ideas was about the culture 
of that time. Also, advertising is an important strategic action for companies, given that all business-
to-consumer organizations need to advertise their activities in one way or another. Then, it spans 
countries, opening up possibilities for comparative studies among different cultures and nations. 
Finally, and most importantly, the advertising regulation and self-regulation system provide 
measurable constructs that can be used as independent or dependent variables.  
 Besides the operationalization of social misconduct, other constructs of this dissertation 
merit to be mentioned. In Chapter 2, I needed to assess the opinion of the journalist towards ASA. 
This was not possible using the current tools in content analysis research (e.g. LIWC) and the 
number of articles was significant - 19,000 articles. I decided to code these articles through 
Mechanical Turk, the crowdsourcing website of Amazon. Recently, Mechanical Turk has been 
increasingly used by scholars for experimental designs and surveys, though it could be also useful for 
researchers that work on media articles. While the results of the coding proved to be only a 
robustness check (more than in 90% of articles the journalist reports the news about ASA in a 
neutral way), future studies on media could use Mechanical Turk and find more interesting results.  
 Also, the operationalization of the local bias for the newspapers in Chapter 4 is quite 
innovative. In fact, while we expect that newspapers have different orientations (e.g. right or left 
wings) and are likely to report news based on their orientations, quantitatively measuring this 
perception is very challenging. The context of soccer and the Moviola provided an opportunity to 
do so. However, I needed to find a different way to measure the agreement among different outlets 
compared to previous literature. This leads to the construction of the variable Favoritism Home. This 
variable provide an asymmetric measure of agreement or disagreement among different evaluators.  
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 Finally, assessing causality is a major concern for scholars. As shown in Chapter 4, scandals 
can be (often) used as quasi-natural experiment to assess causality. This should be one extra reason 
for organizational scholars to be interested in this kind of misconduct.  
 
2.6 Contributions to managers and business strategists 
Every day, managers are asked to take strategic actions that would improve the performance of the 
company, such as decisions on innovation or resource allocation. One important set of actions is 
that which influences the image and reputation of the company in the environment where it must 
operate. Whereas historically, managers were concerned with making sure that their actions were 
considered legal, in the last few decades, managers have also had to concern themselves with 
behaviors that are considered ethical and that, generally speaking, conform to the broad set of values 
and norms in society. For legal actions, there is usually either an internal department or external 
providers that can assist companies in taking on any risk associated with actions that might violate 
the laws of a given country. More difficult is the situation with social norms; sometimes, managers 
can follow their own experience or intuition, or ask advice of the legal department or the public 
relations department. However, there is usually no single department or person specialized in dealing 
with social norms. This dissertation also demonstrates how important it is for managers to think 
about social norms as a specific area of knowledge that currently is fragmented across departments 
or external providers, at best. As proven by research on legitimacy and misconduct in the last few 
years, social norms are uncertain and can produce varying results, depending on the context or the 
actors involved.  
 Laws are relatively fixed (they do change but not very fast), are controlled by a presumably 
impartial third party (such as the state or court), and are in common to all companies. Therefore, 
laws make companies more homogenous and make it more difficult for them to obtain a firm-
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specific competitive advantage. In contrast, social norms can be influenced by the companies’ 
actions; they connect firms across industries, and costs and benefits depend on the characteristics of 
the companies. Thus, social norms can be an important source of competitive advantage for 
companies, so they should be considered as highly important for strategy scholars and practitioners. 
 Chapter 2 shows how social norms connect companies across industries. While scholars and 
managers are well aware of an “industry spill-over” effect—i.e., a situation in which the action of a 
company has consequences for the entire industry—this chapter shows “normative spill-over,” an 
action that affects norms propagates within society across industries. This phenomenon can be 
negative or positive. If, by chance, a company has an advertisement on air during the same week that 
an advertisement on the same topic is banned, it is more likely to receive a complaint. On the other 
hand, managers can leverage the controversial behavior of a company in another industry, like 
IKEA did in the Barilla case. 
 
3  LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Like any research, this dissertation presents limitations that open up opportunities for future 
research. First, one of the key findings is that less ambiguous norms are more consequential than 
more ambiguous ones. This is because more ambiguous norms are more open to individual 
interpretation. However, more ambiguous norms, like offense and harm, are also the ones that 
provoke the most emotional reactions in people. According to the statistics shown in Chapter 2, 
99.5% of advertisements received less than 25 complaints each, while 0.5% received 216, 30% of the 
overall complaints that the ASA received. The interesting finding is that these two groups differ in 
the type of norm complained about. With the 99.5% of advertisements, the split between 
“misleading-offensive” and “harmful” is roughly 70-%-30%, while for the 216 top cases, it is the 
opposite: 30%-70%. This suggests that for small misbehaviors, “misleading” can be more 
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consequential than “offensive/harmful,” and that there is a point at which it is so clear what is 
offensive or harmful that most people will react, and will also react more strongly than they will 
merely for misleading cases. We could not test this in our sample, though this may suggest that the 
effect of more ambiguous norms can be curvilinear; it is less consequential than less ambiguous 
norms for small misconduct, but there is a tipping point at which it will be greater. 
 Second, ambiguity is only one possible way to divide social norms. Other alternatives are 
possible and should be addressed. For example, Vergne (2011) presented a typology of four types of 
norms: environmental, accountant, competitive, and transactional. Another interesting distinction 
will be on the type of topics. Some topics can be more controversial and polarizing than others, such 
as homosexuality, sex, and animal rights. It would be interesting to see whether the social and 
economic consequences are different given the controversy level of a topic.  
 Third, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on a situation in which the ASA is already a recognized 
legitimate player in the field. Its institutional role was not disputed in the focal period under 
investigation. It would be interesting to relax this assumption and focus on contexts in which a self-
regulatory organization is trying to achieve its legitimacy in the eye of the public. In this situation, 
the decision of the organization will also affect its own image. Based on our theory, we expect that 
the self-regulatory organization would be more contested when making decisions on more 
ambiguous norms than on less ambiguous norms. Future research will explore this. More generally, 
the ASA is a self-regulatory organization that has acquired its pivotal role through 50 years of 
operation in a context where it had to compromise among the needs of conflicting audiences: 
advertisers, consumers association, state, and the media. The mere fact that it has survived is an 
interesting research topic; it would be interesting to study how a legitimizing self-regulatory 
organization becomes legitimate. 
CHAPTER 5 
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 More intriguing is the part on financial consequences. The results in Chapter 3 show an 
overall small or insignificant effect of social misconduct on short-term financial performance. I 
already addressed some of the limitations and avenues for future research in the discussion section 
of Chapter 3, such as the fact that I focus only on listed companies and look only at short-term 
variations in share price. Indeed, the consequences can be different for private companies or when 
looking at different measures of performance, both substantive (ROI) and image-related (brand 
reputation). The effect may also be only over the long term or, perhaps, only for repetitive actions of 
social misconduct. More interesting is the explanation that because financial analysts and investors 
are not able to quantify the consequences of social misconduct, they simply ignore this information. 
Would they change their perspective if they knew that people would increase their number of 
complaints as shown in Chapter 2? These findings are inserted into an already puzzling picture in the 
literature that tries to assess the performance impact of conforming and non-conforming actions 
(Heugens and Lander, 2009). Therefore, more studies are needed in this direction. 
 Finally, scandals, events of severe misconduct, have been the subject of a great body of 
literature rooted especially in sociological research. As Chapter 4 shows, scandals can be of great 
interest for organizations. Despite the view that scandals are mere negative events, organizational 
and strategic scholars should be interested in understanding how scandals can change the social 
environment and even open up strategic opportunity for companies. Besides, the (quasi) unexpected 
nature of scandals allows research to use quasi-natural experiments to clarify causality mechanisms.
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APPENDIX A 
 
Some real examples can help explain the different nature of misleading vs. harmful/offensive 
advertisements. Complaints about advertisements cases are clearly assessed by analyzing opposing 
claims and the evidence provided by the company. In contrast, cases of harm and offence are based 
more on the judgment of the ASA Council. Table below represents examples of four cases, two of 
each type (Misleading and Harmful/Offensive) and two of each decision (Ban and Clear). For each case 
we provide a brief synopsis below. 
Company Adjudication Date # Complaints Media Sector Type Topic 
Louis Vuitton  May 26, 2010 3 TV Retail  Misleading  Product Claim 
Apple – 
iPhone 
Jul 29, 2009 11 TV 
Computers 
& telecoms 
Misleading 
Use of 
unique/Product 
Claim 
W&Y – 
Courage Beer 
Apr 15, 2009 3 Poster Alcohol 
Offensive/ 
Harmful 
Depiction of men; 
Depiction of 
women /Human 
Dignity 
Britvic –
Tango 
Nov 11, 2009 82 Poster 
Food & 
Drink 
Offensive/ 
Harmful 
Children;  
Bad language 
 
Louis Vuitton (Misleading – Ban)   
Two national press ads for Louis Vuitton were challenged by 3 members 
of the public regarding whether they misleadingly implied that Louis 
Vuitton products were made by hand. Louis Vuitton responded that 
“the images in the ads were a tribute to the craftsmanship which was 
carried out every day by Louis Vuitton’s artisans. They explained that 
their artisans were trained over many years to be able to carry out the 
various activities involved in the creation of one of their accessories.” 
Louis Vuitton also stated that they had 200 employees working on 
different aspects of their products in each workshop; there were over 
100 stages of production for each individual leather bag and wallet and their manufacture was not 
automated. They said that the ads did not seek to show all the tools that were used in their 
workshops and that hand sewing machines also were used in the making of both the products 
featured in the advertisement. Based on Louis Vuitton’s answer, the ASA “noted that the images 
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were stylized interpretations of real stages of the production process of both of the items featured. 
However, [they] considered that consumers would interpret the image of a woman using a needle 
and thread to stitch the handle of a bag in ad (a), alongside the claim ‘... infinite patience protects 
each overstitch ... One could say that a Louis Vuitton bag is a collection of fine details. But with so 
much attention lavished on every one, should we only call them details?’ to mean that Louis Vuitton 
bags were hand stitched.” 
They “also considered that the image of a woman handcrafting a wallet using a basic manual tool in 
ad (b), alongside the claim ‘In everything from Louis Vuitton, there are elements that cannot be fully 
explained.’” Given that they “had not seen documentation that detailed the entire production 
process for Louis Vuitton products or that showed the proportion of their manufacture that was 
carried out by hand or by machine…[they] had not seen evidence that demonstrated the extent to 
which Louis Vuitton products were made by hand … [and]  concluded that the ads were 
misleading.” The ads breached CAP Code clauses 7.1 and 7.2 (Truthfulness). 
 
Apple – iPhone (Misleading – Clear).  
A TV ad for Apple iPhone showed the extensive range of apps available in the Apple App Store. 
The voice-over concluded: “Only on the iPhone.” Ten viewers, including some users of Galaxy 1 
mobile set (G1), challenged “whether the ad was misleading, because although the voice-over stated 
‘Only on the iPhone,’ the G1 phone had a similar application market place from which a range of 
applications could be downloaded.” Apple “pointed out that the number of applications available at 
the App Store was far higher than their competitors, and there were currently over 50,000 
applications available.” They were “available in 88 different countries and … accessible on a number 
of platforms.” In contrast, “the applications available for the G1 phone numbered around 2100 and 
were available to consumers in nine countries only.” Finally, Apple “emphasized that the iPhones 
[sic] Multi-Touch functionality was more advanced than any competing functionality.” Based on the 
response of Apple, ASA concluded that “the claim ‘Only on the iPhone’ was justified and not 
misleading” because “Apple had shown there were far more applications available for the iPhone 
than the G1 phone, and user-experience of the iPhone and the app store was distinct from its 
competitor.” 
 
W&Y – Courage Beer (Offensive/Harmful – Ban) 
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Three people believed that the 
above poster by Wells & Youngs 
Brewing Company (W&Y) 
promoting their Courage beer 
brand was offensive and 
irresponsible because it “implied 
that the beer would give the 
man confidence to either make 
negative comments on the woman’s appearance or take advantage of her.” W&Y responded that 
this poster “picked up the theme from their advertising from the 1950s to 1980s by using the 
strapline ‘Take Courage,’ which was a call to action to choose Courage over other beers.” They 
searched for legal advice, “to ensure there was no breach of the Code.” Finally, they “believed the 
poster featured [an uncomfortable] situation many men could relate to, where the man was likely to 
be asked what he thought of the woman’s new dress.” Therefore, the text “TAKE COURAGE MY 
FRIEND” was simply used as a “call to choose Courage beers over competitor brands.” ASA took 
note of the response of W&Y, but they “considered that the combination of the text and the image 
of the man with an open beer can and half empty glass of beer was likely to be understood by 
consumers to carry the clear implication that the beer would give the man enough confidence to tell 
the woman that the dress was unflattering.” Therefore, although they “understood the humorous 
intention of the scenario, [they] concluded that the poster breached the Code by suggesting that the 
beer could increase confidence.” 
 
Britvic – Tango 
(Offensive/Harmful – Clear) 
Three posters for soft drink Tango 
(owned by Britvic) were challenged 
by 82 people because they 
considered them “offensive, 
irresponsible and unsuitable for 
public display.” The first poster was alleged to suggest “oral sex with a bull,” the second poster was 
targeted because of the use of the word “guffs,” and the third poster was accused of referencing 
“the shaving of one’s vaginal hair.” 
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Britvic responded to the ASA investigation by explaining that “Tango was a soft drink brand known 
for its cheeky and unconventional sense of humour” and that “they had tried to entertain their target 
audience [17-25-year-old males], without causing serious or widespread offence.” They gave an 
explanation for each of the posters. As an example, for the first one, “they argued that the ad's 
premise was complete nonsense, because bulls did not have udders.” They also stated that they 
“carried out qualitative research groups with 17-20-year-old men before producing the campaign, 
and none of the respondents had interpreted the ad's headline as referring to oral sex with a bull.” 
ASA reviewed the posters, noted the responses of Britvic, and concluded that all three were 
“unlikely to cause serious or widespread offence or be seen as irresponsible, and that it was not 
unsuitable for public display.” Regarding poster 1, ASA “considered that most viewers of the poster, 
including children, would be aware that bulls did not have udders.” For Poster 2, ASA “considered 
that the phrase ‘makes your guffs smell like oranges’ would be interpreted as a reference to breaking 
wind and was therefore likely to be seen as vulgar by some, but as humorous by others.” Finally, 
complaints about poster 3 were dismissed because ASA “considered that the ad was likely to be seen 
as positing the idea that a side effect of drinking Tango was the urge to shave a hairy, elderly 
relative,” the idea of which was considered “clearly ridiculous.” 
 
 223 
APPENDIX B 
 
First, I calculated the relationship between each company’s share and the market as a whole (I used 
the referent index for each market, e.g. the FTSE 100 for London Stock Exchange, CAC 40 for 
Euronext Paris…): 
Rit= αi + βi Rmt+ eit 
 
Where Rit represents the value of the stock of company i on day t; αi is the constant term, Rmt 
represents the value of the market portfolio for day t (e.g. FTSE 100 for London Stock Exchange, 
CAC 40 for Euronext Paris…), βi represents the beta of the stock of the company i, and eit is the 
conventional the error term.  Beta is computed over the period t=254 to t=-3, where t=0 is the day 
of the event. The abnormal return of a stock is the difference between the actual return of that stock 
and its expected return. The abnormal return of security i at time t, ARit, is: 
ARit =Rit - (αi + βi Rmt). 
The cumulative abnormal return for a firm, CARi, is the sum of abnormal returns over the event 
window (from t=-2 to t=+1):  
CARi = ∑ARit 
As in Barnett and King 2008, to allow continuous compounding when aggregating the abnormal 
returns, ln(1 + R) is used instead of R. Therefore, the final formula of the CARi is as follows:  
CARi = ∑ [ln(1 + Rit) - (α + βim ln(1 + Rmt))]  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Below are examples on how the column Moviola appears in each journal. 
 
Below are examples on how the column Moviola appears in each journal. 
 
a. Moviola by Corriere dello Sport  
 
b. Moviola by Gazzetta dello Sport
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c. Moviola by Tuttosport 
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It is like this, you think you submit a dissertation, but in reality you submit emotions, people and 
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Résumé général en français  
  
Revue la littérature et les lacunes de la littérature 
Cette thèse est développée à l'intersection entre la théorie de l'organisation et de la recherche 
stratégique (Oliver, 1991, 1997; Ingram et Silverman, 2002; Durand, 2012). Le cadre théorique est 
principalement enracinée dans la nouvelle théorie institutionnelle en sociologie (Meyer et Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio et Powell, 1983) et des hypothèses et des résultats ont des implications importantes 
pour les entreprises. La littérature sur la théorie institutionnelle a eu comme cible principalement le 
évaluations sociales, qui sont des caracteristiques que les acteurs sociaux donnent aux organismes, 
tels que le statut, la réputation et la légitimité (Deephouse et Suchman, 2008; Bitektine, 2011), 
célébrité (. Pfarrer et al, 2012) , la stigmatisation (Devers et al., 2012). Des évaluations sociales 
influencent sur la façon dont les acteurs sociaux se comportent envers la société (Bitektine, 2011) et, 
finalement, la survie et la performance des entreprises (Meyer et Rowan, 1977; Deephouse et 
Heugens, 2009;. Pollock et Rindova 2003, Durand et al, 2007).  Par conséquent, alors que la 
littérature institutionnelle a examiné longtemps les processus sociologiques qui sous-entendent les 
évaluations sociales (par exemple, Merton, 1968 pour le statut; Weber, 1978 de légitimité), dans les 
deux dernières décennies, la littérature de stratégie a de plus en plus visée sur la compréhension des 
implications stratégiques que les évaluations sociales ont pour les entreprises (Pollock et Rindova, 
2003; Deephouse, 1996, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999;. Cattani et al, 2008; Durand, 2012). En 
conséquence, la littérature sur les évaluations sociales a prospéré ces dernières années. (Deephouse 
et Suchman, 2008; Bitektine, 2012; Pfarrer et al, 2010;. Rindova et al, 2008;. Rao, et al 2005;.. Graffin 
et al, 2013). Cependant, il ya encore des défis actuels dans la littérature, qui conduisent à mon écart 
global de la littérature.      
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      1. Des évaluations sociales sont multidimensionnelles, pas monolithiques.La littérature a souvent 
traité des évaluations sociales d'une manière monolithique (Philippe et Durand, 2011): la bonne 
reputation versus la mauvais, le haut statut contre le bas, ou les organisations légitimes versus les 
illégitimes. La recherche a récemment reconnu que les évaluations sociales ont de nombreuses 
dimensions qui peuvent ou ne peuvent pas produire les mêmes effets. 
 
      2. Les évaluations sociales ne sont pas indépendantes; ils se chevauchent et interagissent. 
Le fait que les chercheurs ont parfois utilisé la même mise à mesurer l'état, la réputation, la légitimité, 
ou autres constructions, ouvre la question évidente de savoir si ces distinctions sont pratiques ou 
purement théoriques. Par conséquent, les chercheurs sont en train de comparer deux ou plusieurs 
évaluations sociales dans la même étude pour comprendre chaque mécanisme unique (Deephouse et 
Carter, 2005;. Pfarrer et al 2010). 
      
      3. La littérature a mis l'accent sur quelques audiences (homogènes). Alors que un public 
nombreux est important pour les organisations, la littérature actuelle a mis l'accent sur un public 
relativement peu nombreux, tels que les médias (Deephouse, 1996;. Zavyalova et al, 2012), les 
analystes financiers (Zuckerman, 1999), les critiques (. Durand et al, 2007) ... en outre, ces 
organisations ont été traités comme si elles avaient un public homogène, tandis que chacun de leurs 
membres peut avoir des motivations individuelles spécifiques (Westphal et al., 2008). 
      
     4. Le ”candidat - (single) public" cadre: Qu'est-ce qui se passe dans un contexte disomogène? 
 Depuis la publication de (1999) l'article de Zuckerman, l'analyse des évaluations sociales sont 
habituellement menées, explicitement ou implicitement, dans un cadre candidat-public: le candidat, 
généralement un organisme, prend des mesures qui affectent le jugement, l'évaluation ou le 
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comportement d'un public (Bitektine, 2011). La plupart des recherches ont la tendance à se 
concentrer sur un public, généralement le plus important dans un contexte donné: par exemple, les 
médias dans le marché du capital de risque (Pollock et Rindova 2003), le guide Michelin dans le 
monde de la cuisine française (Durand et al ., 2007) et les distributeurs dans l'industrie du cinéma 
(Cattani et al., 2008). Néanmoins, dans de nombreux contextes, les organisations sont soumises aux 
pressions simultanées d'un numbreux public (Lamin et Zaheer, 2012), qui peuvent avoir des 
orientations différentes et des critères d'évaluation. En effet, un courant récent de la littérature a mis 
l'accent sur la compréhension de comment des publics multiples réagissent différemment aux 
mêmes actions (Lamin et Zaheer, 2012; Pontikes, 2012), cependant, ces études traitent les 
évaluations de ces audiences comme orthogonales et indépendantes en négligeant d'enquêter 
directement comment et pourquoi l'évaluation d'une audience influence l'évaluation de l'autre. Cette 
nouvelle adress de la littérature exacerbe les trois défis évoqués précédemment: la compréhension 
des différentes dimensions des évaluations sociales, la manière dont les évaluations sociales se 
chevauchent ou interagissent, et l'élargissement de l'éventail de publics étudiés sont encore plus 
intéressants problèmes dans un contexte multi-public. 
Cette discussion cherche a combler la lacune de la littérature actuelle. 
 
Lacune de la littérature  
La littérature précédente a analysé les évaluations sociales dans un contexte mono-public. Dans le 
cas d'un contexte multi-public l'évaluation d'un audience a étè considerè indipendent par rapport a 
l'evaluation de l'autre. Cela laisse inexplorée la question de savoir comment et pourquoi l'évaluation 
d'un public particulier influe sur l'évaluation d'un autre public.  
Cette thèse veut combler cette large lacune de la littérature en se concentrant sur un type spécifique 
de l'évaluation sociale – faute d'organisation sociale - qui est définie à l'intersection entre la littérature 
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sur la légitimité et la mauvaise conduite de l'organisation. Je soutiens que les deux concepts - 
légitimité et faute organisationnelle - ont une faiblesse spécifique et que la mavaise conduite sociale 
peu etre responsable de cette faiblesse. La litterature prècedente a utilisé l'idée de légitimité en 
différents niveaux d'analyse. (organisation et action). Elle n'a pas été clair sur le rôle e sur l'idéntité de 
l'audience evaluant e sur le group di référance. La littérature sur l'inconduite d'entreprise (Greve et al 
2010) a résolu certains de ces problèmes. Cette littérature a défini une faute au niveau de l'action (et 
non de l'organisation) et a clarifié que la mauvaise conduite est une évaluation faite par un organisme 
public spécifique, appelé « agent de contrôle social »(Becker, 1963). Toutefois, cette littérature a 
d'autres problèmes. Cette littérature n’a pas fait de distinction entre les actions qui violent la loi 
(actions illégales) et ceux qui violent les normes sociales. Cette distinction est au contraire l’intuition 
la plus importante dans la littérature sur la légitimité (Webb et al., 2009). Dans ma thèse j’analyse ces 
deux aspects de la littérature et je définis formellement la notion de «mauvais conduite sociale» 
comme suit: 
 La mauvaise conduite sociale d’une organisation est une évaluation faite par un agent de contrôle 
social qui définit le comportement de l'organisation, par opposition au système de valeurs et normes 
de la société. 
Conformément à la documentation de la littérature sur la mauvaise conduite organisée, le niveau 
d'analyse dans ce cas est l'action. En outre, la mauvaise conduite sociale ce n’est pas juste un 
comportement, mais c’ est une évaluation faite par un agent de contrôle social, sous la forme d'une 
déclaration ou d’un acte formel. Au lieu de cela, en accord avec la littérature sur la légitimité, la 
mauvaise conduite sociale d’une organisation  ne concerne que la violation des normes sociales, pas 
nécessairement de la loi. A partir de ces considérations j’arrivé à la question de la recherche de ma 
thèse : 
 
 234 
 
 
Lacunes de la recherche 
Pour répondre à cette question, je pense à trois groupes distincts qui affectent directement ou 
indirectement la survie d'une organisation ou ses performances: les personnes (citoyens), les 
investisseurs et les médias. 
1. L'impact d’une mauvaise conduite sociale sur les personnes. Les gens, dans le rôle de 
consommateurs, d’employés et de citoyens, représente un publique cruciale pour les 
entreprises. Cependant, l'opinion du peuple a été largement négligée dans la littérature sur la 
légitimité et sur la mauvais organisation sociale ou a été assimilée à l'opinion des médias ou 
d'autres organisations (Deephouse, 1996; Pollock et Rindova, 2003). Bien qu'il soit probable 
que les gens réagissent à une mauvais organisation sociale, il n’ est pas immédiatement clair 
ce qui déclenche cette réaction: 
 
Lacune de la recherche 1: Pourquoi les gens réagissent à une mauvais organisation sociale dans une 
façon plus ou moins importante? 
2. L'impact d’une mauvaise conduite sociale sur les investisseurs.  
Il est différent pour une  personne de faire une réclamation relativement sans cout  ou prendre une 
décision qui  affecte de manière significative ses finances, comme la vente ou l'achat d'actions. Il y a 
une vaste littérature qui a analysé la réaction des investisseurs aux nouvelles d’une mauvaise 
conduite ; des études antérieures se sont focalisé principalement sur les actions illégales (Greve et al., 
2010). Bien au contraire, les coûts d’une mauvaise conduite sociale sont intrinsèquement différentes 
Pourquoi un public change son évaluation après une mauvaise conduit sociale d’une 
organization? 
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de ceux des actions illégales (Ingram et Silverman, 2002), donc ils nécessitent une attention 
particulière: 
 
Lacune de la recherche 2: Pourquoi les entreprises sont financièrement     pénalisées  différemment 
pour leur  mauvais conduite sociale? 
 
3. L'effet des scandales - cas de mauvaise conduite sociale - sur les médias. 
Les médias sont un public important pour les organisations, car ils sont en mesure d'influencer de 
nombreuses ressources dont les entreprises ont besoin. La littérature antérieure a généralement 
considérés uniformément les médias (Greve et al. 2010, Pollock et Rindova, 2003). Bien que cette 
hypothèse présente des avantages évidents, néglige le fait que les médias se composent de plusieurs 
membres, qui peuvent avoir des motivations hétérogènes. Dans ma thèse j’étudie  comment les 
évaluations des journaux avec des orientations différentes changent après un scandale,  un 
événement public qui suit a un sérieuse et mauvaise conduite sociale.  
 
     Lacune de recherche 3: Pourquoi les évaluations de medias changent après un scandale? 
Ma thèse se compose de cinq chapitres: le chapitre 1 contient la lacune dans la littérature, les 
domaines de la recherche et les principaux concepts. Les chapitres 2, 3 et 4 contiennent un essai qui 
traite de chacune de trois lacunes de la recherche décrites ci-dessus. Le chapitre 5 décrit les 
conclusions et discute de la contribution générale de ma thèse. 
 
Contexte de la recherche 
Pour mon analyse empirique, j’ai utilisé deux contextes innovants et uniques. J’ai codé manuellement 
les deux bases de données. Le premier et le deuxième essai ont comme focus l’ auto-réglementation 
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de la publicité dans le  Royaume-Uni. Les consommateurs britanniques peuvent envoyer des plaintes 
sur la publicité qui sont considérées  trompeuses, offensives et dangereuses pour un organisme 
d'autoréglementation de la publicité - l'Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). L'ASA examine la 
plainte et décide si le "consommateur moyen" au Royaume-Uni (code PAC 2010: 113) peut être 
induit en erreur, endommagé ou offensé par la publicité. Si c’est comme ça, l’ASA interdit la 
publicité, autrement l’approuve. Dans ma thèse, les décisions de l’ASA visant à interdire la publicité 
sont considérés comme des cas de mauvaise conduite sociale ( une évaluation faite par un agent de 
contrôle social qui analyse le comportement d'une organisation  en opposition au système de valeurs 
et de normes de la société). 
 
Ces décisions n’ entraînent pas de sanctions financières, mais elles peuvent encore influencer 
l'attitude d'autres personnes à faire plus de plaintes (essai 1 / Chapitre 2) et peuvent déclencher des 
réactions des investisseurs (essai 2 / Chapitre 3). Cette base de données se compose de toutes les 
plaintes quotidiennes que les consommateurs britanniques ont apportées à l’ASA entre 2007-2010 
(environ 75 000 demandes) et  l’ensemble médiatique mondiale que l'ASA a reçu (environ 19 000 
articles au total). Le troisième essai concerne  un scandale impliquant la Serie A italienne en 2006, un 
événement connu sous le nom de Calciopoli. Ce scandale est utilisé comme une "expérience presque 
naturelle" pour analyser la façon avec laquelle les journaux vont changer leur évaluation après 
Calciopoli. 
 
Après chaque match, les journaux rapportent les épisodes cruciaux du jeu et ils évaluent les décisions 
des arbitres. Certaines décisions sont contestées et considérées comme des erreurs d'arbitrage; 
d'autres décisions ne sont pas contestées. En Italie, il ya trois quotidiens sportifs nationaux qui sont 
différenciés selon les équipes de Serie A. Par conséquent, ce cadre permet de mesurer un sectarisme 
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potentiel dans l'évaluation des journaux. La base de données se compose d'environ 12 000 épisodes 
sur quatre saisons de football. Les épisodes ont été codées manuellement an analysant presque 5000 
articles des media. En outre, la base de données contient également 20 variables pour chacun des 
1500 matchs joués. Chacune de ces variables montre une décision particulière de l'arbitre (par 
exemple, le nombre de penalty infligées dans un match. 
 
Essai 1: Vox Populi Vox Dei? Les plaintes des personnes sur la publicité inappropriée 
Le premier essai vise à combler la lacune de la recherche. Le contexte est le Royaume-Uni. Le 
nombre de plaintes de la population est un moyen d'analyser la réaction directe des personnes. En 
fait, toute personne de le Royaume-Uni peut faire une réclamation. Dans nos données, le 90% des 
plaintes provient de personnes différentes. Le premier essai étude  comme les décisions de l’Asa 
affectent les plaintes futures des personnes. Cet article propose deux mécanismes: la couverture 
médiatique de la décision et l'ambiguïté de la norme traitée. Le retentissement médiatique des 
décisions de l'ASA devrait avoir un effet positif sur le nombre de plaintes futures: plus de articles 
rapportent les décisions de l'ASA, et plus  est la probabilité que d'autres personnes connaissent le 
travail de l'ASA et sont donc enclins à faire d'autres plaintes. Au contraire, l'ambiguïté de la norme a 
un effet différent. Nous nous attendons à ce que l'ambiguïté de la norme modère la façon avec 
laquelle  les gens réagissent à la décision de l'ASA. Lorsque l'ASA décide d'interdire une publicité , 
nous nous attendons que le nombre de plaintes augmente plus lorsque les règles sont moins 
ambiguës (cas trompeuses), par rapport à quand les règles sont plus ambiguës (cas offensives ou 
nuisibles). Au contraire, lorsque la publicité est acquittée, nous nous attendons que le nombre de 
plaintes devrait augmenter moins quand les règles sont moins ambiguës (cas trompeurs),, par 
rapport à quand les règles sont plus ambiguës (cas offensives ou nuisibles). Les résultats confirment 
nos prédictions. 
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Essai 2: Quel est le prix de l'action à la réaction sociale de mauvaise organisation sociale ? 
Le deuxième essai utilise le même contexte du premier essai, mais se concentre sur la réaction des 
investisseurs. Dans cet essai, j’ analyse l'effet des décisions de l'ASA sur les prix des actions des 
sociétés visées. Dans la littérature, cet effet est connu comme Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). 
Comme l'ASA ne donne pas de sanctions pécuniaires, tout impact sur le prix des actions sera en 
raison de sanctions informelles. Ces sanctions sont hétérogènes entre les entreprises. Le deuxième 
essai contribue à combler la deuxième lacune de recherche essayant de comprendre les conditions 
qui augmentent ou diminuent le degré dans lequel  les entreprises sont pénalisée pour mauvaise 
conduite sociale (pas nécessairement illégale). L’essai propose trois mécanismes qui devraient 
augmenter les sanctions: (1) le retentissement médiatique de la décision; (2) l'ambiguïté des règles: 
alors que la norme est moins ambigüe, le prix des actions devrait être plus pas rapport à quand la 
norme est plus ambigüe (3) la localisation géographique de l'entreprise: les investisseurs devraient 
pénaliser les entreprises du Royaume-Uni dans une plus grande mesure par rapport aux entreprises 
étrangères. Les résultats ne confirment pas l'une de ces hypothèses. Ne pas obtenir de résultats 
statistiquement significatifs est tout aussi intéressant, surtout si on les compare avec les résultats du 
première essai. Cet essai laisse ouverte la question suivante: les investisseurs seraient plus enclins de 
vendre leurs actions si ils savaient que le peuple du Royaume-Uni augmente le nombre de plaintes 
après les nouvelles des décisions de l'ASA? 
 
Essai 3: Les scandales comme épisodes de désordre social et d’opportunité stratégique: 
comme les évaluations des journaux ont changé après Calciopoli 
La publicité suspendu est un exemple de mauvaise conduite légère: les conséquences peuvent être 
importantes, mais elles sont généralement limitée dans le temps et dans le lieu où l'action est 
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effectuée. Au contraire, les scandales sont des exemples de faute grave sociale qui obtient un grande 
retentissement médiatique. On s’agit des événements dramatiques qui peuvent avoir un plus 
profonde effect sur la société et son évolution (Adut, 2005, 2008). Le troisième essai traite ce thème. 
En particulier, il examine comment les évaluations de journaux changent après un scandale. Les 
évaluations concernent les comportements des arbitres. Les décisions des arbitres peuvent être 
controversées et sont souvent signalées et contestées par les journaux. Le troisième essai suppose 
que l'évaluation d'un journal dépend de trois facteurs: les caractéristiques sociales de l'arbitre (le 
status de l'arbitre et son expérience), l'ambiguïté de la législation actuelle, et l'identité de l'équipe (à 
savoir  si elle est local ou non). Il propose une théorie des scandales comme  troubles sociaux, qui 
ouvrent des opportunités stratégiques. On suppose que les scandales produisent un désavantage 
pour les arbitres d’un statut élevé et une avantage pour les nouveaux arbitres. En outre, on suppose 
que un scandale augmente le désaccord entre les journaux et exacerbe leur sectarisme envers les 
équipes locales. Les résultats prouvent ces hypothèses: le scandale de Calciopoli a punis les arbitres 
qui avaient un status plus élevé et ont aidé à stratifier le public (les évaluations des journaux sont 
devenus plus en désaccord). 
 
Principaux résultats et contribution 
Ma thèse examine comment l'évaluation d'un public influe sur l'évaluation d'un autre public. En 
particulier, il se concentre sur la relation entre l'évaluation d'un "agent de contrôle social" et 
comment cela affecte un autre public: les gens dans le premier essai, les investisseurs dans la second 
et les moyens de communication dans la troisième. Au cours des trois essais, trois mécanismes 
émergent: l'ambiguïté des règles, le retentissement médiatique et la proximité géographique. Les 
effets directs sont déjà très intéressantes: le retentissement médiatique augmente le nombre de 
plaintes, mais il n’a pas d’effet statistique sur l'évaluation des investisseurs (bien que la théorie 
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développée fournit un effet négatif). Enfin, les scandales affectent négativement les évaluations des 
journaux, augmentant le nombre d'incidents allégués aux arbitres. Bien que les effets directs sont 
intéressants, en effet sont les trois modérateurs qui développent des théories les plus existants. Tout 
d'abord, l'ambiguïté des règles influence négativement l'effet direct. Lorsque les règles sont plus 
ambigües, la mauvaise conduite sociale  est plus contestable; pour cela, l'effet négatif d'une mauvaise 
conduite sociale est plus doux. Deuxièmement, le retentissement  médiatique augmente l'effet d’une 
mauvaise conduite sociale. Lorsque la faute sociale a plus de résonance, plus de gens sont conscients 
et peuvent potentiellement la sanctionner. La troisième et dernière variable est de caractère local. Les 
normes sociales sont spécifiques à un contexte donné; par conséquent, l'endroit où elles sont violés 
et ceux qui les violent  sont  importants. La théorie développée dans le troisième chapitre prévoit 
que les sociétés cotées des actions en bourse au Royaume-Uni devraient être pénalisées pour 
mauvaise conduite sociale au Royaume-Uni plus que  les sociétés étrangères. C’est parce que une 
entreprise locale peut être considéré comme plus responsable et plus acteurs sociaux peuvent réagir. 
En effet, les seuls effets statistiques au chapitre 3 sont compatibles avec cette hypothèse. Toutefois, 
le chapitre 4 présente un point de vue opposé: les journaux deviennent plus fidèles à leurs équipes 
locales après des exemples de mauvais conduite. Le modèle de Adut (2005, 2008) apporte une 
solution à ce cadre apparemment contrasté. Les médias n’ ont pas été impliqués dans le scandale, 
mais ils étaient encore «contaminés» par le scandale en quelque façon. Pour cela, les journaux 
deviennent encore plus fidèles à leurs équipes locales et essayaient de les présenter sur une bonne 
lumière. Ces mécanismes nous aident à comprendre la manière dont les normes sociales influencent 
les organisations et la société. Basée sur ces résultats, ma thèse a proposé que les normes sociales 
sont mieux comprises quand considérées comme une triade: le candidat - l'agent de contrôle social - 
un autre public. Bien que l'évaluation de l'agent de contrôle social affecte les évaluations d'un autre 
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public, cette influence n’ est pas decisive et doit être étudiée. La figure 1 représente le structure 
globale de ma thèse. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
La littérature sur les évaluations sociales a surtout analysé un group candidat de public, laissant peu exploré que la 
voie de l'évaluation d'un public plus qualifié (par exemple au social-agent de contrôle) influe sur l'évaluation d'un 
autre public. 
La littérature sur la légitimité et sur la mauvaise conduite a étudié comportements qui contrevient aux valeurs et aux 
normes de la société, mais chaque approche présente des inconvénients. Par conséquent, les effets d’une 
mauvaise organisation sociale ne sont pas claires dans la littérature actuelle. 
MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Pourquoi le public change son évaluation suivant un Organizational Social Misconduct? 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Pourquoi il y a des entreprises 
pénalisées financièrement à un 
plus ou moins degré pour leur 
inconduite sociale? 
 
Pourquoi les medias changent les 
évaluations après un scandale? 
1. L'ambiguïté de la norme 
2. Saillance 
3. Le caractère local de la société 
 
1. L'ambiguïté de la norme 
2. Le caractère local 
3. Status des acteurs  
 
Investisseurs (Cotation de la bourse) 
 
Medias (les évaluation des journaux) 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Les investisseurs semblent ne pas 
pénaliser financièrement les 
entreprises qui font une faute 
sociale, laquelle  ne concernent 
pas les amendes directs. 
 
Les scandales créent des 
perturbations sociales et 
opportunité stratégique: 
a. cela crée une responsabilité de 
l'état pour les acteurs ; b. augmente 
le désaccord entre les journaux. 
  
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 En cas de mauvaise organisation sociale, l'évaluation d'un agent de contrôle social influence l'évaluation d'un autre 
public ; cependant, cet effet ne est pas mécanique. Les trois modérateurs primaires émergent  des trois essais: 
ambiguïté de la norme, saillance de l'événement et le caractère local des transgresseur. L'ambiguïté de la norme 
atténue l'effet négatif d'une mauvaise conduite sociale, tandis que la saillie il augmente.  
En revanche, le caractère local est ambivalente: elle peut augmenter ou atténuer. 
 
En résumé, cette thèse montre que les normes sociales sont mieux compris dans un cadre triadique: candidat - 
agent de contrôle social - un autre public. Les normes sociales ne sont pas définies de manière exogène, mais sont 
créés de façon endogène par les actions des candidats et les évaluations du (au moins)  public. 
.  
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Pourquoi les gens réagissent à une 
mauvaise organisation sociale, à un 
plus ou moins degré? 
 
1. L’ambiguité de la norme 
2. Saillance 
 
 
AUDIENCE (EVALUATION) 
Peuple (Plaints du peuple) 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
 Les gens augmentent plaintes sur les 
comportements des organisations: 
1. Lorsque la faute sociale est plus saillant. 
2. Lorsque la violation de la norme est 
moins ambigüe. 
 
AUDIENCE (EVALUATION) AUDIENCE (EVALUATION) 
MAIN MECHANISMS 
 
MAIN MECHANISMS MAIN MECHANISMS 
 
CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 
 
CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 
 
Figure 1 – Structure de la thése  
 
CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 
RESEARCH GAP 
 
RECHERCH  QUESTION PRINCIPALE 
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Social Evaluations in a Multiple-Audience Context:  
The Impact of Social Misconduct on People’s Complaints,  Share Price and Media Evaluation 
 
Abstract. Literature on social evaluations has mainly analyzed the “audience-candidate” dyad, 
leaving underexplored the way the evaluation of a main audience (e.g. a social-control agent) 
influences the evaluation of another audience. This dissertation looks at social evaluations in a 
multiple-audience context. It focuses on organizational social misconduct - an important, yet 
understudied social evaluation - and it investigates “Why does an audience change its evaluation 
following organizational social misconduct?”. Each of the three essays focuses on a different 
audience (evaluation): people (people’s complaints), investors (share price) and the media 
(newspapers’ evaluation). Two novel settings and unique databases were used: advertising self-
regulation in the UK and Calciopoli, the scandal that affected the Italian Serie A in 2006. Results 
show that in case of organizational social misconduct, the evaluation of a social control agent does 
influence the evaluation of another audience, however this effect is not mechanical. Three primary 
moderators emerge from the three essays: the ambiguity of the norm, the saliency of the event, and 
localness of the transgressors. In summary, this dissertation shows that social norms are better 
understood in a triadic framework: “candidate – social-control agent – another audience”. Social 
norms are not set exogenously, but are endogenously created by the actions of the candidates and 
the evaluations of (at least) two audiences.  
 
Keywords. Misconduct, legitimacy, norms, saliency, scandal 
 
 
Evaluations Sociales dans un Contexte d’Audiences Multiples: 
L’Impact de Comportements Condamnables sur les Plaintes, le Prix de l’Action et la Perception des Medias 
 
Résumé. Littérature sur l'évaluation sociale a principalement analysé la dyade “audience-candidat”, 
laissant La recherche sur les évaluations sociales s’est principalement focalisé sur la dyade “audience-
candidat”, sans s’intéresser à la façon dont l’audience principale (par exemple un agent exerçant un 
contrôle social)  influence l’évaluation d’une autre audience. Cette thèse explore la question des 
évaluations sociales dans un contexte d’audiences multiples. Elle se focalise sur les comportements 
organisationnels condamnables – une important forme d’évaluation sociale, pourtant en partie 
ignorée par la recherche – et pose la question suivante : “Pourquoi une audience change-t-elle son 
évaluation après un comportement organisationnel condamnable?”.  Les trois essais s’intéressent à 
une différente forme d’audience (ou d’évaluation) : les individus (plaintes), les investisseurs (prix de 
l’action) et les médias (évaluation de la presse écrite). Deux contextes novateurs et données uniques 
ont été utilisés : l’auto régulation du secteur de la publicité en Grande-Bretagne, et Calciopoli, le 
scandale qui a affecté la Série A en Italie en 2006. Les résultats montrent qu’en cas de comportement 
organisationnel condamnable, l’évaluation des agents de contrôle social influence l’évaluation d’autre 
audience, mais cet effet n’est pas mécanique. Trois modérateurs sont identifiés : l’ambiguïté de la 
norme, la proéminence de l’évènement, et à quel point les transgresseurs sont des acteurs locaux. En 
résumé, cette thèse montre que les normes sociales sont mieux comprises dans un cadre triadique : 
“candidat – agent de contrôle social – autre audience”. Les normes sociales ne sont pas exogènes, 
mais sont crées de manière endogène par les actions des candidats et les évaluations de deux 
audiences au moins. 
Mots clés. Comportement condamnable, la légitimité, les normes, la proéminence, scandale 
